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ABSTRACT 
 
Sacrificing Sovereignty: Bilateral Investment Treaties, International Arbitration, and the Quest for Capital 
(Under the direction of Thomas Oatley) 
 
 
This dissertation examines the phenomenon of bilateral investment treaties, or BITs.  Developing 
countries have increasingly turned to these treaties as a means of offering credible promises to foreign 
investors of favorable treatment, ostensibly in order to induce greater investment flows. My analysis is 
three-pronged.  First, I argue that only certain kinds of BITs are likely to have much of an effect on 
investment flows—namely, those that contain binding state pre-consents to investor-initiated arbitration.  
I present the first comprehensive analysis of the dispute-settlement content of existing treaties.  This 
data-collection effort informs the statistical analyses presented in later chapters.  Second, I argue that the 
willingness of developing countries to enter into BITs should depend in predictable ways on the partisan 
character of their governing elites.  I present results from a large-n statistical analysis that shows that 
partisanship indeed matters in predicting the likelihood that BITs will be embraced as a mechanism to 
attract foreign investment.  Finally, I present a large-n statistical analysis of the effectiveness of BITs at 
attracting additional foreign investment.  I find very limited evidence that strong BITs are of much use in 
the so-called “competition for capital”.  The finding is of great potential significance to developing 
countries, who have in the past appeared to blindly embrace BITs as a significant part of their 
development strategies.  My results suggest that while BITs may be likely to impose significant 
sovereignty costs on developing countries, they are unlikely to provide much in the way of off-setting 
benefits.  
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 CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Several years ago the journal International Organization (IO) devoted a special issue to the subject 
of the “legalization” of international relations.1  By legalization the authors meant that states have 
increasingly undertaken relatively precise, formal legal obligations toward each other, and that they have 
increasingly delegated authority to independent and neutral adjudicators to interpret those obligations 
when disputes as to the obligations’ content or application might arise.  The special issue was remarkable 
because for two decades international relations specialists had studiously avoided any significant 
discussion of the role that “law” as such might meaningfully play in independently and effectively 
constraining opportunistic state behavior.  Now many were saying that “legalization” held substantial 
promise to promote state compliance with international obligations, furthering mutually beneficial 
cooperation. 
 
In an important sense the discovery that international law might matter was hardly a discovery at 
all, but rather a quite logical and long overdue extension of two decades of work making a convincing 
case that “institutions”, variously labeled and distinguished as “regimes”, “principles”, “norms,” “rules”, 
and “decision-making procedures”2, might render the anarchical world stage a significantly less 
depressing place to find oneself than scholars of a more “realist” stripe tend to argue.3  And while the 
institutionalist literature has traditionally focused on informal “rules of the game”, the IO special issue 
signaled that formal institutions—and law, understood as the black-letter sort, tends to be the among the 
most formal—might deserve equal billing.
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 In that original IO discussion the rather specialized realm of international investment law was 
only briefly and incompletely covered.  To the extent that international relations theorists are interested in 
international law, that interest tends to run most inevitably toward topics of trade, regional integration, 
and human rights, and the IO special issue reflected that topical bias.  Yet ironically it is precisely in the 
realm of international investment law that the process of legalization is perhaps most advanced.  Bilateral 
investment treaties, or BITs, sit conspicuously at the forefront of the phenomenon.  It is this aspect of 
the phenomenon—the treaty-based legalization of international investment law—that this Article aims 
most generally to address.  For the uninitiated, a BIT is a treaty, generally between two countries (hence 
“bilateral”), in which each country promises to treat investors from the other country favorably (hence 
“investment).  It is often repeated that the first BIT was a 1959 treaty between Germany and Pakistan.  I 
show below that as a conceptual and factual matter this claim is highly problematic.  But it is sufficiently 
truthful to allow that year to serve as a very rough guide to the start of the BIT era.  What is clear is that 
since that time, and especially since the 1990s, BITs and their close equivalents (such as the investment 
chapters of multilateral free trade agreements like NAFTA) have multiplied exponentially, or nearly so.  
For example, UNCTAD calculates that there were less than 100 BITs in 1980; in 1999, there were over 
2000.4 
 
My precise focus is on the mechanisms by which international law, as codified in BITs and 
related international legal institutions, might be expected to effectively alter state incentives.  Scholars 
have traditionally distinguished the international legal regime from its domestic counterpart on the 
“fact”—the quotes indicating some doubt as to whether it is indeed any longer a (meaningful) fact—of 
the latter’s enjoyment of a reliable system for the coercive enforcement of legal obligations.  Should I 
refuse to pay my roofer for re-shingling my roof, he can sue me in state court for breach of contract.  
Should I refuse to pay the resulting judgment, he can summon the county marshal to seize my Toyota 
Camry, or seek a court order having my (meager) professorial wages garnisheed.  Quite frequently, on the 
international legal plane relations are subject to no sort of obligatory, binding judicial review of the 
 3
adequacy of performance.  And even when they are (as, say, by the International Court of Justice), 
resulting judgments are not directly enforceable, because there is no international equivalent of the 
county marshal empowered to impose meaningful penalties for continued intransigence.  This has led 
international law scholars to emphasize that international law typically matters only where an international 
legal obligation is “self-enforcing.”5    And self-enforcement is said to be most likely where breaking an 
international law reliably leads to “reputation costs” in the eyes of those observing the breach, and 
typically in the eyes of the party directly privy to the agreement.6 
 
Less fully recognized is how out of date the traditional distinction between domestic and 
international legal systems has become in the realm of international investment law.  BITs today routinely 
contain arbitration agreements in which states agree to allow foreign investors from the other state party 
to the treaty to sue for breaches of international investment law before international arbitral tribunals.  
And most importantly, many international investment arbitral awards are readily and coercively 
enforceable through domestic legal systems thanks to a network of international treaties that oblige 
domestic courts to recognize and enforce awards, even those rendered against states, in much the same 
manner as they recognize and enforce the judgments of other domestic courts. 
 
What this means for theory is that BITs provide us with a valuable means of testing the effects 
of different enforcement mechanisms on compliance with international law.  While the casual observer of 
the law might understandably assume that stronger (e.g. more coercive) enforcement mechanisms are 
better at promoting compliance (and thus at rendering international law effective), recent work in 
contract law has emphasized that there may be trade-offs of a negative sort when self-enforcing 
arrangements are transformed into coercively enforced ones.7  For example, in self-enforcing agreements 
the parties to the agreement, if they wish to continue to enjoy the gains from cooperating, have an 
incentive to work things out by informally altering their agreements to suit unforeseen changing 
conditions.  This suggests that self-enforcing agreements, in which reputation plays an important role in 
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promoting (and even in redefining) compliance on the fly, have the potentially salutary benefit of 
promoting relational flexibility, even if they make compliance with the original terms of the agreement 
somewhat less likely.  
 
On the other hand, coercively enforced agreements, especially where coercive enforcement may 
be initiated by a non-party to the original agreement, may promote strict compliance with the original 
terms of the agreement, but they may do so at the cost of increasing the rigidity of the relationship, and 
thus at encouraging breakdown (and litigation) rather than cooperative adjustment, even when 
cooperative adjustment may be much preferred by the original contractual parties. This is particularly a 
danger with BITs, which are interstate agreements which nonetheless often allow and encourage private 
parties (foreign investors) to police compliance with the original terms of the agreement through 
coercively enforceable international arbitration.  In more practical terms, the danger is that investors may 
successfully seek too much strict compliance, with “too much” compared against the yardstick of what 
the state parties to a particular BIT would have wanted, or to what reputational concerns alone would 
have adequately encouraged. 
 
 The difficult task, then, is determining when non-coercive enforcement of international law 
might be good enough (or perhaps even preferred), given its ability to promote a measure of compliance 
along with a measure of relational flexibility.  This is a question closely related to the growing literature on 
the “optimal design of treaties,”8 but it is also one that has so far largely defied empirical testing beyond a 
handful of clumsily constructed empirical examinations in the law review literature.9  BITs provide a 
fertile testing ground because not all BITs contain coercive enforcement arrangements.  Furthermore, 
there are a number of BIT-equivalent international legal instruments (such as association agreements 
between the European Union and applicant countries, as well as various “declarations” by the OECD) 
that make very BIT-like promises to investors but rely exclusively on self-enforcement to promote 
compliance.  Roughly speaking (but in actuality using the powerful tools of modern econometrics) we can 
 5
look at whether BITs of one type are better at promoting compliance with international investment law 
than the other. 
 
This simplistic description of the task at hand hides difficult conceptual questions, perhaps most 
importantly the question of how to measure “compliance,” especially when the meaning of compliance 
might be said to change in conjunction with the changing terms of a given relationship.  The answer is to 
look not at compliance directly (even if this were possible), but to look at the behavior of interested 
parties who can be trusted to evidence, by that behavior, their own views of whether something 
resembling compliance with international law is to be expected.  Less cryptically put, we can examine 
whether international legal promises to foreign investors vary in their apparent ability to change investor 
attitudes about the desirability of investing in particular countries.  We can examine those attitudes by 
looking at whether foreign investors tend to actually invest more in countries that have made coercively 
enforceable promises to treat investors favorably compared to those that have made no such promises, or 
to those that have made promises supported only by the host country’s good word. 
 
We can also extend the analysis a bit further afield to examine whether explicit, legalized 
promises are necessarily more effective than promises of a much more implicit and informal sort.  For 
example, Slaughter’s and Moravcsik’s influential “liberal” theories of international law and of state 
preference formation suggest that liberal democracies are more likely to uphold their international legal 
obligations than are other types of regimes.10  And both Jensen and Li have shown that democracies 
seem to perform better at attracting foreign investment than autocracies, suggesting that investors indeed 
view democracies as more likely to treat them “fairly and equitably”, as customary international law is said 
to require.11   We can begin to disentangle the effects of the implicit and largely non-enforceable promises 
inherent in a regime’s type from more explicit and more enforceable promises embodied in many BITs 
by examining whether the apparent empirical relationship between democracy and foreign investment 
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continues to hold once we take account of the presence of more self-consciously legal promises made to 
investors.  
 
 This dissertation’s contribution can be briefly summarized en gros: it attempts to take seriously 
recent contentions that international law “matters” by changing the incentives that states face, and thus 
that it can effectively constrain state behavior.   But unlike the work of international law optimists, like 
Slaughter, who argue that international law should be taken seriously primarily because of the 
internationalized process that generates the law,12 I argue that it is just as important, and probably more 
so, to take seriously differences in the formal content of international legal promises.  Where international 
legal promises are accompanied by coercive enforcement mechanisms, it is reasonable to assume that 
compliance and its tangible benefits will generally increase as well.  But if compliance does not increase 
by much, or if the expected benefits of compliance do not adequately materialize, then it also becomes 
reasonable to question whether the recent trend of including coercive dispute settlement provisions in 
investment treaties and other international legal instruments is necessarily worth the costs  that such 
provisions generally entail.  
 
 That BITs entail costs is becoming increasingly clear.  BITs can force states to abandon popular 
policy initiatives in the face of legal threats from foreign investors, or to reimburse investors for 
“damages” from policy actions, even when the policies are objectively necessary, and even when 
domestic businesses are not equally entitled to redress.13  They can also lead to serious political backlash 
if citizens view the treaties as unfairly favoring foreigners and perceive treaty-based arbitral awards as 
illegitimate intrusions on sovereignty.14  Argentina provides the most striking recent example of the 
potential costs of BITs.  In the wake of that country’s decision to float the Argentine peso in 2002 (a 
decision that in many respects seems clearly to have been one of “necessity” in the legal sense, and, as a 
practical matter, economically unavoidable) foreign companies filed more than 30 arbitral claims against 
Argentina, collectively seeking hundreds of millions of dollars in damages.15  These claims have so far 
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met with some measure of legal success.16  And in South Africa, the government’s “Black Economic 
Empowerment” regime has been challenged by an Italian mining company, which claims that the regime 
violates South Africa’s BIT-based promises to avoid uncompensated expropriation, discrimination, and 
just and fair treatment.  This has raised the fear that investment treaties may prevent, or make it 
prohibitively costly for, South Africa to effectively redress the lingering economic inequities of the 
apartheid era.     More generally, a recent informal survey of 23 investment treaty awards over the past 16 
years suggests that international arbitral tribunals have awarded investors nearly two billion dollars, not 
including interest and attorneys fees.17  These published awards and proceedings undoubtedly represent 
only the tip of a presumably large iceberg’s worth of host state policy proposals and actions that have 
been withdrawn or reversed under investor threat of international litigation. 
 
 The implications of the present analysis are thus of potentially great practical importance.  As 
international relations become more legalized, there is a correspondingly greater need to ensure that 
states do indeed adopt treaties of the “optimal” sort sooner rather than later.  Muddling one’s way to 
optimality is markedly less desirable than landing in an optimal spot on the first step.  Too many 
developing countries have blindly embraced the international legalization of their relationships with 
foreign investors without much evidence that legalization is all that beneficial or necessary, let alone 
optimal.  This dissertation tries to fill that gap by suggesting whether, and in what forms, it might be. 
 
 The analysis proceeds as follows.  Chapter Two reviews the history and logic of BITs, and 
presents the results of a descriptive exercise that attempts to classify BITs on the basis of the strength of 
their dispute settlement mechanisms.  This classification forms the empirical basis of the statistical 
analyses presented in later chapters.  Chapter Three develops and tests a partisan theory of BIT 
acceptance.  I show that leftist governments have historically been more averse than non-left 
governments to adopting strong BITs, but that by the 1990s this traditional (and expected) pattern had 
reversed as leftist government ideas about the relative value of BITs and of FDI changed.  Chapter Four 
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moves on to begin to address the question of whether BITs are effective at attracting FDI.  The Chapter 
focuses in particular on replicating (and critiquing) the most prominent extant study of BIT effectiveness, 
which claims to provide robust evidence that BITs lead to massive increases in FDI inflows.  Chapter 
Five extends the analysis of Chapter Four by presenting a statistical analysis of an original model of BIT 
effectiveness that shows that while BITs might have been effective at attracting FDI in an earlier era, 
there is very little evidence that they retain any significant ability to meaningfully influence investor 
decisions.  Chapter Six concludes. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE HISTORY & LOGIC OF BITS 
 
§ 2.1: Introduction 
 
Developing countries have historically viewed foreign investment with deep ambivalence.  As 
William L. Thorp, a United States Assistant Secretary of State, observed in 1948: 
 
As engineers and technicians we are more than welcome; our skills are eagerly sought; 
but as businessmen, as entrepreneurs, we are often not so welcome.  Sometimes we feel 
that at the same moment that our capital is sought, every obstacle is being put in the way 
of its use on a fair and equitable basis. 
 
Among the many complex reasons for this attitude is the feeling that the foreign 
investor is an ‘exploiter and not a contributor, that his interest is not in the local welfare, 
that his allegiance is to a distant stockholder, and that when he has won the highest 
return possible he and his enterprise will withdraw.1 
 
The history of developing country policies toward foreign investors reflects this ambivalence.  They seek, 
on the one hand, to encourage the “right kinds” of foreign investment while also attempting to maintain 
the ability to “control” it, to subjugate it to national development or regulatory priorities.    
 
 The level of ambivalence ebbs and flows with time, of course.  In some eras, where ambivalence 
shades into hostility, developing countries may emphasize subjugation over encouragement.  In other 
eras, where ambivalence shades into affection, systems of control may be dismantled in order to attract 
more investment through an improved “investment climate.” In this current era of seemingly relentless 
FDI promotion, FDI competition, and, perhaps not coincidentally, increasingly massive foreign capital 
flows, the idea of host state ambivalence toward foreign investment must seem rather strange.  But not so 
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long ago ambivalence, if not outright hostility, was the norm rather than the exception.  After World War 
II, and especially by the 1960s and early 1970s, analysts and policymakers in the Third World, and their 
sympathizers in the First, had pushed Argentine economist Raul Prebisch’s ideas about the plight of the 
economic “periphery” into a reasonably coherent set of propositions about the “dependency” of the 
Third World on the First.  One of the chief villains in dependencia thought was the multinational 
corporation, whose investments, if left unchecked, would perpetuate a “world system” in which the Third 
World would remain exploited and immiserated.  The overall mood was such that, by 1974, C. Fred 
Bergsten could plausibly claim that  
 
Virtually every country in the world... is levying increasingly stringent requirements on 
foreign firms... Few countries ask any longer the simplistic question: ‘Do we want 
foreign investment?’ The issue is how to get foreign investment on the terms which are 
best for them, and indeed how to use the power of the firms to promote their own 
national goals.2 
 
Bergsten went on to warn, not so accurately it turned out, that then-current ideas about the proper role 
of foreign investors in national development strategies would lead to “investment wars” in which host 
states would increasingly regulate and limit the activities of multinational corporations.3   
 
 Like most grandiose predictions, Bergsten’s was quite wrong.  What is so surprising is how 
quickly it was wrong.  By the early 1980s developing and developed countries alike were having serious 
second thoughts about the wisdom of restricting and controlling foreign investment. In a 1985 article, 
Encarnation and Wells documented the rise of “competition” for foreign investment among developing 
countries, in which the focus was increasingly on offering investment “incentives” rather than on 
imposing investment controls.4  And indeed, over the following years many developing countries began 
dismantling the elaborate systems of national control of foreign investment that had been painstakingly 
and painfully erected just a few years before. 
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 Either causally or coincidentally, the volume of worldwide foreign direct investment flows has 
increased by tremendous leaps and bounds.  The following two Figures illustrate the trend.  In real terms, 
and as of the year 2000, the worldwide annual volume of FDI inflows has increased by a factor of nearly 
48 from its 1970 level. 
Figure 2.1: Annual FDI Inflows, World vs. LDC 
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Figure 2.2: Annual FDI Outflows, World vs. LDC 
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The Figures taken together illustrate the well-observed fact that the vast majority of FDI takes 
place between the world’s richest countries, with relatively little going to the developing world, and hardly 
any originating from it.  (The apparent difference in total volume of world inflows illustrated in Figure 
2.1 and world outflows in Figure 2.2 is an artifact of the fact that Figure 2.1 relies on statistics compiled 
by the World Bank, while Figure 2.2 relies on statistics compiled by UNCTAD).  For example, over the 
1990s approximately ¼ of total world FDI inflows went to less-developed countries, or LDCs, with the 
rest going to (and an even higher percentage coming from) the developed world.  But in absolute terms 
the increase in FDI flows to LDCs remains quite impressive.  For example, annual inflows to LDCs 
increased by a factor of almost 18 over the period 1970-2000.5  
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 From a formal policy perspective, the most observable and in some ways the most striking 
aspect of the widespread change of heart regarding the value of FDI has been the diffusion of bilateral 
investment treaties as an important means of attracting foreign capital.  The solid line in Figure 2.03, 
below, shows the cumulative number of new BITs signed over the years 1970s-2001.  The dashed line 
shows the numbed of new BITs signed annually.  I discuss the mechanics of counting BITs in much 
more detail in the following Sections of this Chapter, but for the moment I should point out that the 
count illustrated below includes only those BITs signed between the top 18 capital-exporting countries 
(the United States, France, and so on) and the remaining capital-importing countries.  If we were to 
include investment treaties signed between pairs of capital-importing countries, the count would be 
approximately twice as high.6 
 
Figure 2.3: Cumulative and Annual Count of BITs Signed between Major Capital-Exporting and 
Capital-Importing Countries, 1970-2001 
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 At least since Fatorous’s exceptionally useful 1962 study of “Government Guarantees to Foreign 
Investors”,7 it has been suggested that the primary problem facing would-be foreign investors is the 
problem of effectively guaranteeing the investor that the host state will not act opportunistically once the 
investment has been sunk.  This problem has been described as one of “obsolescing bargain” in the 
business-school literature of the 1970s,8 and as one of “credible commitment” in the transaction-cost-
economics literature of the 1980s, which is most closely associated with Williamson.9  It is not simply a 
problem for foreign investors.  It is also a problem for host states that desire foreign investment.  The 
host state that is unable to convince investors that it will not unduly interfere with the investment’s 
profitability post-establishment will presumably be denied needed investment, or will have to pay a risk 
premium for it.  It is widely argued that BITs are appropriate and potentially quite effective solutions to 
the obsolescing bargain/credible commitment problem because they allow developing countries to use 
international law to make more credible promises that their “bargains” with foreign investors will not 
obsolesce.  This is the standard story, and it is one that is widely echoed by analysts interested in 
explaining why states sign BITs,10 by those interested in exploring whether BITs succeed in encouraging 
foreign direct investment (FDI),11 and by those interested in studying the doctrinal evolution of BITs.12 
 
 In the Sections that follow I make two principle claims.  First, I argue that while some BITs have 
the meaningful potential to act as credible commitment devices, they are not uniform in their ability to do 
so.  In particular, BITs that lack guaranteed access to investor-initiated arbitration have little theoretical 
potential to meaningfully circumscribe host state incentives to treat investors poorly. Second, I argue that 
BITs are by no means unique in their ability, such as it is, to function as effective credible commitment 
devices.  BITs are typically assumed to fill a large hole in the international institutional infrastructure, 
broadly construed, that protects investors. In fact, and as I show, investors and investment-seeking states 
have long had the ability, through alternative informal and formal means, to reasonably secure the 
property rights of foreign investors.  BITs add very little to what was already on the “credible 
commitment” table, and as such we should be very suspicious of theoretical claims that BITs will 
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necessarily lead to great rather than marginal increases in investor confidence and, ultimately, in 
investment flows. 
 
I make these claims within the context of an extended critique of the tendency of empirical BIT 
scholars to uncritically rely on a list of BITs drawn up by UNCTAD. UNCTAD has long taken a role in 
promoting BITs, and in the year 2000 the organization published what was intended to be a 
comprehensive, chronological listing of the treaties, updating two earlier such compendia.13  The central 
thrust of my critique is that the persuasiveness—or what might be called the internal validity—of 
empirical tests of the credible commitment thesis necessarily depends in significant part on whether the 
analysts (and by direct implication, UNCTAD) have accurately and comprehensively identified the 
relevant instances of “credible commitment” that are theoretically likely to provide the particular host 
state involved with a competitive advantage at attracting foreign capital.  The argument is modest, but not 
unimportant. Quasi-experimental statistical studies of investment treaties are by design intended to 
confirm or disconfirm theoretical expectations through the identification of empirical correlations 
between key variables.  As the old saw goes, correlation does not equal causation, and whether the former 
really does confirm the latter depends in part on the internal validity of the particular study, and 
particularly on the study’s measurements of the underlying theoretical concepts.  In other words, a study 
may be usefully described as internally valid if we can have confidence that the researcher has isolated the 
true cause of any observed correlation.14  Whether confidence is warranted depends in turn on whether 
the study’s measurement techniques are accurate in the sense of correctly identifying the phenomena of 
theoretical interest, and complete in the sense of controlling for plausible alternative explanations.15   Of 
course, whether a particular study of BITs is internally valid necessarily depends on what the study is 
attempting to explain, and it is perfectly conceivable that UNCTAD’s list of BITs might be appropriate 
or adequate for certain research questions.  But for the research questions that most BIT analysts seem 
interested in asking, the list is problematic.  I conclude, in short, that BIT analysts need to do a much 
better job then they have so far done of convincingly “linking [their] abstract concepts to empirical 
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indicators” of those concepts.16  Until they do, credible commitment stories of the causes and 
consequences of BITs will remain far less persuasive than it otherwise might be. 
 
§ 2.2 BITs and Self-Enforcement 
 
BITs are typically understood, most basically, as serving two functions. On the one hand, the 
treaties provide states with a means of making what might be called “substantive” promises to treat 
investors well.  On the other hand, they can provide states with a means of making those substantive 
promises more credible.  One of the first conceptual concerns of any BIT analyst should be whether the 
treaties identified by UNCTAD are sufficiently similar in terms of both the favorableness of the 
substantive promises extended to investors and the credibility of those promises.  The potential value of a 
given treaty to an investor will naturally depend on the values taken by these two logically separate 
parameters. A treaty that advances wholly credible but relatively stingy substantive promises is not 
necessarily more valuable to the investor than less credible promises of significantly more favorable 
treatment.   
 
BIT analysts commonly assume that the treaties’ substantive promises are indeed equivalently 
favorable, and that these equally favorable promises are identically credible.  The first assumption is, with 
one major exception, not an entirely unreasonable one.  The second assumption can be highly 
problematic.   
 
Most BITs mimic, at least in broad strokes, the OECD’s 1967 Draft Convention on the 
Protection of Foreign Property, and the language used and the subjects covered in the various treaties can 
appear remarkably similar, both over time and across countries.  For example, capital exporting states 
have long been “preoccup[ied]” with convincing host states to provide certain generally applicable 
standards of treatment for established investments.17  BITs accordingly, and largely to a tee, promise that 
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investors shall be “treated” in any number of imperfectly distinguishable ways.  The most common 
examples include promises of “non-discriminatory” treatment; treatment that is not “unreasonable” or 
“arbitrary”; “fair and equitable” treatment; treatment including “full protection and security”; treatment 
as favorable as provided to domestic investors (“national treatment”); and “most-favored-nation” (MFN) 
treatment.  Investors have also long been concerned with maintaining their ability to repatriate 
investment proceeds out of the host country, and with receiving compensation in the event that their 
property is expropriated.  Most BITs unsurprisingly contain somewhat more specific guarantees as to 
both subjects. 
 
This set of promises form what might usefully be called the “substantive core” of modern BITs, 
and they are what begin to make it possible to analyze the treaties as a conceptually cohesive group.  That 
task is made easier by the widespread promise of MFN treatment. A promise of MFN treatment means 
that when a host state offers more favorable substantive promises to investors in a later BIT, those more 
favorable promises will automatically apply to investors covered by the first, less favorable BIT.  The 
ubiquity of the MFN clause also makes it a largely useless and virtually impossible task for the analyst to 
construct any sort of index of the relative substantive favorableness of the various treaties, just as it can 
make it rather difficult for an investor to determine just what exactly he has been promised.18 
 
United States BITs provide the principle exception to this general rule of substantive sameness.  
The point is a small one, and tangential to the larger argument, but it is worth emphasizing that U.S. 
BITs, unlike the BITs of other capital-exporting countries, consistently extend promises of favorable 
treatment to investors at the “pre-establishment” stage of the investment process.19  Generally, this 
means that host states that enter into BITs with the U.S. promise to allow investors to enter the country 
and make an investment under the same procedures and on the same terms as domestic investors—a 
significant relinquishment of a host state’s well-recognized (and for much of history jealously guarded) 
sovereign right to exert largely absolute control over the entry of foreigners.  And because promises of 
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MFN treatment usually apply only to post-establishment phases of the investment process, this 
particularly liberal aspect of the U.S. treaties is not incorporated by reference into the treaties of other 
capital-exporting countries.  Analysts, and especially those interested in the effects of BITs on FDI flows, 
will necessarily have to adjust the conceptual “weight” of the value of signing or ratifying a U.S. BIT 
versus signing or ratifying a BIT with another state. Signing a U.S. bit represents a substantively different 
commitment than signing a BIT with a European capital-exporting state. 
 
 The larger point, however, is that BIT promises, even if we assume them to be equally favorable, 
are not equally credible. To see why, note that the idea that BITs have the capacity to function as credible 
commitment devices implies that something about the treaties makes it particularly unattractive—e.g. 
costly – for states to renege on favorable promises to investors. It has long been argued that in some 
instances treaty-based promises may be “self-enforcing” in the sense that a breach of the treaty will lead 
“automatically” or nearly so to the imposition of significant costs on the breaching state.20  In most cases 
those costs will be of the reputational sort.21  Third parties will observe the breach and update their 
beliefs about the breaching state’s willingness to honor its commitments.  In the case of foreign 
investment, the host state that breaches an investment treaty can expect perceptions of its investment 
climate to worsen, making it more difficult for the state to attract desired investment in the future.  The 
prudent host state will thus weigh the short-term benefits of breaching the treaty (say, for example, the 
domestic political benefits of seizing a foreign-owned mining operation) against the long-term costs of 
forgone future foreign capital. 
 
 It is very difficult to argue, however, that the substantive promises contained in BITs are 
meaningfully self-enforcing.  The difficulty arises from the fact that these core substantive promises are 
extended as relatively vague standards, and what the promises of favorable treatment actually mean or 
how they will apply in a given instance can be highly uncertain.  This is particularly the case for the 
treaties’ generally applicable standards of treatment, which have been described as “otiose” and “vague 
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and open to different interpretations”22 or as “offer[ing only] a general point of departure in formulating 
an argument that the foreign investor has not been well treated.”23 
 
Even where the promise is relatively specific, such that in theory an observer might be able to tell 
with a reasonable degree of confidence and without too much effort that if fact “X” has occurred then 
promise “Y” will have been breached, whether fact “X” has indeed occurred will often be both highly 
contestable and highly contested.  For example, the common guarantee of “prompt, adequate, and 
effective” compensation in the event of expropriation can be surprisingly difficult to implement to 
particular facts.24  And hiding behind even that modestly specific rule of law lurk immensely important 
legal questions, such as the proper application of expropriation law to “normal” government regulatory 
activity.  That particular question is left almost completely unaddressed in most treaties and remains far 
from settled theoretically or jurisprudentially, creating enormous legal uncertainty and fostering a growing 
political backlash against investment treaties.25 
 
This means that in most foreign investment disputes, save the most obvious and egregious, it will 
be quite difficult for the parties to the dispute or for outside observers to determine whether or not a 
breach of a given promise has objectively occurred.  It is even difficult for international arbitral tribunals 
to consistently construe and apply BIT promises.26  And where a breach is not easily identified either 
because of legal or factual uncertainty, reputational concerns are unlikely to dissuade the state from acting 
in ways that might objectively be considered contrary to its treaty or other international legal promises.27  
The investor, of course, is sure to claim the treaty has been violated, but the investor’s self-serving 
rhetoric, like the host state’s own, should not be counted upon to reflect the true state of affairs, 
especially where it simply isn’t certain what a particular promise actually means.28 
 
It is worthwhile to briefly address in the current context Guzman’s more general argument 
(though one that he has also applied specifically to international investment law) that treaties are “[t]he 
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most formal and reliable international commitment” in large part because they “represent clear and well-
defined obligations of states.”29  The real question is “in comparison to what”, and the “what” in 
Guzman’s analysis is, for the most part, customary international law.  It would be misguided to argue that 
BITs offer no improvement over customary international in terms of what might be called the 
“international legal coverage” of investment issues. BITs typically contain many promises that simply 
have never been incorporated (or never claimed to have been incorporated) into customary international 
law: promises to permit investors to transfer funds out of the host country, promises of MFN treatment, 
promises to recognize the subrogation rights of home states, promises to restrain from imposing 
performance requirements on investors, and so on.  But in an absolute sense, and as I have already 
argued, these additional promises are typically framed in language that is far from clear and precise.  And 
in a relative sense, it is quite difficult to argue that customary law was less clear.  Indeed, it is perfectly 
clear that custom has nothing to say on these topics, and that whatever obligations might exist would 
necessarily have to derive from other sources, such as municipal law or investment contracts. 
 
Even where BITs do treat topics traditionally covered by customary international law (such as 
expropriation), the treaties typically add little in the way of meaningful additional content, clarity, or 
precision.  Indeed, the United States argues that the most important treaty promises, such as those 
requiring “prompt, adequate, and effective” compensation or those requiring “fair and equitable” 
treatment or “full protection and security”, merely incorporate by reference the same protections that 
were already available under custom.30  The position is not unreasonable.  UNCTAD agrees that “[m]ost 
[BITs] tend to restate traditional principles of customary international law with respect to the treatment 
of foreign property abroad.”31 
 
The fundamental issue, then, is one of distinguishing between the existence of an obligation and 
its clarity of meaning or application.  BITs certainly commit host states to something.  That something 
appears to be largely investor-friendly, but what exactly the obligation will entail in particular cases can be 
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quite obscure.  For that reason, it is not theoretically plausible to consider investment treaties’ core 
substantive promises to be meaningfully “credible” in and of themselves.  Indeed, there is good reason to 
suspect that investment treaties, by making broad and vague promises to indiscriminate classes of 
investors, may make disputes even more likely. 
 
§ 2.3 BITs, Credible Commitment, and the Role of Arbitration 
 
What is theoretically necessary to render BIT promises meaningfully credible is investor access to 
authoritative adjudication.  As North has argued, effective institutional solutions to the credible 
commitment problem entail “not only creating the formal rules but creating and implementing a judicial 
system that will impartially enforce such rules.”32  It is through adjudication that vague standards of 
treatment are given useful legal content,33 and that inevitable factual disputes are resolved.  And access to 
international arbitration, as opposed to access to municipal courts in the host state, is essential because 
investors typically assume that municipal courts in developing countries will lack the technical 
competence or neutrality to adequately and fairly resolve investment disputes.34  Wälde’s recent and quite 
forceful statement of the point is worth quoting at length: 
 
It is the ability to access a tribunal outside the sway of the Host State which is the 
principal advantage of a modern investment treaty.  This advantage is much more significant 
than the applicability to the dispute of substantive international law rules.  The remedy trumps in 
terms of practical effectiveness the definition of the right. 
 
… 
 
The effectiveness of substantive rights is everywhere – but nowhere more so than in 
investment disputes – linked to the availability of an effective enforcement (i.e. independent) 
enforcement procedure.  This link is so close that the best way to emasculate an investor’s right 
against a host State is to sever the link between an international-law-based right and an 
international enforcement procedure and to compel the investor to seek justice before domestic 
courts.  Right and procedural remedy are, in practical and effective terms, one.35  
 
The benefits of authoritative interpretation are twofold.  Most immediately, an investor in possession of a 
favorable international arbitral award has the very real ability to enforce the terms of the award even in the 
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face of continued host-state resistance.  This is because a network of important international treaties, including 
most prominently the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards and the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States (the ICSID Convention), empower investors to seek award enforcement against host state 
property located in third-party states.36  For example, the New York Convention requires the courts of 
contracting states to enforce international arbitral awards unless one of several relatively strict conditions 
are met.  The New York Convention currently has well over 100 member-states and is widely viewed as 
the most successful treaty of its kind, as it has encouraged national courts to give far greater deference to 
international arbitral awards than they did in the past.  The ICSID Convention creates a specialized 
international arbitral institution, situated within the World Bank and designed exclusively to mediate and 
decide investment disputes between foreign investors and host states.  The ICSID Convention currently 
has over 150 signatories, and the terms of the Convention obligate the domestic courts of those 
contracting states to enforce ICSID awards as if they were final judgments by a domestic court, with no 
possibility of collateral attack.  These treaty-based judgment-enforcement provisions are far from 
worthless.  To cite just one recent example, a German investor who won an investment treaty award 
against the Russian government has been able to enforce the award by seizing “a $40 million Russian-
owned apartment complex in Cologne that once served as the local KGB outpost.”37   
 
 More abstractly, but perhaps even more importantly, authoritative, impartial arbitration awards 
have the tremendous potential to increase the reputation costs of the host state’s breach by publicly 
clarifying both the facts surrounding the dispute and the content of the relevant legal rules, and by 
applying those facts to the rules.  While it is true that most arbitral awards are “confidential” in the sense 
that they are not regularly published by the tribunals themselves, there is a very real possibility that an 
investor possessing a favorable award will circulate it widely among his fellow investors in the event that 
the host state attempts to avoid respecting it. 
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 The problem for BIT analysts is that not all BITs provide access to international arbitration, or 
provide it comprehensively, or provide it with absolute certainty.  These extremely important differences 
in “procedural” (or perhaps more properly “remedial”) content suggest that BITs, as potential credible 
commitment devices, are not created equal, and that some treaties are likely to have far less value to 
investors than others.  
 
 Let me add an important caveat.  The basic argument—that procedural distinctions matter 
conceptually—is premised on the assumption that an MFN clause in a investment treaty that does not 
contain an effective, comprehensive pre-consent to arbitration cannot be used to take advantage of a pre-
consent provided in another treaty. This is admittedly a “delicate” question currently subject to 
substantial debate38, but the limited jurisprudence on the issue suggests that arbitral tribunals are very 
unlikely to premise jurisdiction on an MFN clause where the treaty otherwise provides the investor with 
no right to unilaterally initiate arbitration as to the particular dispute at hand.39 
 
 Figure 2.4, below, illustrates the results of a comprehensive analysis of the investor-state dispute 
settlement provisions (or lack thereof) in the BITs or BIT-like FCNs of 18 of the most important capital-
exporting states: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States.  Historically these states have supplied between 84 and 99 percent of annual world FDI flows over 
the past 30-some years.40  (The numbers are for the years 1993 and 1970 respectively).  And when share 
of FDI outflows is considered on an annual basis, the identity of the top countries remains remarkably 
stable; only those countries at the very bottom of the ranking, such as Austria, tend to fall in or out of the 
top 18 in any given year.   
 
 I obtained full-text copies of the various treaties, and where possible I evaluated each treaty’s 
content in its official language or as professionally translated by the United Nations.  Where a treaty was 
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available only in a language which I do not read (in nearly all cases Italian or German) I had a native 
speaker evaluate or translate the relevant passages.   Drawing heavily on Schreuer’s authoritative 
discussion of the topic,41 I placed each treaty each of the four categories described immediately below.  
The texts of many of the treaties are available on either on UNCTAD’s website or in the Oceana 
Publications Inc. looseleaf series “Investment Treaties.”  But neither source independently or jointly 
provides a universally comprehensive selection of treaties.  Where a treaty was not available in either 
source, I was typically able to locate a copy by contacting the relevant home country foreign ministry.  
But in seven instances I was unable to obtain a full text of the relevant treaty, despite repeated contacts 
with the appropriate foreign officials.  In each of these seven cases I evaluated the treaty as containing an 
effective and comprehensive pre-consent based on each treaty partner’s contemporaneous BIT practice, 
though in truth the evaluation is at best an educated guess.  The full texts of investment treaties between 
pairs of developing countries are available on a very spotty basis.  It is mainly for that reason that I do 
not include developing country BITs in this Dissertation’s analysis. 
 
 I should also caution that I only code the dispute settlement provisions of treaties that have 
entered into force, and that the statistical analyses that follow in later chapters also rely primarily on 
treaties that are in force and not merely signed.  This focus contrasts with the overriding tendency of 
most other empirical BIT analysts, who count the presence or absence of BITs on the basis of dates of 
signature rather than dates of entry into force, and who do not take into account whether a signed BIT is 
in fact eventually ratified by both parties. 
 
 I focus on treaties that have entered into force mainly for practical reasons, but there are also 
good theoretical reasons for doing so. As a practical matter, it can be difficult or impossible for the 
analyst to determine whether a signed treaty that has not entered into force actually exists, and if it exists, 
what it might contain.  States supply copies of their treaties to the United Nations for publication in the 
United Nations Treaty Series very haphazardly and only after entry into force (and sometimes long after 
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entry into force).  States also tend to publish the texts of treaties in their national legislative gazettes only 
after ratification.  Only very recently have capital exporting states, but rarely developing countries, begun 
to post reasonably up-to-date, comprehensive and accessible lists of their BITs online.  And even in these 
fortunate cases, links to treaty texts may not be provided, especially if the treaty is not yet ratified or in 
force. 
 
More theoretically, it would seem quite relevant for purposes of credible commitment that, as a 
formal legal matter, a signed treaty that has not entered into force commits the host state to nothing of value to 
the investor.  Almost all investment treaties are subject to ratification procedures by one or both parties, 
and the treaties almost always explicitly provide that they will not enter into force until some short period 
after those domestic procedures are fulfilled and the ratified documents have been formally exchanged or 
deposited.  The act of signing the treaty neither creates an obligation to ratify the instrument nor 
establishes the signing parties’ consent to be bound by the treaty.42  Where a treaty has failed to enter into 
force, neither the substantive nor procedural provisions contained therein will likely have any legal force.  
Most critically for the foreign investor, arbitral tribunals are highly unlikely to accept jurisdiction on the 
basis of a treaty-based state pre-consent where the treaty has only been signed.43 Even where a BIT 
eventually does enter into force, the treaties almost always specify that disputes arising prior to entry into 
force do not benefit from treaty protections. 
 
This is not merely an academic point.  Most investment treaties are ultimately ratified and do 
enter into force, but some do so only after long delays, and some not at all.  Brazil, perhaps Latin 
America’s greatest success story in terms of attracting FDI, has signed 14 BITs as counted by UNCTAD, 
but ratified none.  None of Colombia’s four UNCTAD-identified BITs has entered into force.  A 
number of United States BITs have also failed to enter into force, including the 1994 treaty with Russia. 
More generally, a recent UNCTAD study found that of 2,392 BITs signed by 2004, 674 had not entered 
into force; of those 674 treaties, more than 300 had been signed five or more years earlier.44  And only 
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44% of African BITs signed by 2004 had entered into force, a percentage significantly lower than the 
equivalent figures for other regions.45 
 
These are problematic truths for extant analyses that rely on credible commitment explanations, 
because the core idea of the credible commitment thesis is that investors are aware of the relevant 
treaties, reasonably view the treaties as formally committing host states to something of significant value 
to the investor, and take the presence of that formal commitment into account when making investment 
decisions.  In fact, there is slim direct evidence that investors have historically had any significant 
awareness of the existence or potential significance of treaties that have entered into force, let alone 
treaties that have merely been signed and which have no formal power of commitment.  For example, a 
small survey of business executives conducted in 1976 found that only 16 percent of respondents were 
“familiar” with ICSID, that only one quarter of that 16 percent felt that ICSID provided “adequate 
safeguards.”46 These results led the authors to conclude that ICSID needed to mount a major 
promotional campaign.  It is highly unlikely that investor awareness or appreciation of specific BITs was 
any higher.  I would wager it was strikingly lower.  Perhaps even more revealing is the title of a recent 
practitioner-oriented publication, “Arbitration under Bilateral Investment Teaties: An often overlooked 
tool,” which suggests that additional promotional efforts may still be needed.47   And while anecdotes 
should always be approached with extreme caution, my own informal conversations with practicing 
international lawyers suggest that BITs rarely enter into the investment-making process in any concrete 
and significant way, and that far more important are rather mundane considerations relating to what 
might be called the “ease of doing business.”  Along the same lines, an analyst at a major state-sponsored 
investment insurance agency told me that the impression of his agency colleagues was that, with the 
possible exception of investors in the oil and gas sectors, investors are often “unaware of or unfamiliar 
with BITs and their existence or lack thereof in their countries of interest.”  In short, the point is that it 
seems quite doubtful—though this is admittedly an assertion of opinion and not of fact—that the mere 
signing of a treaty is either a public or confidence-inspiring enough an event to decisively influence 
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investment decisions.48  It is of course true that in the last several years there has been an explosion of 
highly publicized investor-state arbitrations.49  The rise of litigation and its prominence in the major 
newspapers makes it likely that many more investors are aware of ICSID and BITs than they were just a 
few years ago.  Even if this is the case, however, it remains to be seen whether greater awareness 
decisively influences investment decisions.50 
 
 Comprehensive, Effective Pre-Consents.  BITs that have the greatest capacity to function as meaningful 
credible commitment devices are those that contain comprehensive, effective pre-consents to investor-
initiated arbitration.  In these truly “modern” treaties, each state agrees in advance of any particular 
dispute to allow future investors to unilaterally initiate arbitration in the event of an “investment dispute,” 
broadly defined, before particular arbitral tribunals.  These pre-consents can be very explicit, but they can 
also be implicit if still very clear in their implications.  For example, an explicit pre-consent might provide 
that “Each Contracting Party hereby consents to the submission of an investment dispute to international 
arbitration [as specified above].”51   Implicit pre-consents include those that contain “formulations to the 
effect that a dispute ‘shall be submitted’ to [arbitration] or that [the investor has] the right to initiate 
proceedings”.52  The German Model BIT provides a typical example: “If the divergency [sic] cannot be 
settled within six months…it shall, at the request of the [investor], be submitted for arbitration.  Unless 
the parties to the dispute agree otherwise, the divergency shall be submitted [to ICSID].”53 
 
ICSID is a very frequent beneficiary of investment treaty pre-consents,54 though investment 
treaties are also used to pre-consent to privately organized institutional arbitration, such as through the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), or to ad hoc arbitration.  I assume here that differences in 
the forum offered are largely immaterial.  The key point is that no matter what the forum, once a 
standing offer to arbitrate has been accepted by the investor, the host state will find it very difficult to 
convince the tribunal to decline to authoritatively decide the dispute.55  Arbitral tribunals tend to interpret 
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state offers to arbitrate generously,56 and given the very real possibility of an adverse default award,57 
states have an important incentive to participate in proceedings. 
 
 Limited, Effective Pre-Consents (“Partial Pre-Consents”).  A certain number of BITs contain pre-
consents of extremely limited scope.  These treaties typically involve a communist state, and offer the 
state’s consent to arbitrate only certain kinds of disputes – typically disputes over the amount of 
compensation due in cases of expropriation, and sometimes also including disputes over the freedom to 
transfer investments and proceeds out of the host state.  Left completely uncovered are disputes relating 
to the treaty’s other substantive promises.  The lacuna is conceptually significant for at least two reasons.  
First, and most importantly, BITs derive much of their credible commitment power from giving 
investors the ability to threaten the host state with litigation over the meaning and applicability of vague 
substantive promises, like “fair and equitable treatment,” in order to persuade the host state to abandon 
or avoid a wide range of potential actions adverse to the investor’s interests.58  Excluding the possibility 
of litigation over such matters removes the most important arrow from the investor’s quiver.  Second, 
while protecting against the threat of uncompensated expropriation was the principle concern of 
investors of an earlier era,59 today the risk of such expropriation, traditionally understood, is objectively 
slight.60  This suggests that treaties that only provide guaranteed access to arbitration for expropriation 
disputes fail to cover the most common, modern sources of investor-state tension.  And while it is 
difficult to say precisely how much less valuable these kinds of treaties are compared to those that offer 
investors comprehensive pre-consents, it is quite reasonable to presume that they are significantly less 
valuable. 
 
Promissory Pre-Consents.  It should be obvious that pre-consenting to investor-initiated, enforceable 
arbitration for a wide range of investment disputes risks seriously constraining a host state’s policy 
autonomy.  Presumably for that reason a number of states have sought to regulate their potential 
exposure to crippling adverse awards by offering investors carefully-tailored promises to consent to 
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arbitration rather than actual pre-consents. Article 11 of the 1982 Japan-Sri Lanka BIT provides an 
excellent example of a promissory pre-consent: “Each Contracting Party shall, at the request of the 
[investor], consent to submit any legal dispute … to…arbitration.”  Lest this distinction strike the reader 
as so much lawyerly hair-splitting, let me in defense follow Schreuer in suggesting that the difference 
between a consent and a promise to consent can be quite significant legally,61 and that a belief that BITs 
matter is typically a belief that law in all of its formal nuance matters.  The significance is this: when a 
state has promised to consent to arbitration in a treaty, a refusal to actually consent when the investor so 
demands is indeed a breach of the treaty under international law.  But in the face of such a refusal, no 
matter how illegal, an international arbitral tribunal will not exercise jurisdiction over the dispute, because 
arbitral jurisdiction always and necessarily depends on the actual consent of the parties.62  This much is 
quite clear.   Less clear is whether the reputational costs of breaching a promise to arbitrate will typically 
be so great that a promise to consent is for all practical purposes of as much value to the investor as an 
actual pre-consent.  My own sense, defensible but certainly debatable, is that a promise to consent is 
worth considerably less to the investor than an actual consent, because it leaves the investor wholly 
exposed in those instances where the host state sees the most benefit in ignoring its substantive 
obligations to the investor. 
 
No Pre-Consent.  Finally, many early BITs contain no investor-state dispute-settlement provisions 
whatsoever.  A handful of these early treaties contain mere hortatory expressions of a willingness to 
consider arbitration.  For example, the Netherlands-Yugoslavia BIT of 1976 provides that the host state 
“shall give sympathetic consideration to any request” by the investor to arbitrate a dispute.63 These kinds 
of treaties have no theoretical potential to credibly commit host states to treat investors favorably. 
 
I provide details of the coding exercise in the Appendix, which presents tables organized by 
capital-exporting country and lists each BIT or BIT-equivalent treaty coded for the present analysis.  The 
results of the coding exercise are presented more immediately below in summary graphical form. 
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Figure 2.4: Comparing UNCTAD’s Count of Signed, Undifferentiated BITs to BITs in Force, 
Differentiated by Dispute Settlement 
 
 
 
The solid gray line in Figure 2.4 shows the cumulative number of signed BITs through 1999 as 
listed on UNCTAD’s year 2000 list.  UNCTAD’s list contains a number of obvious errors and omissions 
which most empirical BIT analysts neither notice nor correct.  I leave these errors and omissions 
uncorrected in constructing UNCTAD’s count, but I correct them in constructing my own BIT counts.  
For example, UNCTAD erroneously includes a number of treaties that are not properly considered to be 
“BITs” because they do not contain the core substantive provisions discussed above.  Most notably, 
UNCTAD includes a number of conceptually distinct “investment guarantee treaties,” which apply 
largely or wholly to the capital-exporting states’ investment insurance programs, and a number of 
“establishment treaties” between France and its ex-colonies that relate to the creation of the Communauté 
Française d’Afrique (CFA) and which are essentially distinct in character and content from modern BITs .  
I have deleted those non-BIT treaties from my own count.   
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 UNCTAD’s list also inexplicably fails to include a relatively large number of Germany’s initial 
BITs, including treaties with Kenya, the Philippines, Ghana, Colombia, and Chile. This absence is 
puzzling because UNCTAD’s list does include other German BITs that failed to enter into force, such as 
its 1964 BIT with Ethiopia.  UNCTAD’s list also leaves out a BIT-equivalent 1964 “exchange of letters” 
between Germany and India. 64  I have included these missing German BITs in my own counts where 
conceptually appropriate. 
 
We see a steady rise in the number of signed BITs (beginning with Germany’s 1959 treaty with 
Pakistan) up until the late 1980s and early 1990s, with a fairly dramatic increase in the rate of new 
signings beginning about that time.  This general pattern has, of course, been well-documented by others.  
What makes Figure 2.4 interesting is its rather dramatic illustration of the extent to which the standard 
way of counting of BITs both misstates the timing of the BIT phenomenon, understood as a credible 
commitment phenomenon, and grossly overstates its importance, especially in the early years.  The solid 
dashed line shows the cumulative number of (1) in-force BITs that (2) contain comprehensive, effective 
pre-consents, through the year 2002. By these two criteria the BIT phenomenon did not begin until 1969, 
when a BIT between Italy and Chad, signed that same year, entered into force.  Furthermore, the rate of 
modern (e.g. strong) treaties entering into force remained remarkably low until the early 1990s.    
 
In order to better examine trends in the different kinds of BITs that are obscured by the scale of 
the previous figure, Figure 2.5, below, reproduces the disaggregated annual count of in-force BITs for the 
years 1967-2002 omitting the UNCTAD count of signed BITs. 
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Figure 2.5: Annual Number of BITs in Force, Disaggregated by Dispute Settlement 
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We see again that the BIT phenomenon, understood as a credible commitment phenomenon, by 
which I mean strong, in-force BITs, is primarily a phenomenon of the 1990s.  The majority of BITs in 
force until the early- to mid-1990s were weak BITs—those containing no trace of investor-state dispute 
settlement provisions—and BITs with highly imperfect such provisions.  Strong BITs, illustrated by the 
solid black line, did not become numerically important in a relative sense until approximately 1993.  
Furthermore, we see quite clearly that a large number of non-strong BITs remained in force over the 
1990s.   In 2002, for instance, 66 “partial pre-consent” treaties, which grant investors enforceable rights 
to arbitrate only a limited class of disputes, remained in force.  We also see that BITs with promissory 
pre-consents are relatively rare; in 2002 only 28 of these kinds of treaties were in force.  What the figures 
don’t show, however, is that particular capital-exporting states are especially prone to use them.  For 
example, six of Japan’s nine BITs contain promissory pre-consents, as do ten of Australia’s 18 BITs.  
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Australia’s BITs are very subtle in this regard.  They generally contain a comprehensive, effective pre-
consent to ad hoc arbitration, but only if Australia and its treaty partner have not joined the ICSID Convention.  
Where they both have done so, the ad hoc pre-consent becomes invalid, leaving the investor with the 
sole option of seeking ICSID arbitration.  But as to ICSID arbitration, each state party to the Australian 
treaties promises only that it “shall consent in writing to the submission of the dispute to the Centre 
within forty-five days of receiving such a request from the investor”—with the words “shall consent” 
indicating that the consent has not yet been given, but is only promised.65 
 
The take-away point from Figure 2.5 is that our understanding of the timing and extent of the 
BIT phenomenon depends crucially on whether we disaggregate BITs by dispute settlement procedures.  
Figure 2.6, below, considers this point in more detail for two particularly important cases: the BIT 
programs of France and Germany.  (The Dutch and Swiss BIT programs would show a similar pattern).  
France and Germany were at the forefront of the BIT phenomenon as UNCTAD identifies it, signing 
large numbers of treaties in the 1960s and 1970s, and historically both states have been very important 
sources of investment capital.  But few if any of these states’ early treaties contain comprehensive, 
effective pre-consents to arbitration.  (For clarity of presentation I have not included in Figure 2.6 French 
and German BITs that contain mere promissory pre-consents or pre-consents of limited scope; doing so 
adds only six BITs to either state’s count.)  Again, the impact of the exercise is relatively dramatic: 
Germany and France’s “modern” BIT programs appear far less ambitious than they are commonly 
portrayed to be; they also appear to have commenced far more recently than is typically appreciated.  It is 
particularly striking to note that German investors did not enjoy the protections of a modern BIT until 
1988, when Germany’s treaty with Nepal entered into force.  This is striking precisely because it is so 
often claimed that Germany initiated the BIT phenomenon, with the “success” of its early BIT program 
regarded with something approaching awe, envy, or both.  In fact, however, measured by the presence of 
comprehensive, effective pre-consents, Germany’s BIT program appears to be neither all that “first” nor 
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all that awesome.  Note that for the entire period of study, France had more modern BITs in force than 
did Germany. 
 
Figure 2.6: Comparing Counts of BITs in France & Germany 
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Figure 2.7, below, compares the annual number of LDCs with at least one strong BIT in force versus the 
annual number of LDCs with no strong BITs in force, beginning with the first strong BIT to enter into 
force, Chad’s 1969 treaty with Italy, which entered into force that same year.  The Figure provides further 
evidence that (strong) BITs did not become a numerically significant phenomenon until the late 1980s 
and early 1990s.  Until 1993, a majority of capital-importing states had not entered into a strong BIT with 
a major capital-exporting country.  But by the end of the sample (2002) we see that 117 out of 149 
developing countries—79 percent!—had at least one strong BIT in force. 
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Figure 2.7: LDCs with One Strong BIT In Force vs. No Strong BITs in Force 
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Differentiating BITs on the basis of dispute settlement provisions also has huge effects on what 
we might call the “effective” BIT count of particular capital-importing states.  Hungary, for instance, has 
been one of the most economically successful Eastern European states but has never bothered to update 
its 15 outmoded BITs, most of which it signed in the 1980s and all but one of which limit investors’ 
access to arbitration to expropriation-type disputes.  China’s 13 BITs also uniformly provide very limited 
pre-consents, a trend that has only just recently begun to change as China begins to anticipate relying on 
strong BITs to protect its own investments abroad, rather than primarily as a tool to attract inward 
investment.66 
 
What is the upshot of the argument so far?  UNCTAD’s list of BITs, by failing to account for 
key procedural differences in treaty content and entry into force, provides a conceptually inadequate 
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“count” of the degree to which states have credibly committed through bilateral treaties to treat investors 
well.  Disaggregating BITs by dispute settlement provisions, and counting only BITs that have entered 
into force, gives us a quite different picture of the chronology and scope of the BIT phenomenon, both 
generally and as to particular states. 
 
§ 2.4 Alternatives to BITs 
 
 Whatever the merits of the argument made in the previous Section, there are a number of other 
reasons to be extremely wary of the use of UNCTAD’s list for theoretically driven empirical inquiry of 
foreign investment policy.  These additional problems stems from UNCTAD’s focus on treaties that are 
bilateral and that deal exclusively with investment.  The italics indicate the three problems to be discussed 
below. 
 
 Multilateral Treaties as BIT Alternatives.  That an investment treaty is bilateral rather than 
multilateral has no relevance to the treaty’s potential value as a credible commitment device.  It is true 
that the most ambitious attempts to create investment treaties of world-wide scope have failed.67  But 
there are important multilateral success stories.  Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) is the most obvious example.  Other noteworthy examples include the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) 1987 “Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments”;68 the 1994 Colonia Protocol for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments 
in MERCOSUR;69 and Chapter 17 of the 1994 free trade agreement between Colombia, Venezuela, and 
Mexico.70  There is also the hugely important 1994 Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), a multilateral 
agreement regulating energy-sector investments, broadly defined, between over 50 states.71  Analysts are 
hard-pressed to justify the exclusion of these multilateral treaties from their samples, since it is beyond 
cavil that these treaties offer investors substantive and procedural promises that are formally and 
functionally equivalent to those provided in modern BITs. 
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There are more difficult cases.  Take, for example, the 1982 League of Arab States’ “Unified 
Agreement for the Investment of Arab Capital in the Arab States”, signed by 22 states and ratified by 
20.72  While the tone and content of this particular agreement are undeniably less investor-friendly than 
modern BITs, the treaty does offer investors (sometimes carefully hedged) promises of MFN and non-
discriminatory treatment, freedom to transfer investment proceeds, the right to “fair” compensation in 
the event of non-discriminatory expropriation, and the right to “compensation…equivalent to damages” 
in the event the host state breaches the treaty.   The treaty also offers investors the possibility of bringing 
suit against a breaching host state before the “Arab Investment Court”, a specialized dispute settlement 
body that came into being in 1988.  Whether the Unified Agreement should or should not be considered 
a BIT equivalent is a question that I need not answer definitively here; the larger point is that the careful 
analyst will need to (carefully) consider whether it should be counted as one for the particular analysis at 
hand. 
 
Incorporating multilateral investment agreements into extant analyses of BITs can present a 
number of other subtle considerations.  For example, several ASEAN members have signed BITs 
between themselves, both prior to and even after signing on to ASEAN’s BIT-like investment provisions.  
To cite just two cases, Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995, but had already signed BITs with Indonesia, 
Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines as of 1992.  Thailand, an original member of ASEAN, signed the 
1987 ASEAN investment agreement, yet subsequently signed BITs with the Philippines and Indonesia in 
1995 and 1998 respectively.  This practice raises a rather obvious potential problem of double-counting 
that must be taken into account before blindly adding an additional seven BITs to each ASEAN member 
country’s total count. 
 
Incorporating the ECT into extant analyses poses a particularly significant challenge, because 
unlike most BITs the ECT is a sector-specific agreement. An ECT between France and Poland is clearly 
 38
not of the same import as a BIT of general application between those two states, and the presence or 
absence of a sector-specific agreement like the ECT necessarily needs to be appropriately weighted.  The 
most obvious weighting scheme might consider the relative importance of the energy sector to the 
member states’ total potential supply of FDI. But whatever scheme is ultimately adopted, it is clear that 
weight of some sort should usually be given.  Because of the sheer number of countries that have bound 
themselves to it,73 ignoring the ECT’s existence should not be an option.  
 
 Commercial Treaties as Alternatives to BITs.  UNCTAD identifies a 1959 Germany-Pakistan 
treaty as the “first” BIT because the treaty is indeed the first to deal with investment-related issues both 
in a sustained way and exclusively and independently of other commercial issues.74  The claim that the 
Germany-Pakistan treaty is meaningfully considered to be the first BIT has been repeated by many 
others.  The conceptual problem is that exclusivity of subject matter is hardly sufficient to distinguish the 
Germany-Pakistan treaty from a host of other previous and contemporaneous “commercial” treaties.  
These treaties were often entered into under the label of “friendship, commerce, and navigation” or 
something similar, and provide investors with certain guarantees while also dealing in the same document 
with issues of more immediate concern to traders and ship captains. 
  
To appreciate the potential scope of the issue, note that the United States has negotiated FCN-
type treaties since the early days of the Republic.75  France, Germany,76 Japan,77 and the United 
Kingdom78 have pursued roughly similar commercial treaty programs.  The primary focus of the earliest 
commercial treaties was on regulating trading and merchant relations, with issues of interest primarily to 
investors covered only accidentally or incidentally.79  But over time the treaties became significantly more 
concerned with addressing investment-specific needs, and after World War II the United States 
concluded a series of 21 modern FCNs with a wide variety of developed and developing countries.80 One 
of the “major purpose[s]” of the post-war FCNs was to “to protect…investment abroad.”81  Many FCN-
type treaties are still in force, and they are occasionally invoked by or on behalf on investors before 
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municipal and international tribunals.82  Most importantly, the guarantees provided to investors in the 
FCNs are in many cases identical in form and substance to investment-only treaties.83 
 
 It is particularly instructive to compare the main investor-related provisions of the 1959 United 
States-Pakistan FCN with the Germany-Pakistan BIT from the same year, as Table 2.1 does below. 
 
Table 2.1: FCNs vs. BITs 
Subject 1959 U.S.-Pakistan FCN 1959 Germany-Pakistan BIT 
Preamble/Object 
& Purpose 
 
“encouraging mutually beneficial 
investments, promoting mutually 
advantageous commercial intercourse 
and otherwise establishing mutual rights 
and privileges” 
“Desiring to intensify economic co-
operation…, Intending to create 
favorable conditions for investments… 
promot[ing] investment, encourage[ing] 
private industrial and financial 
enterprise” 
General 
Standard of 
Treatment 
Treatment “no less favorable than other 
enterprises of whatever nationality 
engaged in similar activities” (Art. VII); 
freedom from “unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures” (Art. VI(3)); 
“the most constant protection and 
security” (Art. VI(1)). 
 
“non-discrimination” (Arts. 1(2) & 2); 
“protection and security” (Art. 3(1)). 
Expropriation Allowed only for “public purpose” and 
against “prompt payment of just 
compensation” that is “effectively 
realizable” (Art. VI(4)). 
Allowed only for “public benefit” and 
against “compensation” that is “actually 
realizable” and “equivalent of [sic] the 
investment affected” (Art. 3(2)). 
Transfers Freedom to transfer “funds” on national 
treatment or most favored nation basis 
(Art. XII(1)). 
Freedom to transfer “invested capital 
and returns” “without undue delay” and 
at “just and reasonable” rate of exchange 
(Arts. 4 & 6). 
Dispute 
Settlement (State-
State Only) 
 
 
Disputes between states “as to 
interpretation or application” subject to 
compulsory arbitration before the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Art. 
XXIII(2)). 
Disputes between states as to 
“interpretation or application” subject to 
compulsory ad hoc international 
arbitration (Art. 11). 
 
The similarities are undeniably striking, and the conclusion, I think, is unavoidable: if the Germany-Pakistan 
treaty is a conceptually relevant BIT, then the United States version must be considered one as well.   
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 The practical importance of this point will, of course, vary according to the particular analysis.  
Many of the United States’ post-war FCNs were concluded with what today are considered to be firmly 
“developed” countries: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, France, Japan, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
and the Netherlands.  Most analyses of the BIT phenomenon are primarily concerned with explaining the 
treaties’ causes and consequences only as to developing countries. That a potentially equivalent treaty 
might exist between developed countries is, in those circumstances, arguably irrelevant.   But the United 
States and several other capital-exporting states did sign BIT-like FCNs with a number of developing 
countries, and the failure of extant analyses to consider these FCNs as BIT-equivalent treaties is 
indefensible as long as the Germany-Pakistan BIT and others like it are also included in the analysis.  
Indeed, that UNCTAD’s exclusion of the United States-Pakistan FCN (and other equivalent post-war 
FCNs) is entirely arbitrary is best illustrated by the fact that UNCTAD’s list of BITs inexplicably includes 
a host of FCN-type commercial treaties concluded by Switzerland, France, and Sweden in the years 
immediately following 1959.  Why these treaties should be included on UNCTAD’s list, but not the 
United States-Pakistan FCN or others like it, is difficult to fathom. 
  
 How many BIT-like FCNs are at issue here?  Not a great number, but not an insignificant 
number either.  Table 2.2 lists the principle candidates for inclusion for four of the most important 
capital exporting countries.  All of the FCN treaties listed below contain something arguably 
approximating what I have defined as the “substantive core” of modern BITs and involve “developing 
countries” (or countries that might fairly have suffered the name until quite recently). 
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Table 2.2: BIT-Like FCNs between Major Capital-Exporting Countries and Developing 
Countries 
 
United States Japan Germany UK 
Ethiopia 
Haiti* 
Israel 
Iran 
Nicaragua* 
Oman 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Togo 
Vietnam 
Uruguay* 
Colombia* 
Argentina 
Cuba 
El Salvador 
India 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Philippines 
Singapore 
 
Dominican Rep.* 
 
Cameroon* 
Iran  
 
*Never entered into force or no longer appears to be in force 
 
 
 Other commercial treaties are worthy of consideration. I have not included them in Table 2.2 
because they emphasize investment-related issues to a significantly less degree than other FCN treaties.  
But this does not mean they are analytically irrelevant. Japan in particular entered into at least eight 
commercial treaties with Communist states that largely ignore investment but which nonetheless promise 
“nationals” and “legal persons engaged in business activities” MFN “treatment” in regard to their 
activities in the host state.  It is very likely that these MFN provisions operated (and, to the extent these 
treaties remain in force, continue to operate) to fully extend most substantive BIT promises to Japanese 
investors operating in those (ex)-Communist states. 
 
What to do about these largely BIT-equivalent FCNs?  The solution, I think, is to dispose of the 
FCN treaties on principled ground.  To the extent that the treaties fail to provide investors with 
guaranteed access to international arbitration (and all of them do) they should not be included in the 
analysis because they are not properly considered credible commitment devices of any significant 
potential.  But if that is indeed a supportable position, then many other early investment-only treaties, like 
the Germany-Pakistan example, should be dropped from the analysis as well. 
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It should also be emphasized that an analytic focus on investment-only treaties ignores the 
modern trend toward embedding significant investment provisions, including guaranteed investor access 
to international arbitration, within free trade agreements.  NAFTA’s Chapter 11 is the most well-known 
example, but a host of other multilateral and bilateral free trade agreements contain similar investment 
chapters. ASEAN and MERCOSUR have already been mentioned, but there are numerous other 
examples.  Mexico, for instance, has signed FTAs containing BIT-equivalent investment chapters with 
Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala,84 
none of which are found on UNCTAD’s list. 
 
Finally, note that commercial treaties, whether of the FCN or FTA type, are not the only multi-
subject treaty-based source of BIT-like guarantees to investors.  The best example is Protocol One of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which provides 
foreign investors with an explicit guarantee that they shall not suffer expropriation in violation of the 
“general principles of international law”85 and legally binds most of Western and Eastern Europe, as well 
as Russia and Turkey.  Other provisions of the ECHR and its associated protocols give covered “natural 
and legal persons” the right to bring enforcement actions against expropriating states before the 
European Court of Human Rights; the European Court of Justice can also decide investor-state property 
rights claims arising under Protocol One.86   That empirically minded BIT analysts have largely if not 
wholly failed to consider the European Convention as something approaching a BIT is quite 
troublesome. One of the central achievements of BITs is often said to be the reinforcement of customary 
international law principles of just compensation for expropriation.87  The European Convention does 
just that, and it does so on a remarkable scale. 
 
 Of course, many international treaties, and even some non-binding international agreements, 
contain provisions of potential relevance to foreign investors.  Among these, the General Agreement on 
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Trade in Services (GATS), the Treaty Establishing the European Community, and the OECD’s various 
Declarations and Codes on foreign investment88 stand out in particular, but there are many others of 
greater or lesser conceptual relevance, and of greater or lesser facial resemblance to the typical BIT.  Of 
significant potential importance are the various “Partnership and Cooperation Agreements” (PCA) that 
states wishing to accede to the European Union are required to sign and which typically contain 
provisions promising foreign investors certain rights of establishment, non-discriminatory treatment, 
freedom to transfer capital, hortatory calls to promote foreign investment and to improve the investment 
climate, and so on--all very BIT-like promises.89 
 
 Let me be clear that I am not arguing that these various non-BIT instruments should necessarily 
be “counted” as BIT equivalents in all studies.  But I do think it is important for analysts to consider in a 
much more careful and theoretically self-conscious manner the extent to which such instruments might 
make BIT commitments redundant or unnecessary as credible commitment devices.90  For example, a 
PCA with the European Union, combined with the property protection provisions of the European 
Convention, comes perilously close to providing exactly the same guarantees contained in many 
Communist-era BITs, and I think it is exceedingly hard to justify considering the latter treaties to be 
theoretically meaningful but not the former. 
 
I accordingly include BIT-equivalent commercial treaties, such as NAFTA, ASEAN, and the 
various FCNs, in the disaggregated counts of in-force BITs presented in the figures above and used in 
the statistical analyses in later chapters.  In those analyses I also separately control for membership in the 
most important of the other close BIT substitutes discussed above. 
 
 The Need to Consider Non-Treaty Means of Credible Commitment.  A study seeking to explain 
why people use umbrellas would surely be suspect if it ignored the possibility of foregoing umbrellas for 
raincoats or folded-up newspapers.  To say that individuals choose to use umbrellas because umbrellas 
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keep them dry begs the question of why they choose umbrellas and not rain slickers or the morning 
broadsheet.  The same goes for any study of the effectiveness of umbrellas at performing their task.  To 
conclude that umbrellas succeed in warding off wet clothes begs the question of whether success is to be 
measured in terms of the likely outcome of going out of the house unprotected or rain-coated.  
 
The problem is one of identifying the proper comparison.  Most BIT analysts seem to presume 
that the relevant comparison is indeed between going out in the world well-protected – e.g. protected by 
a BIT – or not protected at all.  This presumption is particularly evident in Guzman’s elaboration of his 
cartel theory of the reasons “why LDCs sign [BITs] that hurt them,”91 but it is a presumption implicit in 
other BIT studies too.  As presumptions go, this one is particularly unfounded.  Some reasons have 
already been mentioned but nonetheless bear repeating:  other kinds of treaties—multilateral rather than 
bilateral, commercial rather than investment-only—may contain provisions largely equivalent to those 
traditionally provided in BITs.  But it is also essential to realize that states can provide BIT-like 
guarantees, of both a substantive and procedural nature, through formal non-treaty instruments such as 
municipal law and individual investment contracts.  These treaty alternatives also have strong potential to 
function as substitute credible commitment devices. 
 
Municipal Law.  Take municipal law first.  Recall that BITs perform two logically separate 
functions – they are devices through which host states can extend favorable substantive promises, and 
through which host states can make those promises credible.  Non-specialists tend to assume that a host 
state’s decision to enter a BIT is necessarily a decision to significantly liberalize FDI policy – that is, that 
signing or ratifying a BIT is to extend to investors significantly more favorable substantive promises than 
were being offered to investors absent the BIT.  With the potential exception of U.S. BITs, which, as 
mentioned earlier in the Chapter, require national treatment at the pre-investment stage, this is simply not 
the case.  Most BITs do not require host states to accept more investment, nor do most BITs prevent 
host states from imposing burdensome performance requirements on investors as a condition of entry.  
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Instead, what might be called the “liberality” of a host state’s FDI regime is primarily determined by 
promises extended to investors through municipal law.  For example, municipal law defines which 
sectors of the economy are open to foreign investment and on what particular terms; it determines tax 
rates, the availability of investment incentives, and conditions of operation.  The vast bulk of what 
matters legally to foreign investors is supplied by municipal law, and indeed, this is unavoidable because 
BITs, as quite brief and general statements of the law applicable to investments of all types, are 
necessarily unable to provide investors or host states with a sufficiently detailed and self-contained legal 
regime.  It is unsurprising that for much of recent history investment “framework” laws have been the 
primary means both of promoting and controlling foreign investment in the developing world.92 
 
Municipal law is thus a necessary complement to BITs.  But municipal law can also provide the 
same substantive guarantees as BITs, and it can provide them much more broadly.  For example, domestic 
laws often contain fairly favorable rules concerning compensation for expropriation.  Domestic laws also 
frequently specify that foreign investors in most sectors shall enjoy “national treatment.”  Over the past 
decade host states have also used domestic law to greatly liberalize their capital accounts, allowing foreign 
investors much greater freedom to repatriate assets and income.93  And unlike BITs, which provide their 
guarantees only to investors from a single home state, municipal law guarantees are in principle extended 
to investors from the world over. 
 
From the investor’s perspective, of course, the main problem with municipal law is the relative 
ease with which the host state may be able to change the laws in adverse ways.  It is reasonable to 
presume that BITs might usefully serve to reduce state incentives to change municipal law in ways 
unfavorable to the foreign investor by providing causes of action for “regulatory takings” and the like.  
But the potential utility of BITs in this regard hardly means that favorable municipal law promises may 
not be made sufficiently credible by other means. 
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On the one hand, municipal law itself can make changes in the law formally difficult to achieve.  
This is particularly the case where, for instance, guarantees of compensation for expropriation are 
embedded in the national constitution, as they have been in most Latin American countries for some 
time.94  A more unusual example is provided by Greece, which in the past has used a special legal 
procedure to grant investment-related laws “special status” that constrained the government’s ability to 
amend the laws.95  On the other hand, host states can use municipal law to explicitly promise investors 
that the relevant legal regimes will remain stable as to their current investments.  Article 9 of Russia’s 
1999 Federal Law on Foreign Investment, which bears the unwieldy title of “Guarantees to Foreign 
Investors and Companies with Foreign Investment Against Unfavorable Changes in the Legislation of 
the Russian Federation”, is one particular example. 
 
I do not wish to lend any sort of magical power of commitment to a host state’s unilateral 
legislative declarations that foreign investors are welcome on such and such terms.  Bolivia’s very recent 
announcement of a “nationalization” of the assets of foreign-owned natural gas operations is a powerful 
reminder that in the law and politics of foreign investment what has gone around often comes around 
once again, and that a state that greatly values change in the status quo is unlikely to be dissuaded from 
vigorously pursuing it, though law or contract might inconveniently stand in the way.  That said, it is 
reasonable to presume that a state that has explicitly and publicly made pro-investor promises in an 
investment law will indeed be more likely to think twice about changing the regulatory regime in ways 
adverse to foreign investors than one that has not, even absent a binding commitment to international arbitration.  
In other words, our old friend “reputation” has a potentially great role to play here, especially if breaches 
of municipal law promises, because of their relative clarity of meaning and application, are more easily 
detectable than breaches of vague treaty law. 
 
Regardless of the role that reputation might or might not play in naturally stabilizing certain 
kinds of favorable municipal law promises, host states can also use municipal law to provide investors 
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with guaranteed access to international arbitration, where claims of unfair changes in the substantive 
domestic legal regime (or other claims) can be litigated.  Greece appears to be one of the earliest states to 
embed a promise to arbitrate in its foreign investment laws,96 but it is certainly not the only example.  
Fatouros’s excellent 1963 survey of “investment guarantees” finds that states anxious to develop their 
petroleum resources were especially likely to provide for international arbitration of investment disputes 
through domestic laws.97  A more recent survey has found that approximately 20 national foreign 
investment laws contain “generic consent provisions offering to submit disputes with investors to 
arbitration under the ICSID Convention.”98 
 
Why does all this matter? It suggests, on the one hand, that BITs are not a necessary part of the 
“competition” for capital.  To the extent that BIT promises are replicable in municipal law, host states 
might reasonably respond to a “competitor’s” decision to enter a BIT by offering investors equivalent 
promises in municipal law.  Consider a more subtle point: even if municipal law is congenitally unable to 
function as a perfect BIT substitute, it nevertheless provides host states with a tool through which 
concessions can be made to investors that will, from the investor’s perspective, more than make up for 
the lack of an investment treaty. “Utility” is the currency of the land, and an investor should be willing to 
accept, as the price paid for the investment, more favorable investment incentives, tax breaks, or the like 
that will make up for the lack of a BIT.  BITs become a necessary part of the “competition” for FDI only 
if the “competitors” are already offering investors all of the other policy concessions at their disposal.  
But there is little reason to think that they are. 
 
The relevance of municipal law promises also suggests that disentangling the causal effects of 
BITs on FDI flows from the causal effects of contemporaneous, favorable changes in the domestic legal 
regime poses substantial difficulties that the statistically oriented empirical literature on BITs has yet to 
adequately address.  Over the past fifteen years many host states have dramatically modernized and 
liberalized their foreign investment laws – opening up new sectors to foreign involvement (often by 
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privatizing state-owned enterprises and contracting out the provision of basic governmental services), 
relaxing joint venture requirements, eliminating investment screening boards and performance 
requirements, establishing investment promotion agencies and export processing zones (EPZs), and so 
on.  It is undeniable that investors have attached “considerable value” to these changes when they have 
taken place.99  Take Mexico for instance.  In 1993 Mexico enacted an ambitious new Foreign Investment 
Law – a “crown jewel” achievement representing an unprecedent “repudiation” of Mexico’s historically 
ambivalent and often hostile policies toward foreign investors.100  At virtually the same time Mexico 
signed its “BIT” with the United States and Canada – Chapter 11 of NAFTA – and joined the OECD 
and its international investment instruments.  Which policy change is responsible for the resulting 
increases in Mexico’s foreign investment inflows?  Would United States investors have flocked to Mexico 
absent NAFTA but with the protections and guarantees of the 1993 law?  Are the contemporaneous 
OECD commitments safely ignored?  I leave it to others to provide definitive answers, but there is some 
indication that Mexican authorities, at least, viewed Chapter 11 and the 1993 domestic legal changes as 
largely substitutable, and Chapter 11 as largely redundant to what Mexico was already ready to do—and 
ultimately did do— unilaterally.  In their in-depth analysis of “how the [NAFTA] deal was done,” 
Cameron and Tomlin argue that Mexico accepted Chapter 11, and NAFTA more generally, because it 
“desire[d] to implement a radical agenda of economic restructuring within Mexico. NAFTA was the 
cornerstone of this policy, and many of the measures that Mexico was called upon to take in the NAFTA 
were ones that Mexican leaders had already decided to undertake anyway.”  They add, “The policies 
[embedded in NAFTA] were, however, policies that could have been undertaken anyway, if not under the 
NAFTA, then under the auspices of the GATT, or even in come cases unilaterally.  In some ways 
NAFTA was simply the culmination of a process of dramatic economic and social restructuring that had 
occurred, or was [already] occurring in Mexico.” 101  
 
Investment Contracts.  Municipal law is not the only plausible BIT substitute.  Foreign investors, 
unlike private parties engaged in international trade, are often placed in the position of explicitly 
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bargaining with host states over the terms under which they are allowed to establish their investment and 
to continue operations.102  This is especially so in the natural resources sector,103 where the host state 
usually own the natural resources to be extracted, and in the public utilities or infrastructure sectors,104 
where the investor is called upon to provide an essential public service, like the provision of electricity or 
a passable highway.  But it is also true in the manufacturing sector (as more generally), where the foreign 
investor is typically required to enter into privity with the host state in order to receive special treatment, 
such as tax incentives or the right to operate in an EPZ. 
 
The opportunity to bargain is important because it provides the foreign investor with the occasion to 
induce the host state to clarify the terms of the investor’s entry and operation, or to improve upon the 
promises offered under municipal or international law.105  Indeed, there is good reason to view the 
investment contract as the most effective formal legal means at the investor’s disposal of securing his 
investment, by allowing the investor to negotiate for relatively precise substantive terms and to protect 
those terms through the inclusion of enforceable arbitration, choice of law, and stabilization clauses 106  
Entering into an investment contract, especially one with an arbitration clause, may also provide a 
number of important side benefits, such as improving the investor’s access to project financing or 
investment insurance.107  
 
Early contracts between host states and investors tended to be “rather simple documents,”108 but 
these contracts have become significantly more detailed and complex over time.109  To cite one example 
from a recent, prominent international arbitration, the water services concession contract at issue was 111 
single-spaced pages long, “consisting of 16 articles plus lengthy appendices,” and was the product of two 
years of negotiation.110  And lest one think that foreign investment contracts are a phenomenon limited 
to the infrastructure or natural resources sectors, note that Intel’s practice when deciding whether to 
construct new semi-conductor manufacturing facilities is to enter into intensive haggling with potential 
 50
host states over a variety of fine-grained matters, and to insist that any resulting deal be committed to a 
written contract before the investment will be sunk.111 
 
In fact, in many of the early investment framework laws it was explicitly envisioned that most foreign 
investors would enter into some sort of “establishment agreement” with the host state in the process of 
gaining state approval to make the investment.112  Many states still require investments to be “approved” 
before they will receive the benefits of a BIT.113 “Approval” does not necessarily mean “contract,” but 
the approval process does give the investor at least an informal opportunity to ask for a formal 
agreement.  Latin American states in particular have historically preferred to bargain directly with foreign 
investors rather than to grant foreign investors rights indirectly through treaties with the investors’ home 
states,114 and certain of those states still seek to encourage investor-state contracting by making access to 
favorable guarantees benefits contingent upon it.115   
 
Home states have also long encouraged investor-host state contracting.  For example, investors will 
often be legally precluded from accessing home-state sponsored investment insurance absent the host 
state’s formal “approval” of the investment.116  Some home state investment insurance programs go even 
further in requiring an actual investment “agreement.”117 Unsurprisingly, these investment agreements 
routinely contain state pre-consents to international arbitration.  Arbitration clauses began to appear 
regularly in petroleum concessions in the middle of the last century;118 and quickly came to be viewed as a 
necessary complement to contracts made in that sector.119   Today arbitration clauses are standard across 
the board. Indeed, investment framework laws often expressly provide that investment contracts shall 
contain arbitration clauses.120  The availability of foreign investment insurance also again has a role to 
play here.  French investment guarantee treaties, for instance, require host states to insert investor-state 
arbitration clauses in investment contracts as a condition for insuring the project.121  French BITs have 
also required host states to promise to insert arbitration clauses into investment contracts upon the 
investor’s request.122 
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Obtaining an accurate and comprehensive indicator of the use or content of investment contracts is 
impossible because the contracts are not systematically collected and published.  But best-guess estimates 
suggest that investment contracts have been and remain an essential component of the modern regime of 
foreign investment protection,123 and that many of those contracts do indeed contain host state pre-
consents to investor-initiated international arbitration.124  Even Latin American states, which have long 
insisted on inserting “Calvo clauses” into investment agreements that require the investor to submit to 
the exclusive jurisdiction of municipal courts, appear to have relaxed their attachment to that particular 
contractual term.125  The continuing relevance of investment contracts matters for BIT analysts for much 
the same reason that the continuing relevance of municipal law matters: it suggests that the presence or 
absence of a BIT, by itself, is a lousy measure of the extent to which a host state has extended credible 
and favorable promises to investors. 
 
§2.5 BITs and Bargaining: An Alternative Understanding 
 
 In this Chapter I have tried to make two modest but important points.  The first, which is 
essentially that all BITs are not created equal and that analysts need to do a much better job sorting wheat 
from chaff, is sufficiently simple that further comment should not be necessary.  The second point—of 
the existence of numerous BIT substitutes—deserves a bit of further explication.  We have seen that BIT 
analysts tend to adopt a predominantly rational-functionalist view of the treaties that produces, in 
summary form, something like the following arguments: we can expect signing treaties to lead to 
increases in FDI flows because the treaties function as credible commitment devices, and many investors 
won’t invest absent this particular form of commitment; host states are competing for these 
commitment-sensitive investments, and will naturally want to sign the treaties that the investors require.  
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 What is lacking in the standard functionalist story is any sustained comparative analysis of why 
the treaties, as one potential credible commitment device among at least several others, are any better 
suited to performing the task at hand than their primary competitors.  This is a curious failing because 
one of the central lessons of the transaction-cost economics literature from which the credible 
commitment story is in part drawn is that careful comparison is essential to understand the development 
of new institutional arrangements.  The discussion above focused on several relatively formal ways in 
which host states might effectively make such commitments even in the absence of a BIT.  In particular, 
domestic laws and investment contracts might be used to make favorable substantive promises; to the 
extent that reputational concerns alone are not up to the task, binding commitments to arbitrate disputes 
can be appended.  Other mechanisms for coping with the problem of the obsolescing bargain, although 
not discussed in detail above, should not be forgotten.  The widespread availability of home state-
sponsored investment insurance is especially significant, as is the availability of private ordering types of 
solutions, in which the investor structures its relationship with the host state, perhaps by creating an 
economic “hostage,” to make breach less attractive an option.126   
 
 And we should not forget the power of reputational concerns to curb opportunistic assaults by 
host states on investment profitability.  This may seem a curious caveat given my arguments above that 
we can not expect reputational concerns alone to render treaty-based legal promises to investors 
especially credible.  That was indeed the argument. Treaty-based legal promises are generally too 
ambiguous and too vague in content and application to reliably cause host states to suffer reputational 
costs in the eyes of other investors as “breakers” of international law.  In other words, in the absence of 
authoritative adjudication, the reputational value of an investment treaty is purely rhetorical—it gives an 
aggrieved investor an opportunity to declare to the world that the particular host state not only treats 
investors badly, but that it does so in a way that is “illegal” under international law.  But the added benefit 
of a rhetorical (and, in the absence of authoritative adjudication, unverifiable) claim of “international 
illegality” is likely to be quite slight.  Foreign investors undoubtedly care about whether host states have a 
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reputation for treating investors “fairly” (in a non-technical, non-legalistic sense), for making their lives 
relatively easy, and their investments profitable, and so on.   And they are able to verify the spotlessness 
of that general, non-legal reputation by talking to other investors.   Indeed, there is strong evidence that 
investors do talk about precisely such things.  For example, in her well-researched case study of Intel’s 
surprising selection of Costa Rica as the site for a $300 million semiconductor assembly and testing plant, 
Spar describes Intel’s practice of consulting with existing foreign investors in Costa Rica.  These 
interviews, upon which Intel “relied heavily,” allowed Intel to “assess Costa Rica’s record in delivering on 
its promises.”127  Spar concludes that 
 
Costa Rica got on Intel’s list because other investors had already gone there and were 
beginning to spread word of the country’s attractions.  This follow-the-leader process 
supports what the data on FDI already suggest: it is highly concentrated in a handful of 
top recipient.  Because companies such as Intel rely so extensively on word-of-mouth 
reports from existing investors, each round of investment seems to generate its own 
offspring, and success in attracting FDI begets success. 
 
The implication of this practice is that as long as developing countries desire additional FDI in the future, 
they have a very strong incentive to ensure that these “word-of-mouth reports” are favorable.  This basic 
point points to a fundamental weakness of the “obsolescing bargain” (OB) theory that underlies most 
analyses of BITs.  OB theory models the interactions between host states and investors as a two-player, 
two-shot game.  The state and the investor bargain at Time One, and reach a bargain very favorable to 
the investor because the host state wants to encourage the investor to sink the investment.  At Time 
Two, once the investment is sunk, the host state uses its leverage, borne of the fact that it holds the sunk 
investment hostage, to revise the original bargain.  The investor, suckered, accepts his fate.  What OB 
theory entirely fails to explore is how this theory fits into a multi-investor world, in which multiple 
decisions to invest are spread across time.  We might expect the first investor to be suckered, but why 
would we expect the second, third, and fourth investors to similarly fall for the host state’s ruse? 
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 The fundamental question, then, is what do BITs add to what was already available to protect 
investments from problems of obsolescing bargain and of credible commitment?  My own suspicion is 
“not much.” BITs are hardly the inevitable solution to an insoluble problem of obsolescing bargain that 
they are often made out to be.  Once we recognize the plethora of alternatives to BITs, including 
informal alternatives such as “reputation”, it seems quite likely that the obsolescing bargaining problem is 
not nearly as big a problem for investors as it is typically said to be. 
 
 “Not much” is not the same thing as “nothing,” of course.  In one of the more subtle and 
perceptive evaluations of the treaties, and one that is worth quoting at length, Wälde has argued that 
 
Before the advent of [modern BITs], the treaty drafters expected investors to be able to 
negotiate their own dispute settlement method by way of agreement with the host State. 
 
… the treaties, in effect, added a direct investor right without regard relation to 
underlying dispute settlement arrangements in order to create an investor right that was 
independent of the ad hoc, individual negotiation, licensing or other parts of the 
investment process.  This was done under the assumption that investors should not have to rely on 
their own negotiating strength and ability but be able to rely on a general treaty-provided 
remedy…granted by law, not waivable and not dependent on an individual jurisdiction 
agreement with the state. 
 
 … 
 
 … [the treaties] thus partly replace[] the need to negotiate in the contract with the host 
state an internationalization regime consisting of stabilization, arbitration and an 
international law clause. 
 
 Modern investment treaties have further developed this approach.  They include 
methods of property and contract protection which individual investors, in an often more 
difficult negotiating context, might not have been able to negotiate on their own.128 
 
In other words, what BITs bring to the table is something different from what BIT analysts typically 
assume.  Take, for instance, Guzman’s claim that BITs are of great theoretical importance principally 
because they “allow potential investors to negotiate for whatever protections and safeguards they feel are 
needed. In other words, BITs provide the investor with protections that are superior, in all forms of 
investor-host conflicts, to those of customary international law.”129  It should be obvious that this claim is 
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highly suspect, in large part because host states have long had the capacity to credibly bind themselves 
through municipal law and contract, a capacity that the BIT phenomenon has done little directly to 
enhance or promote.  Investors were “allow[ed]” to negotiate with states well before BITs rose to 
prominence, and other institutional innovations (particularly the New York and ICSID Conventions)— 
allowed investors to secure the fruits of those negotiations with access to effective dispute settlement 
procedures. 
  
 But even more fundamentally, BITs can interfere with investor-state negotiation by granting 
investors “protections and safeguards” that they are unable to waive, and that they may or may not have 
been able to convince a host state to grant them in direct negotiations.  This is the point that Wälde’s 
analysis brings to the forefront, and it is immensely important because it suggests that the main function 
of BITs is not to facilitate bargains that would otherwise not have occurred, or to check states from 
acting unfairly upon post-contract shifts in their bargaining power, but to limit host state bargaining 
power from the outset.  The obsolescing bargain theory, which posits that host state power is at its 
weakest at the time of initial contracting, and that the investor will usually have no trouble convincing the 
host state to promise it the world and more, is truly turned on its head, because it is precisely at this point 
that there should be the least objective need for a treaty to specify the particular terms of the deal.  If an 
investor cares enough about a particular promise, procedural or substantive, he can bargain for it.  BITs 
remove a good part of the bargaining space by forcing the host state to offer particular terms to all 
comers, even those who would have invested without those particular promises contained in the BIT. 
 
 Given this understanding of the logic of the treaties, it is worth considering whether their 
primary useful and relatively unique function might be one of reducing bargaining costs rather than of 
permitting credible commitment.  The treaties eliminate the need for investors and host states to engage 
in costly direct bargaining by providing the parties with default, off-the-shelf rules to govern their 
relationship.  These are rules the parties would have agreed to anyway (the argument would go), and 
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incorporating the rules into a treaty eliminates the need to go through the motions of formal contracting 
on a project-by-project basis. 
 
 The notion of BITs as default rules is attractive in large part because many host states have 
recently begun dismantling or scaling back their investment-approval institutions (often under pressure 
from the United States), thereby eliminating opportunities for investors and states to easily enter into 
direct privity. But a default rules-based understanding of BITs faces a number of conceptual problems. 
First, and as we have seen, the default rules provided by BITs are too vague for the most important 
foreign investment projects, such as mining ventures or semi-conductor or automobile manufacturing 
facilities.  In those cases the foreign investor will almost always be in dialogue, and indeed in a true 
bargaining situation, with host state authorities, and will be well-positioned to demand what BITs have to 
offer.  Second, from a default-rules perspective it is quite difficult to justify the tendency of BITs to 
prevent host states and investors from bargaining around BIT rules.  If BITs require host states to extend 
to investors offers richer than the value of the investment to the host state, the host state will simply not 
allow the investment to take place.  The surprising implication is that in some cases BITs might actually 
be expected to discourage investment by preventing host states and investors from reaching a mutually 
acceptable bargain.  Third, if BITs are best viewed as reducing bargaining costs, and if bargaining costs in 
the absence of a BIT are rather slight compared to the overall value of the typical investment project (as I 
imagine they must be), then the competitive advantage that BITs can be expected to provide to 
developing states is correspondingly slight, and BITs should not be associated with very significant 
increases in investment flows.  And if this is indeed the case, we should be extremely suspicious of 
empirical studies that purport to find otherwise. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PARTISANSHIP AND INVESTMENT TREATIES 
 
§ 3.1: Introduction 
 
 The aim of this Chapter is, most generally, to explore the important question of why developing 
countries sign BITs with the world’s major capital exporters.  I examine in particular the ways in which 
the partisan character of government affects the tendency of developing countries to embrace BITs as 
part of their economic development strategy.  Like most current empirical and theoretical work in 
international relations, I assume that developing countries are rationalistic in their international activities: 
state leaders will be most likely to enter into investment treaties when it is in their “interest” to do so, that 
is, when they expect the benefits of the treaties to outweigh the costs.  I argue that perceptions of the 
costs and benefits of the treaties are likely to be filtered through a partisan lens. In particular, when the 
executive or legislature is dominated by leftist or nationalist political parties, we should expect to see that 
the host state is less likely to sign or to ratify a BIT.  I suggest that this relationship should hold because 
political parties embody particular economic ideologies that act as lenses through which party leaders and 
party members evaluate the costs and benefits of particular policy initiatives.  Partisans of the left are 
likely to view the costs of BITs to be particularly high and the benefits rather low, absent strong evidence 
to the contrary.  But where evidence mounts that leftist economic ideas are wrongheaded or 
unsuccessful, we should expect to see partisan differences in the willingness to enter into BITs to decline 
as party leaders adjust their calculations of costs and benefits to converge on a common model.  In 
Section II I develop the theoretical argument.  Section III presents results from a large-N empirical 
analysis that uses negative binomial regression techniques to model the likelihood that a given host state 
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will ratify an investment treaty in a given year.  The results of the empirical exercise offer some support 
for the theory.  Partisanship matters in the expected direction, but only for the period prior to the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall and the emergence of the “Washington Consensus” as the preferred model of 
economic development.  Less expectedly, after the end of the Cold War leftist governments appear to 
have embraced BITs much more strongly than governments of the right.    
 
§ 3.2: The Importance of Partisanship 
 
 Scholars of what might be called “international public policy,” like scholars of international 
relations more generally, tend overwhelmingly to analyze state action in the international sphere as the 
product of a rationalistic decision-making process, in which a unitary state pursues its “national interest.” 
What the national interest is, and how precisely to achieve it, is primarily if not solely defined objectively 
on the basis of certain “structural” characteristics, broadly understood to include the formal and informal 
domestic and international institutions in which political actors act and which constrain their autonomous 
behavior.  (While some analysts treat “structure” (usually meaning international anarchy) as distinct from 
“institutions”, I follow Wendt in treating the concepts as essentially the same).1    
 
 We can identify three main strands of structural theories of international public policy.   For 
structural realists, the structure that matters is primarily international (or “systemic”) in nature, and is 
embodied in such basic concepts as the “balance of power,” reflecting variables such as the balance of 
material possessions and (or) military capabilities.  Waltz, of course, provides the most well-known and 
influential statement.2  Different flavors of structural realism co-exist (sometimes uneasily) in the 
literature,3 but the basic view is that a state’s foreign policies are driven primarily by the state’s power 
position in an “anarchic” international system.  The international system, very narrowly construed, 
defines the state’s international policy interest (increasing its “power” or “security”) and the manner in 
which it pursues it (e.g. through balancing alliances).   
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 Neo-liberal institutionalists, perhaps exemplified best by Robert Keohane,4take a broader view of the 
structure that matters.  The focus remains on the international structure, but it expands to admit that 
international institutions, whether relatively formal, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or more informal, such as international “norms”, might 
meaningfully help both to define the national interest and to provide a rational means of achieving it by 
promoting and supporting cooperation for joint gain. 
 
 And third, an alternate strand of neo-liberal theory, which I call state-centered liberalism, has 
broadened the analytic focus to include domestic structures as drivers of international policy.  These 
domestic structures may again be relatively informal, including such concepts as national “cultures”5 or 
transnational “civilizations.”6  But it is far more common to focus on the more formal aspects of 
domestic governance structures to define various “types” of states.  The most common and most 
important typology to emerge in the literature is that of democratic versus non-democratic regimes.  
Whether a state is a democracy has been said to influence a bewildering array of international 
phenomena.  For example, democracies are said to be less likely to initiate wars;7 more likely to keep their 
international promises; less likely to restrict trade flows; more likely to treat foreign investors favorably; 
but less likely to use tax incentives to attract foreign investment. 
 
  These various structural approaches share an important common characteristic. Whether the 
focus is on the international structure narrowly or broadly construed, or on the contributions of the 
domestic structure in which agents of the state operate, implicit in all three views is the idea that the 
international policies that a particular state will pursue at a particular time will not depend on who controls 
the state.  States may be “weak” or “strong” in terms of the international balance of power; they may be 
more or less integrated into the most important international institutions; they may be more or less 
democratic, or they may exemplify one culture or civilization or another.  In other words, each approach 
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necessarily admits that states may differ in theoretically relevant ways in terms of their structural positions 
and structural characteristics, even if the approaches differ as to the degree and quality of theoretically 
relevant differentiation.  But given a particular state in a particular structural position and with particular 
structural characteristics, mainstream international relations theory would not expect the identity of the 
national leadership—of those who actually choose the international policies to pursue, and the means of 
pursuing them—to meaningfully affect either the choice of policy goals or the means of pursuit.  The 
“state,” viewed as a unitary actor, is the unit of analysis.  The people actually acting as the state’s agent in 
the international arena are given short theoretical shrift. 
 
 The principle weakness of the “state-as-actor” models that dominate mainstream international 
relations theory is, then, that they leave largely unaddressed (but implicitly answered in an unsatisfactory 
way) the important question of “whether man and his societies pursue goals of their own choosing or are 
moved toward those imposed upon them by forces which are primarily beyond their control.”8  This is 
certainly not a new observation.  Singer’s well-known 1961 essay addressing the “level-of-analysis 
problem in international relations”, the source of the immediately preceding quotation, makes the point 
well, as does work by Wagner, Keohane and Nye, Allison, and others in the 1970s that sought to 
“dissolve” or to disaggregate the state’s role in forming international policy, both by looking at 
transnational actors situated hors the state and at groups and individuals comprising the state.9  But in the 
intervening years international relations theory has been largely consumed by debates between structural 
realists and institutionalists over whether international institutions “matter”, and between realists and 
state-centered liberals over whether it is theoretically necessary, or even analytically worthwhile, to 
differentiate state actors on the basis of domestic structural characteristics.  Lost in the shuffle has been 
much sustained concern with peeling back the abstract skin of the state to identify theoretically relevant 
agent-level differences in the people that run it.   
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 The predictable result of this state of affairs is that domestic politics in the quotidian sense, in 
which different actors with different views of the world vie for control of the reins of state, with the 
selectorate acting as if much hinges on who succeeds in seizing them, is largely missing from accounts of 
the international policy-making process.  This lacuna represents, as Singer noted long ago, one of the 
“more significant implications and fascinating problems raised by the adoption” of a “state-as-actor” 
model of international public policy.   
 
 The idea that “states” “act” internationally is well-recognized to be a simplifying assumption, and 
one that in many cases is probably well-warranted on the basis of theoretical parsimony.  But as a matter 
of descriptive accuracy that can have important implications for predictive accuracy, it is worth revisiting 
the relatively obvious but too frequently ignored point that states are indeed abstractions on whose behalf 
actual people act, and that those peoples’ “beliefs and convictions”, “experiences, images, and 
expectations” may play a very important role in determining how the “state’s” goals are defined and the 
ways in which those goals are pursued.10 
 
 It is in something approaching this sense that Byman and Pollack have recently called on 
international relations scholars to “bring the statesman back in”.11  Recalling Waltz’s famous division of 
the discipline into three “images” of international politics, Byman and Pollack note that international 
relations scholars, including Waltz himself, have almost entirely avoided any exploration of the “first” 
image, in which international events are supposedly driven in large part by variance in the “human 
nature” of individual leaders.  Instead, analysts have focused almost entirely on the second image, in 
which international politics are viewed as primarily driven by domestic political structure (state-centered 
liberals, in my typology above), or on the third image, in which “the behavior of nations is driven by their 
relative position…in an anarchic international system”,12 with the relevant system either narrowly 
construed as by structural realists or more broadly construed as by neoliberal institutionalists. 
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 But it is becoming increasingly difficult to keep first-image theory from taking its seat at the 
international relations table.  In recent years a number of scholars in both international relations and 
comparative politics have resurrected and greatly expanded upon Weber’s claim that the subjectively held 
ideas of policymakers operate as the “switchmen” of history by “determining the tracks along which 
action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest.”13  Ideational theory has enjoyed its most recent 
renaissance in the field of comparative political economy, which typically defines ideas as “subjective 
claims about descriptions of the world, causal relationships, or the normative legitimacy of certain 
actions.”14  For ideational theorists these subjective beliefs do more than to simply “rationalize strategies 
chosen for other [e.g. objective] reasons.”  Instead, the claim is that subjective beliefs actually serve to 
guide policymakers’ actions.15  The approach has been used with some success to identify the effects of 
changing ideas on such diverse phenomena as the realization of the post-World War II “class 
compromise” and the rise of the welfare state upon which the compromise was based,16 decolonization,17 
and the development of the European Union.18   
 
 Ideational theories are often contrasted with rational choice theories of public policy, though in 
fact the two approaches are hardly incompatible. Rational choice theories purport to identify an actor’s 
supposedly “objective” interest—e.g. power, votes, money—and posit that the actor will rationally seek 
to maximize that interest within given institutional constraints. The key difference between rationalist and 
ideational accounts of public policy is that in rationalist accounts it is the analyst who stipulates what the 
actor should be expected to desire, based on the analyst's understanding of the actor’s objective position, 
and it is likewise the analyst who stipulates how, precisely, the actor should be expected to most 
efficiently achieve that desire.19  By implication, and absent some sort of Darwinian natural selection 
process, the actor himself is also aware of his objective interests, and of how to best achieve them. In its 
most extreme view, this approach leads to the “de-emphasis of ideas in and of themselves, since they are 
seen mainly as a thin disguise for the play of interests and power…what Clifford Geertz has called the 
‘interest theory’ of ideology, where ideas are seen as a ‘mask and a weapon.’”20   
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 An ideational approach, in contrast, emphasizes that an actor’s goals are not fixed and 
predetermined, but rather reflect his mutable and subjective “beliefs about the nature of the universe, and 
about right and wrong,” that is, about what he would like to achieve.21  Nor can we expect the actor to 
always choose the “best” way to achieve those goals, as the particular path chosen will itself depends on 
the actors’ equally subjective and mutable causal beliefs. 
 
 Ideational theory is relevant for first-image approaches to international public policy precisely 
because it tends to focus the analyst’s attention on the ideas held by policy-makers.22  As Mowle has recently 
put it in the foreign policy context, and as in any other policy context, 
 
individuals within the state…direct purposive action… 
 
… 
 
 A state’s behavior is not reflexive; rather, it flows from the way its foreign policy 
decision-makers understand what is happening….[their] assumptions—which include images of 
other actors in the world, causal beliefs about how they interact with one another, and 
prescriptions about appropriate courses of action—constitute a “worldview”.  The worldview 
influences the way individuals interact with reality.23 
 
In other words, ideational theory suggests quite strongly that there is good reason to expand our analytic 
focus beyond international and domestic structural variables to include agent-centered variables—precisely 
the beliefs, convictions, experiences, images, and expectations (“ideas”, broadly construed) that Singer 
found lacking in international relations theory long ago.   
  
 What do ideas, again, broadly construed, have to do with BITs?  This Chapter’s central argument 
is that the BIT phenomenon cannot be adequately understood without recognizing that it is based in 
large part on particular ideas, held by people in power, about the value of FDI in promoting economic 
development, and about the value of BITs as a tool to encourage that investment.  Ideational approaches 
do, of course, face well-known limitations, including most prominently the problems of determining 
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which ideas policymakers actually and sincerely hold, and which ideas they espouse merely as “intellectual 
rationales” for actions taken on the basis of unspoken objective interests.24  In consequence, ideational 
theories have had great difficulty empirically demonstrating simple causation, e.g. that ideas actually do, 
rather than just should, matter. Ideational theory also frequently fails to adequately demonstrate the 
relative influence of ideas compared to arguably non-ideational factors, like coercion or “power.” And 
finally, first image theories that focus on individually held ideas risk quickly degenerating into “great 
man” theories of history that offer little or no prospect of generalizability.  Byman and Pollack’s attempt 
to “bring the statesman back in” falls into precisely this trap by emphasizing Hitler’s supposedly “unique” 
combination of ideas and psychological traits as the defining cause of World War II.  
 
 These are indeed serious problems, and I do not attempt to fully resolve them here, either 
theoretically or empirically.  But I do insist that our ability to test the independent impact of ideas on 
policy is not necessarily intractable if we can reasonably associate the sincere holding of one policy idea or 
another with the particular political groups that control the levers of government.  In other words, I 
attempt to move from a simple assertion that “ideas matter” or that “individuals matter” to something 
approaching a theory of when certain individuals, holding certain ideas might matter. 
 
 My most basic claim is that the decision to sign and ratify a BIT is rationalistic in the sense that 
the political leaders of a given developing country will tend to sign and ratify investment treaties when 
they view the likely benefits of doing so to outweigh the likely costs.  What makes “ideas” relevant 
conceptually is that certain political actors are likely to view the costs of BITs to be quite high; others are 
likely to view the costs as low, both within a particular developing country and over time.  A similar story 
can be told as to benefits.   Given these differences in opinion among political actors, differences which correspond 
approximately to the partisan identity of the decision-maker, the outcome of the policy-making process—the decision to enter 
into or to forgo a BIT—will necessarily depend on who is authorized to perform the relevant calculations.   
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 This is not to say that partisan preferences are set in stone, and that leftist leaders always do x 
while rightist leaders always do y.  Over time, as evidence of the costs and benefits of particular courses 
of action shift and change, or become more clear, we can expect partisan positions to shift as well, and 
perhaps even to converge or to switch places.  Partisans, in other words, are not immune to “policy 
learning,” either in the narrower sense of adapting their preferred methods of achieving a particular goal, 
or in the broader sense of shifting their understanding of the goal itself.  As Fidel Castro, a long-time 
opponent of foreign investment, surprisingly admitted in a 1993 speech celebrating the 40th anniversary 
of his assault on the Moncada Barracks, “[w]ho would have thought that we, so doctrinaire, we who 
fought foreign investment, would one day view foreign investment as an urgent need?....Greater opening 
for foreign investment is one of the solutions we have to tackle the difficult situation we face.”25  The 
speech was soon followed by dramatic changes in Cuban foreign investment laws, in which full 
repatriation of profits and full foreign ownership were allowed for the first time since the revolution.26 
 
 But the possibility of policy learning does not mean that policymakers are also not immune to 
the occasional, or even the frequent or long-lived, partisan idée fixe.  Partisan ideological rigidity is a 
measurable fact of life, and it may even be viewed as rational, as Sánchez-Cuenca has recently argued.27  It 
is the orderly and predictable distribution of these relatively fixed ideas that makes it possible to present a 
partisan-based, ideational, first-image theory of international public policy.  Consider, for example, the 
following simple world, in which the costs and benefits of entering into a BIT can be either “high” or 
“low”: 
 
Table 3.1: The Costs & Benefits of BITs 
 
 Costs of BITs 
 High Low 
High ? Sign BIT 
Benefits 
of BITs 
Low Refuse BIT ? 
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If the relevant political actors believe the costs of BITs to be low, and the benefits high, then the host 
state is likely to sign the treaty.  If the relevant political actors’ beliefs are the opposite, then we would 
expect the host state’s leaders to refuse to sign and ratify the treaty.  And when the relevant political 
actors believe the costs and benefits to be in rough equipoise, the best decision remains (subjectively) 
uncertain, and the actual decision made difficult to predict ex ante.  
 
 The main task an ideational theorist faces in predicting the policy outcome lies thus in identifying 
the particular power-holder’s likely views on costs and benefits.  State-centered structural theory suggests 
that there is but one “objective” view, and that all relevant political actors in the particular state will share 
it.  Ideational theory suggests in contrast that different political actors may hold different subjective 
views, which in turn suggests that the actual and observed policy outcome may necessarily depend on 
who decides the policy.∗  The analytic problem is that absent a theory of idea-holding, the ideational 
theorist is unable to predict a priori what the policy outcome will be, even if the theorist knows who the 
decision-maker is.   After the fact of decision it may be relatively easy to impute certain ideas to the 
decision-maker and to argue, and even to argue convincingly, that those ideas “mattered” in influencing 
the decision.  But retrospective and ad hoc explanations of this sort, no matter how convincing, are a far 
cry from the generally applicable predictive theories upon which social science places justifiably high 
value. 
 
   Partisanship offers a potential foundation to move from ad hoc idea-based explanation to 
prediction.  Consider once again the simple world initially presented above and slightly complicated in its 
present version: 
                                                 
∗ Strictly speaking, ideational theory is also capable of producing state-centered theories of policy outcomes.  For 
instance, Wendt’s constructivist theory of international politics attributes “ideas” to states, and not to particular 
actors within the state, an approach which minimizes the importance of variation in the ideas of individual policy-
makers. 
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Table 3.2: Partisan Evaluation of the Costs & Benefits of BITs 
 Costs of BITs 
 High Low  
Partisan Character of 
Government 
Left Right 
High Right - Sign BIT 
Benefits of 
BITs 
Low Left Refuse BIT - 
 
Imagine that decision-makers that ascribe to “leftist” political-economic ideologies are generally more 
likely to view the costs of BITs to be high and the corresponding benefits to be low.  By “leftist” I mean 
a political-economic worldview that emphasizes the value of government interventionism in the 
economy.  And imagine that decision-makers on the political-economic “right” are likely to take the view 
that BITs offer high benefits while imposing low costs.  By “right” I mean a political-economic 
worldview that emphasizes the value of laissez-faire economic policies and restrictions on government 
intervention in the economy.  And finally imagine that decision-makers reliably reveal their political-
economic ideologies by membership in ideologically identifiable and distinct political parties.  We are now 
in a position to offer powerful and testable first-image predictions on the basis of a relatively small 
amount of information: when a state is led by a member or members of a leftist political party, the state 
will be less likely to enter into a BIT; when a state is led by a member or members of a rightist political 
party, the state will be more likely to enter into a BIT.  
 
 Why might political partisanship be a reliable guide to a policymaker’s subjective policy 
preferences, and ultimately to his policy decisions? Consider first the long body of cognitive research in 
the field of political behavior that demonstrates the commonplace tendency of ordinary voters to use 
cognitive heuristics to make political decisions or to form political opinions on issues in the face of 
insufficient objective information.  Voters typically turn first and foremost to a candidate’s party 
affiliation and ideological position to gauge the candidate’s position on a given issue.  As Laue and 
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Redlawsk have recently noted, “[p]arty and ideological stereotypes or schemata are among the richest and 
most widely shared in American politics.”28  And Brewer and Steenbergen have recently shown that 
voters’ views on “human nature” provide an “information shortcut” that informs their views on foreign 
policy issues.29 
 
 Voters are not national leaders deciding weighty issues of foreign policy, of course.  National 
leaders tend to have more and better information than voters, especially on foreign policy issues, and to 
have a much greater personal stake in the outcome of a particular foreign policy decision than does an 
individual voter deciding for whom to vote or formulating and expressing a layman’s political opinion.   
But it is still quite reasonable to assume that national leaders, when formulating their own foreign policy 
preferences, will also turn to “[p]arty and ideological stereotypes or schemata” when attempting to 
determine and to weigh the relative costs and benefits of a given policy action, especially in the face of 
uncertainty as to what the “objective” costs and benefits actually are.   The decisions that foreign 
policymakers must make can be exceptionally complex, and a growing body of empirical evidence 
suggests that in the face of such complexity, decision-makers, like voters, tend indeed to use various sorts 
of heuristics.  For example, recent experimental research suggests that foreign policy decision-makers are 
especially likely to rely on heuristics in “low threat” situations,30 which reasonably would include most 
foreign policy issues in the field of international economic relations, including FDI policy.  In this vein it 
is worthwhile to note Tugwell’s observation, in his excellent case study of Venezuelan foreign investment 
policy in the petroleum sector in the 1960s and 1970s, that 
 
the role of doctrine or ideology seems to be critical: it provides a filter for information, a 
source of new bargaining positions, and a guide and justification for policy as a whole…. 
 The role of a strong and consistent doctrine in Venezuela’s petroleum policy adds 
support to [the] argument…that the form and content of elite ideology can be of central 
importance in determining the quality of development policy.  In the management of 
dependence, it would seem especially important in determining whether a moderate, 
incremental, and experimental approach is possible or whether policy-makers will turn to 
a more extreme response, either submissiveness or xenophobic reaction.31 
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 Foreign policy heuristics are likely to comprise what Mowle calls “world views.”  World views 
“do not spring randomly from each individual’s unique experiences, but…are learned through a 
combination of formal study and socialization with other policymakers.”32  This “socialization” is most 
likely to take place within a partisan environment, in which members of the same political party routinely 
interact with each other on campaigns and in committees and caucuses, creating and transmitting shared 
“mental model[s] of goals, constraints, preferred solutions, and expectations about the effectiveness of 
various tactics.”33  For example, Marks, Wilson, and Ray have provided powerful cross-national evidence 
that “ideological prisms” along familiar lines of political cleavage drive political parties (and, by 
implication their members and representatives in office) of similar “families” to adopt similar positions 
on European integration.34  As Marks and Wilson argue in a related study,  
 
Political parties are not empty vessels into which issue positions are poured in response to 
electoral or constituency pressures; rather, they are organizations with historically rooted 
orientations that guide their response to new issues.  The range of a political party’s likely 
response to a new issue is therefore a product of the ideologies of party leaders and the 
endogenous constraints of party organization, constituency ties and reputation. In other words, a 
political party has its own ‘bounded rationality’… that shapes the way in which it comes to terms 
with new challenges and uncertainties.35 
 
An important line of work in the comparative welfare states literature provides strong confirmation that 
partisanship can be a powerful predictor of domestic public policy outcomes.  Most prominently, Huber 
and Stephens provide extensive case-study and statistical evidence that the partisan identity of 
government decision-makers strongly influences the development of welfare state policies.36  More recent 
empirical work has confirmed this general relationship between government partisanship and social 
policy.37 And of course, a long line of research on the formation of trade policy in the United States 
suggests that “party and ideology … capture parsimoniously a good deal of variation in floor voting” on 
international trade issues, at least in the United States Congress.38 
 
 What this means for the present analysis has already been suggested: if we can identify shared 
partisan “world views” on FDI policy generally, and on BITs in particular, we can predict whether 
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particular national leaders, or particular national governments, are likely to sign and ratify the treaties. 
Take the following flow chart as a more complicated illustration of the simple world first introduced 
above. 
 
Figure 3.1: Informal Model of BIT Decision Calculus 
 
 
The basic causal rationale of BITs is illustrated by the black arrows, and is familiar by now to the reader:  
BITs are expected to lead to increases in FDI; FDI is valued because it helps to further the developing 
country’s “development” goals, whatever those may be. 
 
 The grey arrows indicate a complementary, and alternate, causal story: the possibility that capital 
exporting countries may offer “bribes” to developing countries that agree to enter into BITs, such as 
tying acceptance of a BIT to support for the developing country’s entry into the World Trade 
Organization, or to access to World Bank or International Monetary Fund lending, that may also help the 
developing country to achieve its development goals independent of any effect that BITs might have on 
FDI flows.  Hard evidence of such bribes is difficult to unearth, but it is both interesting and relevant 
that the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) has reportedly “encouraged 
BITs 
Development 
Goals 
FDI 
Sovereignty 
Costs Political 
Costs 
“Policy Bribes”
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the adoption of BITs as a test to ensure that investments are sufficiently protected” to merit the 
provision of insurance.39  This suggests the rather ironic possibility that host states may have signed 
certain BITs not because the treaties reduce the investor’s risk, but because signing the treaties allows the 
investor to insure against the risk.40  There is also evidence that capital exporting states have similarly 
“bribed” developing countries into signing BITs by making the availability of home state-sponsored 
insurance contingent on the adoption of a BIT.41   The United States has also long made the availability 
of foreign aid contingent upon a willingness to settle investment disputes by arbitration, and in at least 
one case has used its influence in a multilateral development bank to block funding for a project where 
the host state (Costa Rica) was resisting an investor’s demand for arbitration in an unrelated dispute. 42  
Whether similar pressures might encourage states to sign BITs with the United States remains less than 
fully explored, but the U.S. business lobby, in voicing its support for the U.S. BIT program, has explicitly 
urged the government to “consider the extent to which countries’ investment policies may have 
foreclosed development by private capital” before extending official aid or supporting loans from 
“multilateral development… institutions.”43 
 
 The white arrows illustrate that BITs and increased FDI can impose certain costs on domestic 
politicians.  We have seen in the previous Chapter that BITs, especially strong ones, risk imposing 
potentially serious constraints on a host state’s ability to change policies in ways that adversely impact 
foreign investors, something that I refer to as the “sovereignty costs” of the treaties.  Increased foreign 
investment also imposes costs in its own right.  I call these “political costs.” Political costs might 
primarily include the loss in popular political support that politicians suffer when constituents perceive 
foreign companies to be “taking over” symbolically or economically important sectors of the domestic 
economy.  We can think, for instance, of the political uproar that accompanied much of the foreign 
investment in the United States by the Japanese in the 1980s (and especially the Japanese purchase of the 
Seattle Mariners’ baseball franchise), and the more recent controversy over Dubai Ports World’s 
investment in the operation of United States maritime ports. 
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 Whether a given state will enter into a BIT will be determined by the state’s leaders’ rationalistic 
weighing of the various costs and benefits as the leaders perceive them to be.  More formally, but still quite 
simply, we can specify that a developing country will sign and ratify a BIT when 
 
E(CS)+ E(CP) < E(BD), 
 
Where E(CS) are estimated sovereignty costs, E(Cp) are estimated political costs, and E(BD) are the 
development benefits that are expected to arise from the additional foreign investments induced by 
entering into a BIT, or from the “policy bribes” offered to induce acceptance of a treaty.  These 
expectations can be expected to vary along partisan lines in predictable ways. 
 
 First take the sequence of black arrows.  The policymaker must necessarily estimate the 
probability that BITs will lead to more FDI, and that more FDI will advance the policymaker’s policy 
goals.  These are, at heart, causal expectations that x causes (or doesn’t cause) y.  The first causal idea, that 
BITs cause FDI, may seem inherently “objective” in character, as it presents an essentially empirical, 
econometric question.  But in fact until very recently there had been no systematic empirical study of the 
correlation, if any, between BITs and FDI flows.  (Indeed, until recently there was little to no data on 
FDI flows to developing countries of sufficient quality and scope of coverage to permit justifiable 
regression analysis.  Existing FDI data remains of very low quality for many developing countries and for 
many, if not most, years).  The lack of empirical evidence even led the United States government to adopt 
the quasi-official policy of informing all prospective BIT partners that entering into a BIT with the 
United States was no guarantee that American investors would soon flock to the host state’s shores.   A 
number of empirical studies have appeared over the last several years, but a close review suggests that 
economists remain far from consensus on the proper methods or models to employ, or the proper 
conclusions to draw from the various results.  Perhaps most importantly, the various studies reach 
contradictory, or at least inconsistent, results.  In later Chapters I present my own econometric analysis of 
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the effects of BITs on FDI, but for the moment the important point is that given this objective 
uncertainty about the causal effect of BITs on FDI, we might reasonably expect the views of policy-
makers to be more likely to be influenced in predictable ways by their own subjective worldviews.  In 
other words, the lack of clear “objective” evidence of a causal relationship allows, or even forces, 
policymakers to fall back on other, more subjective criteria and beliefs to arrive at particular causal 
expectations.  To the extent that the “BITs lead to FDI” logic itself represents a “Chicago School” faith 
in the positive responsiveness of private actors to the absence of government interference in (foreign 
investment) marketplace, we might expect partisans of the economic right to find the argument 
inherently much more persuasive, even in the absence of objective empirical evidence, than partisans of 
the left.  In other words, it may be the case that partisans of the right are more likely to “think like 
economists”, and therefore more likely to view the “BITs lead to FDI” logic as inherently plausible, if not 
likely.44 
 
 What about the second black-arrow relationship, the causal relationship between BITs and the 
development goals that they are supposed to promote?  It is clear that development can have a host of 
different meanings, and can entail a host of cross-cutting objectives, ranging from social equity and social 
cohesion (favorite goals of the political left) to economic growth and efficiency (favorite goals of the 
political right).  BITs and FDI are unlikely to help policymakers achieve all such development goals, and 
indeed, BITs and FDI may actually hinder the achievement of certain goals that require government 
intervention in the economy, such as environmental sustainability or social equity.  There is some—
though certainly not overwhelming—evidence that FDI might reasonably be expected to lead to 
economic growth.45  And there is virtually no evidence that increased FDI helps governments achieve 
traditionally leftist developmental goals.  Indeed, leftist political discourse frequently asserts that increased 
FDI is bad for development, a position that has recently (and surprisingly) received very qualified support 
from the IMF.46  In short, partisan differences in the developmental goals that policy-makers can be 
expected to privilege, and differences in the quality and quantity of the evidence that increased FDI might 
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be useful (or harmful) in achieving those goals, suggests that different policy-makers are likely to hold 
markedly different assessments of the developmental value of using BITs to increase FDI.  
 
 Partisan ideas are also very likely to influence a policy-maker’s estimation of the costs of entering 
into a BIT.  (Costs are illustrated by the white arrows in the figure above).  For example, leftist policy-
makers, who can be expected to more highly value the ability to intervene in the domestic economy than 
rightist policy-makers, will be likely to view the sovereignty costs of BITs to be especially high.  Rightist 
policy-makers, on the other hand, typically seek to restrain government interference in the economy, and 
may view the sovereignty costs of investment treaties to be not so much a cost of BITs, but actually a 
desirable side-benefit.  The same goes for what I have labeled the “political costs” of increased foreign 
investment.  As Sikkink has argued, “the expanded availability of international investment [can] be 
perceived as an opportunity or as a danger, depending on the ideas held by policymakers.”47  Leftist 
politicians (and their constituents) are much more likely to view increased foreign “penetration” of the 
domestic economy as a dangerous threat to national autonomy and identity than are partisans of the 
right.  We can get a good sense of these fears of foreign investment by perusing leftist-oriented websites 
devoted to spreading alarmist “information” about free trade and investment agreements that, in the 
words of one prominent site, “are opening countries to the deepest forms of penetration by transnational 
corporations.”48  And historically speaking, we cannot forget the left’s longstanding attachment to 
theories of dependencia, which emerged most directly out of work by Paul Prebisch, Hans Singer, and 
others in the 1950s, and which were widely publicized under the auspices of the Economic Commission 
for Latin America (ECLA).49  Dependency theorists viewed with great suspicion the power that foreign 
corporations and their home governments were said to wield over developing countries and sought to 
render foreign investment subservient to the perceived development needs of the state, as part of what 
Blostrom and Hettne call “programmed industrialization.”50  
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 And finally, there is good reason to suspect that rightist politicians may be more likely to ascribe 
relatively higher values to the various “bribes” that capital-exporting countries may offer to developing 
countries to reward (or to coerce) them into signing and ratifying investment treaties.  This is the case, for 
instance, if these bribes entail access to other neo-liberal economic institutions (such as the WTO).  We 
can expect leftist politicians to view such access as at best a mixed blessing.  For instance, leftist 
politicians are likely to view greater global economic integration as a threat to national economic 
sovereignty and to government-led development efforts. Politicians on the right, on the other hand, are 
likely to view such increased integration, including the loss of governmental capacity to manage and 
direct domestic markets, as developmentally desirable. 
 
 The chart below summarizes my argument so far.  The basic point is that the ideas of politicians 
regarding the value of BITs, and of increased foreign investment, is likely to vary subjectively, and that 
this variance in subjective ideas is likely to be correlated with the politicians’ partisan identities.  In other 
words, politicians of different partisan stripes are likely to view the costs and benefits of BITs and of FDI 
in different (and predictable) ways.  Politicians of the right are more likely to view the benefits of 
investment treaties to be high (indicated by “ + ”) and the costs to be low (“ –  ”), and thus are more likely 
to view the treaties as, on net, advancing the “national interest” and worthy of signature and ratification. 
Politicians of the left are likely to have precisely the opposite estimations of costs and benefits, and 
precisely the opposite policy leanings. 
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Table 3.3: Policy Ideas of Partisan Decision-Makers 
 Ideological Orientation 
 Right Left 
BITs Promote FDI + – 
FDI Promotes 
Development 
+ – 
Benefits of 
Investment 
Treaties 
Bribes Are Valued + – 
Sovereignty Costs Are 
High 
– + 
Political Costs Are 
High 
– + 
Costs of 
Investment 
Treaties 
   
“+” indicates more likely to believe; “–” indicates less likely to believe 
 
The theory as discussed so far implicitly assumes that what it means to be economically “leftist” or 
“rightist” is stable across time.  But what if “leftist” ideas about the costs and benefits of BITs and FDI 
change temporarly in predictable (e.g. non-random) ways?  For example, it is frequently suggested in the 
ideational literature that new ideas are particularly influential when “dramatic policy failures or crises” 
illustrate the bankruptcy of status quo world views.51  In this vein, the collapse of Communism vividly 
illustrated the failings of Marxist and neo-Marxist ideology as a viable economic strategy.  As Juliet 
Johnson has argued,  
 
the nearly simultaneous collapse of…Communist polities undermined…fundamental bases on 
which these states had made policy choices…it exploded the perceived right of the state to direct 
the economy, control property, and employ most citizens engaged in commercial 
transactions….The breakdown of Communist rule can therefore be seen as a critical juncture 
that opened a window of expanded policy choice.52 
 
Communism’s collapse was meaningful even outside of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as 
Marxist thinking explicitly influenced the various flavors of “dependency theory” that non-Communist 
members of the developing world used to justify stringent government control over foreign investment.53  
Conventional wisdom suggests that neo-liberal economic ideas quickly rushed in to fill the ideological 
void.54  For instance, Oyzranzowski and Paleczny-Zapp attribute Poland's ready adoption of so-called 
“shock therapy” to the inability of Polish economists, trained exclusively in now-defunct Marxist 
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methods, to offer “any meaningful alternatives” to the heavily free-market suggestions of American 
advisers such as economist Jeffrey Sachs.55  The general perception that “middle-ground” or “heterdox” 
economic policies, adopted briefly by such countries as Argentina and Brazil in the 1980s, had also failed 
to promote economic growth provided further support in favor of the neo-liberal model that would 
become known as the “Washington Consensus” and which emphasized open-door policies to foreign 
investment.56 
 
 Such arguments suggest that in the face of strong “lessons learned” that discredit particular 
partisan economic ideas, partisanship might be expected to decline in importance as a predictor of the 
orientation of economic policy generally, and as a predictor of FDI policy in particular.   In other words, 
in the wake of the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the “Washington Consensus,” leftist 
policymakers might be expected to behave much more like rightist policymakers because of the 
newfound persuasiveness of the rightist economic worldview.  Note that the hypothesized relationship 
between the collapse of Communism (as a signal of the failure of leftist economic policies generally) and 
government partisanship as predictors of FDI policy is conditional.  Left government is predicted to 
negatively affect BIT signings and ratifications prior to the collapse of Communism, but to insignificantly 
affect BIT signings and ratifications after the collapse.     
 
§ 3.3: A Note on Policy Diffusion 
 
 The present study must be properly situated in the recently revived literature on international 
policy “diffusion.”  Diffusion theory is especially well-developed in the domestic politics literature, which 
for many years has sought to explain the adoption and maintenance of various laws and policies by states 
in the American federal system.  Gray’s 1973 contribution is especially seminal in this regard.57  The 
essential insight of the diffusion literature is that the adoption of a new policy in one political unit may 
influence the likelihood that another political unit will also adopt the policy.  It is in this sense that 
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policies are said to diffuse “spatially” across countries as the unit of analysis.  Diffusion theory is thus 
largely a sophisticated gloss on Sir Francis Galton’s famous “problem” of lack of independence between 
cross-national units.  The problem is so potentially injurious to our ability to make valid causal inferences 
in pooled samples that its recognition reportedly stifled cross-national comparative research in 
anthropology for half a century.58 
 
 Diffusion theory has been only fitfully applied to the field of international relations.  Within 
international relations, it has been invoked almost exclusively to explain state decisions to wage war.  But 
by 1998 scholarly interest in the “diffusion of war” research program was “waning” due in part to the 
program’s failure to produce measurable and cumulative gains in our understanding of the causes of 
war.59  This waning interest in diffusion explanations of international security policy choices makes the 
current explosion of interest in diffusion explanations of international political economy all the more 
remarkable.  In a recent special symposium issue of the journal International Organization, four separate 
articles apply diffusion theory to explain a wide array of international economic policy choices, ranging 
from tax policy to “public-sector downsizing”, all grouped under the generic label of the “diffusion of 
liberalism.”  The collection includes an important contribution by Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons (EGS) 
that presents a sophisticated diffusion analysis of state decisions to sign BITs.60 
 
 Government partisanship, the main explanatory variable in the present study, is not a diffusion 
variable precisely because it taps characteristics internal to the unit of analysis that are presumed to be 
independent of the characteristics of other units.  To explain Unit A’s behavior, we are concerned with 
Unit A’s partisanship and not with Unit B’s.  Furthermore, there is no suggestion of what might be called 
“indirect diffusion” in the sense that Unit B is somehow “causing” Unit A’s partisanship, which in turn 
“causes” Unit A’s adoption of BITs.  But this does not mean that diffusion-type mechanisms may not 
also play a causal role in influencing state decisions to sign and ratify BITs, and the analysis below makes 
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a number of attempts to control for the possibility that those decisions are indeed influenced by the 
examples of other states. 
 
 For example, in an introductory article to the symposium issue that informs EGS’s own 
contribution, Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett suggest four mechanisms through which international policy 
diffusion might take place.61  States might be “coerced” into adopting particular policies, either by a 
powerful state in the world system, or by powerful international institutions, such as the IMF or World 
Bank.  States might also face “competitive” economic pressures to adopt policies.  Policy adoption might 
be driven by policy “learning”, whereby the policy choices and experiences of other states in the 
international system provide new data on the costs and benefits of particular actions.  And finally, states 
may adopt policies in “emulation” of the shared ideas of the “world polity” or of “epistemic 
communities.” 
    
 This is not the place to critique this particular slicing of the diffusion pie, though it is helpful to 
point out that the models tested below include controls of one sort or another for three of the four 
suggested diffusion mechanisms.  I do not separately and explicitly control for the possibility of policy 
“emulation”, in large part because the concept is under-developed in the Simmons et al. schema and is 
difficult to distinguish in theory or in practice from other diffusion mechanisms.  For example, is a 
developing country that adopts a BIT in response to its neighbor’s own adoption of BITs doing so 
because of competitive pressures, or out of some sort of non-competitive “emulation” based on a shared 
idea that BITs are the “right thing to do”?  It is telling in this regard that Elkins et al. do not separately 
control for the possibility of “emulation” in their own empirical models.  I follow their example here. 
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§ 3.4: Empirical Analysis 
 
 The present Section presents results from a statistical analysis of the arguments made above.  
The basic hypothesis is that, ceteris paribus, states headed by partisans of the economic left will be less 
likely to sign and ratify BITs than states headed by partisans of the economic right.    
 
§ 3.41: The Model 
 
 I test the hypothesis using an unbalanced panel research design, in which models are estimated 
across country-units and across time.  The main dataset comprises country-level annual observations, 
covering the years 1975 to 2000.  I am unable to extend the analysis beyond 2000 because the main 
explanatory variable, government partisanship, is not collected beyond that date.   As a sensitivity test, I 
also present results from an analysis in which I convert the annual data to five-year period averages.  
 
 The models using the annual dataset generally comprise more than 2000 observations, and cover 
up to approximately 140 (capital-importing) countries.  The unit of analysis is the country-year.  This is a 
key methodological difference from the EGS study.  In the EGS models the unit of analysis is the dyad-
year.  This choice reflects the fact that EGS are attempting to explain why particular developing countries 
sign (or don’t sign) BITs with particular capital-exporting countries.  Their data set is accordingly 
arranged by pairs of capital-importing and capital-exporting dyad partners, as is appropriate if one wishes 
to predict whether Nigeria is more likely to sign a BIT with the United Kingdom than with the United 
States.   My own analysis addresses the analytically distinct question of why particular developing 
countries sign (and ratify) BITs with capital-exporting countries considered as a group. 
 
 My research design is “unbalanced” in the sense that certain developing countries are observed 
for more time periods than are others.  This is because of imperfect data availability as well as the entry 
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of new developing countries into the world system following the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
Depending on the form of the dependent variable, I estimate the models using either negative binomial 
or logit techniques.  (In contrast, EGS estimate their models using duration analysis techniques).  In all 
reported cases likelihood-ratio tests indicate that panel estimation, rather than simple pooled estimation, 
is appropriate.   
 
§ 3.42: Dependent Variables 
 
 In all of the models presented below we are, in essence, trying to predict whether or not a given 
developing country will agree to “enter into” a BIT of one kind or another in a particular year.  The 
quotes around “enter into” are meant to indicate an important ambiguity: most countries divide their 
treaty-related decision-making process into two stages.  In the first, the country’s chief executive signs the 
treaty, indicating his intent to see the treaty eventually enter into force.  But the chief executive’s signature, 
by itself, is not usually sufficient to guarantee entry into force: the domestic laws of most countries 
impose the additional requirement of ratification, which is usually the purview of the national legislature.  
Until a treaty has been ratified by the legislatures of both countries that have signed the treaty, the treaty 
will generally have no legal effect, because it has not yet entered into force.  This means that the analyst 
has two choices of dates indicating when a developing country has “entered into” a treaty: either the date 
of signing, which is more properly viewed as the date upon which one branch of the government has 
indicated an intent that the state be legally bound, and the date of ratification, upon which all relevant 
branches of the government have indicated their assent in a binding way. 
 
 Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to collect data on the date of 
developing-country ratification of a particular treaty, as opposed to the date upon which the particular 
treaty enters into force.  (Bilateral treaties generally do not enter into force until they have been ratified by 
both of the treaty signatories, where the signatories’ internal laws require ratification).   The impossibility 
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of identifying dates of ratification for a sufficiently large sample of treaties means that I have to rely on 
the year of treaty entry into force as a proxy for the year in which the developing country treaty partner in 
fact ratified the treaty.  In some cases a treaty’s entry into force may be delayed by the capital-exporting 
partner, though in truth it is difficult to understand why a capital-exporting state would have much if any 
incentive to delay ratification of a treaty that stands primarily to benefit its own investors.  An in those 
cases where country-specific ratification dates are available, it appears from my admittedly non-systematic 
examination that treaties are typically ratified by host states in the same year in which the treaties enter 
into force.  This suggests that relying on dates (e.g. the year) of entry into force is a reasonable if 
imperfect proxy for the date of developing country ratification.  In any event, I report results using both 
dates of signing and dates of ratification to construct the dependent variables. 
 
 Putting aside the question of relying on dates of signing or entry into force, it is important to 
note that the basic dependent variable—whether a country entered into a treaty—can be constructed as 
either a count of new treaties (“how many BITs did the developing country enter into last year?”) or as a 
dichotomous variable (“did the developing country enter into any BITs last year?”).   
 
 I present results for both constructions, with the results for the count models presented first. 
Here the dependent variable is the total number of BITs that a given host state signs or ratifies in a given 
year with any of the top 18 capital-exporting countries.  The dependent variable takes the form of non-
negative count data: in a given year, a given country might sign or ratify 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and so on number of 
BITs.  Poisson maximum-likelihood regression is appropriate for this form of data, although where the 
variance of the dependent variable is greater than it would be if generated by a true Poisson process (e.g. 
where the dependent variable is over-dispersed), negative binomial maximum likelihood regression, a 
special case of Poisson regression, is preferred.  This is because, in the face of significant overdispersion, 
Poisson estimation produces downward-biased standard errors and, thus, inflated z-scores.62  Negative 
binomial regression addresses the problem of overdispersion by parameterizing the degree of dispersion 
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(generally denoted α).  The Poisson model assumes that α is equal to zero; the negative binomial model 
allows α to take on non-zero values. 
 
 There is substantial evidence of overdispersion in the raw count data.  For example, in Model I, 
Table 3.8, presented further below, I predict the number of new strong BITs that enter into force for a 
given developing country in a given year.  Summary statistics of the dependent variable for that model 
show that the standard deviation exceeds the sample mean by, approximately, a factor of 3: 
 
Table 3.4: Overdispersion of the BIT Variable 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
New Strong 
BITs, EIF 
3120 0.165 0.548 0 5 
Note: Summary Statistics are from the sample estimated in Model I, Table 3.8, presented 
and discussed in the next Section. 
 
The other versions of the dependent variable presented in Table 3.8 have similar means and standard 
deviations, again suggesting overdispersion.  Likelihood-ratio (LR) tests on the estimated models provide 
further evidence.  For all of the models presented in Table 3.8, LR tests suggest that the α 
parameterization of the degree of dispersion is significantly greater than zero at the ≤ 0.001 level.  
Because the Poisson distribution is characterized by an α of zero, the results of the LR test council 
strongly in favor of negative binomial rather than Poisson estimation.  (In fact, model results using 
Poisson regression, in either its random- or fixed-effects form, are “better” in the sense that key 
independent variables are more consistently statistically significant than they are in the negative binomial 
results presented below.  I do not report the Poisson results, however, precisely because of the likelihood 
that the results are biased). 
 
 I report results for both random effects and conditional fixed effects negative binomial models.  
The “effects” concern the way in which the value of the α (overdispersion) parameter is modeled.  In 
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both cases α is held constant within country groups.  In the random effects case, α is assigned to country-
groups randomly such that the overall distribution satisfies a particular distribution.  In the conditional 
fixed effects case, α is allowed to take any value, without constraint to an overall distribution.  We have 
no a priori reason to prefer either modeling approach, though it is worth noting that the conditional fixed 
estimator forces countries with all-zero outcomes across the time-period of study to drop from the 
sample.  This means that the random effects and conditional fixed effects models cover somewhat 
different samples and, for that reason, are not fully comparable.  (Stata also permits the computation of 
population-averaged (PA) negative binomial models.  I do not report PA results here because the PA 
estimator fails to converge in several of the model specifications). 
    
 Second, I present results for models in which the dependent variable takes on a value of “0” if a 
given host state signs or ratifies no BITs in a given time period, and a value of “1” if it signs or ratifies 
one or more BITs in a given time period.  In other words, the dependent variable here is whether or not a 
host state signs or ratifies any BITs.   Here that the dependent variable is dichotomous, which means that logit 
or probit maximum-likelihood regression techniques are appropriate.  Because logit is used more 
frequently in the empirical political science literature, and because logit coefficients tend to be more easily 
interpretable than probit coefficients, I present logit results in the main figures below.  Note also that 
dichotomizing the dependent variable throws out a certain amount of information.  For instance, in the 
logit analysis the developing country that signs four new BITs in a given year is analytically 
indistinguishable from the developing country that signs only one new BIT.  The loss of information, 
however, appears to be substantively slight, because there are relatively few observations in which the 
number of new BITs signed or ratified is higher than “1”.  For example, tabulating the dependent 
variable used in Model I, Table 3.8 (the number of new strong BITs entering into force), we see that less 
than four percent of the sample observations contain a count higher than “1”: 
Table 3.5: Summary Statistics: New Strong BITs Entering Into Force 
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Count Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent  
0 2777 89.01 89.01 
1 233 7.47 96.47 
2 64 2.05 98.53 
3 33 1.06 99.58 
4 10 0.32 99.90 
5 5 0.10 100.00 
Note: Summary Statistics are from the sample estimated in Model I, Table 3.8, presented and 
discussed in the next Section. 
 
The other versions of the dependent variable show similar distributive characteristics, suggesting, again, 
that the information loss entailed in moving from negative binomial to logit regression is not particularly 
severe.  As with the negative binomial models, I present logit results using both random and fixed effects 
estimators.  
 
§ 3.43: Independent Variables 
 
 Government Partisanship.  The independent variable of main theoretical interest taps the 
partisan ideology of the host state’s government leaders.  I use data on government partisanship derived 
from the World Bank’s Database on Political Institutions (DPI) to construct dummy variables indicating 
whether the executive is controlled by a member of a economically leftist party and whether the 
legislature is controlled by members of an economically leftist party.63  The DPI uses primary and 
secondary sources to classify political parties along a left-center-right continuum on the basis of 
economic policy orientation.  Parties on the right prefer less government control over the economy; 
parties on the left prefer the opposite.  The DPI identifies the partisan affiliation of the holder of 
executive power (e.g. the president or prime minister) and the affiliations of the major majority and 
minority parties in national legislatures. Where the DPI indicates that the executive is controlled by the 
left, the executive dummy variable is coded as “1”; where the DPI indicates that the executive is coded by 
a “center”, “right”, or “other” type of party, I code the executive dummy variable as “0”.  Likewise, 
where the DPI codes the largest party in the parliamentary majority as being on the left, my legislative 
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dummy variable takes the value of “1”.  Where the DPI codes the largest majority party as being on the 
“center” or “right”, or being “other”, my legislative dummy variable takes on the value of “0.”   
 
 The following Figure shows the annual proportion of leftist-controlled governments in the 
sample on an annual basis.  We can see that in the typical year approximately 1/3 of the sampled 
countries were governed either by a leftist chief executive or a leftist-controlled parliament, and that there 
is an overall decline in the proportion of countries governed by the left in the years following 1990, as a 
number of formerly Communist countries embraced democracy (and rightist political candidates), and as 
right-governed former republics of the Soviet Union entered the sample.   
 
Figure 3.2: Proportion of Developing Countries Governed by Leftist Chief Executives or 
Legislatures 
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 In the analysis below I estimate separate models using, alternately, the executive-branch and 
legislative-branch partisanship variables.  This is because the two variables are very highly correlated (with 
a correlation coefficient of over 0.88), leading to problems of multicollinearity when both measures are 
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included in a single model.  But to the extent that chief executives primarily control treaty signings, and 
legislatures primarily control treaty ratifications, we would expect the partisan chief executive variable to 
be most consistently correlated with dates of signing, and the partisan legislature variable to be most 
consistently correlated with dates of entry into force.  
 
 The Collapse of Communism.  The discussion in Section 3.2 suggested that partisan differences 
in FDI policy might be expected to decline in the face of strong “lessons learned” about the relative costs 
and benefits of different courses of policy action.  The collapse of Communism is widely held to 
represent the kind of dramatic evidence of policy failure that is needed to spur changes in long-held 
patterns of beliefs and behavior. 
I control for this possibility by including a dummy variable modeling the period before and after the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall in the final half of 1989.  For years prior to 1990, the dummy variable is coded 
as “0”.  For years after 1989, the dummy variable is coded as “1”.  Note however that the hypothesized 
relationship between partisanship and the end of the Cold War is a conditional one.  Partisanship is 
predicted to matter prior to 1990, and to not matter, or to matter less, in the years after 1989.  I model 
this conditionality in the standard way: by including in the models a multiplicative interaction term 
between the government partisanship variable and the Berlin Wall dummy variable. 
 
 Number of Existing BITs.  I also include two control variables for the number of BITs already 
in force in the given host state.  The first variable is a simple count of the number of strong BITs already 
in force, and the second variable is a count of the number of non-strong BITs already in force.  These 
two variables controls for the fact that as the host state has more and more BITs in force with the 
world’s capital-exporting countries, there are less potential new capital-exporting partners with whom to 
sign additional treaties.  All else being equal, we would expect a particular host state to be less likely to 
sign or ratify a new BIT as the number of potential new partners decreases. 
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  Developing Country Competition.  One of the more consistent themes in the BIT literature is 
that developing countries are in a “competition” for FDI.  The basic idea is intuitively plausible.  Foreign 
investors are footloose, and have the luxury of sinking their investments in one of a number of 
“competing” developing countries.  Developing countries recognize this possibility, and adopt their FDI 
policies in response to the policies of their competitors in order to remain “competitive” in the contest to 
attract the investments.  EGS argue in particular that competitive dynamics are in large part responsible 
for the popularity of BITs.  But EGS fail to map out the competitive logic of their theory in any detail.  
This failure leads them to make a critical analytic error.  For example, EGS argue that competitive 
pressures to adopt BITs will increase linearly as more and more competing developing countries sign the 
treaties.  Where more of a particular developing state’s competitors have already signed BITs, the 
remaining holdout, they argue, will be significantly more likely to give in than it was when none of its 
competitors had yet taken the plunge.  And indeed, they report very strong empirical confirmation of 
their theoretical expectations: “When more of a host state’s competitors have signed BITs, that country is 
much more likely to do so itself.”64  The problem is that their theoretical expectations are the exact 
opposite of what competitive theory, properly understood, should lead us to expect.   
 
 Take the following simple illustration of the competitive dynamics that might drive BIT 
adoptions.  Imagine four developing countries, A, B, C, and D, which are competing for a given FDI 
project.  Imagine that the foreign investor compares the four countries along five dimensions (quality of 
infrastructure, policy stability, and the like) and finds that the countries are evenly matched.  On the 
investor’s checklist, each country rates a five out of five.  In this situation, the investor’s decision will 
essentially be determined by chance, and each country stands a 25 percent probability of winning the 
project.  This is the situation represented in Column I of Table 3.6, below.  Boldfaced entries indicate 
that the particular State has a chance of winning the FDI project. 
 
Table 3.6: The Competitive Dynamics of BITs (Investor-Friendly Index / Percent Chance of 
Winning Investment Project) 
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 I II III IV 
State A 5 / 25% 6 / 100% 6 / 33% 6 / 25% 
State B 5 / 25% 5 / 0% 6 / 33% 6 / 25% 
State C 5 / 25% 5 / 0% 6 / 33% 6 / 25% 
State D 5 / 25% 5 / 0% 5 / 0% 6 / 25% 
 
Now imagine that it becomes feasible to sign and ratify a BIT, and that doing so would raise a country’s 
investment rating by one.  State A concludes a BIT, and its score increases to 6.  State A is now a 
noticeably more attractive place to invest than its competitors.  State A will win the project with 100 
percent certainty, as indicated in Column II.  Now notice what happens in Column III.  Here, States B 
and C have followed A’s lead and also entered into BITs, raising their own probability of winning the 
project from zero percent to 33 percent, but lowering A’s probability of success from 100 percent to 33 
percent as well.  When State D finally follows suit, the developing countries are back in the same 
(relative) positions they were in before the BITs were feasible.  Each stands an equal, 25 percent chance 
of winning the project.   
 
 This simple model suggests that the effects of BITs on the distribution of FDI inflows will be 
the greatest when BITs are few and far between.  When State A is the only state bound by a BIT, it will 
always win competitive FDI projects given equality on all other factors that matter to investors.  On the 
other hand, when all states are bound by BITs, the treaties have no effect on who wins a particular 
project. This in turn suggests that developing countries will face the greatest “competitive pressures” to 
sign and ratify a BIT when few or none if its “competitors” have done so.  This is when the expected 
benefit of the BIT is the greatest.  And because, as we have seen, BITs necessarily entail costs as well as 
benefits, we might expect an equilibrium of sorts to be reached well before all competing states have 
adopted the treaties.  For example, in Column III in the Table above, imagine that the costs of entering 
into a BIT exceed the expected benefit of a 25 percent chance of winning competitive FDI projects.  In 
that case, State D is better off declining to join the BIT party. 
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 In the empirical analyses presented below I proxy the state of the FDI “competition” by 
controlling for the number of BITs in force in each host state’s geographic region.  This count of 
regional BITs is adjusted by subtracting the particular host state’s own BITs from the regional count.65    
I standardize the measure by dividing the adjusted regional count by the number of capital-importing 
countries in each region.  I expect this measure of regional competition to be negatively correlated with 
the probability that a given host state will sign or ratify its own BITs.  As the number of regional BITs 
increases, competitive incentives for holdouts to adopt BITs should decrease. 
 
 EGS use a more complicated methodology to identify “competitors”.  They draw on work in 
network analysis to calculate “spatial lags” that measure the “competitive distance” between units, based 
on inter-unit correlations across certain variables assume to be relevant to investor decision-making.  
Units that are “closer” are assumed to be “competitors” for FDI projects.  EGS calculate three different 
spatial lag variables.  The first measures the similarity of export markets, the second the similarity of 
goods exported, and the third measures similarity among a basket of “cultural” variables.   
 
 My position is that focusing on regions as the epicenter of FDI competition is to be preferred, 
both on pragmatic and on substantive grounds.  Pragmatically, identifying regions is computationally far 
simpler for the analyst, as it requires significantly less information and mathematical manipulation.  Using 
regions as a proxy means of identifying “competitors” thus promotes more parsimonious model-building. 
Substantively, note that the real task at hand is to identify as competitors the same countries that 
developing leaders themselves view as competitors.  By “competition” we mean that State A monitors 
the policy choices of State B and views itself as materially affected by those policy choices.  Presumably 
national leaders use some sort of heuristic process to identify states worthy of monitoring, and certainly 
some states will be easier to monitor than others.  The real question, then, is whether calculating various 
“spatial lags”, and especially calculating spatial lags based on the sophisticated analysis of bilateral trade 
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flows, accurately approximates the actual heuristic used by leaders to decide which countries’ FDI 
policies to carefully monitor.  It is certain that national leaders in the developing world do not actually 
identify competitors on the basis of spatial lag calculations.  Indeed, until quite recently calculating spatial 
lags would have been impossible given the lack of reliable cross-national bilateral trade data for most of 
the developing world.  National leaders simply haven’t had the statistical capacity to determine the 
similarity of export patterns to those of other developing countries, even if they might have found the 
exercise worthwhile. 
 
 What national leaders are likely to do is precisely to adopt a regional bias in their monitoring 
efforts for both subjective and objective reasons.  Subjectively, monitoring the policies of regional 
members is likely to be easier than monitoring the policies of states outside of the region due to 
geographic distance and, perhaps, cultural factors that are regionally based, such as the sharing of a 
common language.  Regionalism is also highly institutionalized through free trade areas, regional working 
groups, and other regionally based institutions, providing regional members with ample opportunities to 
remain up-to-date on the policy initiatives of other members.  Indeed, much of the work of the United 
Nations is region-based and region-organized, and it is very likely that this tendency to formalize 
international institutions along regional lines in the U.N. both reflects and influences the tendency of 
state leaders to look first and foremost and what their geographic neighbors are doing, whether in the 
realm of FDI policy or elsewhere.  It is notable in this regard that in his comparative study of domestic 
FDI regimes, based on interviews with FDI officials and international businessmen, the only “overt” 
evidence of competition that Robinson found was regionally-based (between Malaysia and the 
Philippines).66   
 
 Objectively, there appears to be quite good reason for developing countries to view their regional 
counterparts as likely competitors for FDI projects.  For example, there is fairly robust evidence that FDI 
tends to cluster on a regional basis, and that multinational corporations tend to arrange their operations 
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on a regional basis, all of which suggests that when deciding where to site a project foreign investors tend 
to compare and contrast regionally proximate investment opportunities.67  In contrast, there appears to 
be little to no evidence in support of the EGS contention that FDI tends to mimic or to follow 
developing country export patterns.  EGS assert conclusorily that “trade competitors are also likely to be 
competitors for FDI and empirical studies show that the two are strongly correlated,”68 but they provide 
no citations to any such study. 
 
 In sum, in the absence of stronger evidence that spatial lag constructions accurately reflect either 
the subjective perceptions of national leaders or the objective tendencies of foreign investors, the better 
route is to approximate competition through regional variables.  
 
 Institutional Coercion.  I include a dummy variable indicating whether or not the particular host 
state has received a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank in the period of the 
treaty signing or its entry into force.  It is reasonable to suspect that international financial institutions 
might pressure or bribe developing countries to adopt investment treaties.  The International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank are the two most important such institutions, and either of them might 
view BITs as desirable either in a narrow, technocratic sense (as helpful in promoting economic 
development by securing property rights, and in promoting or stabilizing international capital flows) or in 
a more nuanced political sense (as a means of providing important economic benefits for the 
corporations of the institutions’ most important members). 
 
 Past FDI Performance.  Finally, I include a measure of each host state’s past performance at 
attracting FDI.  If host states sign BITs primarily in an attempt to attract greater levels of foreign 
investment, then we would expect host states with poorer records of attracting investment to be more 
willing enter into the treaties than host states with highly successful records.  Host states that are already 
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successful at attracting large amounts of foreign investment have little need to incur the sovereignty and 
political costs associated with BITs.  
 
 I measure past investment performance as FDI inflows as a percent of host state GDP, a 
measure which we can usefully view as tapping the extent to which FDI is “penetrating” the host 
economy.69  FDI penetration has been used as a measure of foreign investment success in previous 
studies of the determinants of FDI inflows. Including past FDI performance allows us to avoid having to 
include separate control variables for the overall attractiveness of the given host state as a destination for 
foreign investment.  For example, it is reasonably argued that host states suffering from high levels of 
political risk will be most likely to turn to BITs in order to compensate for their risky investment 
climates.  Where the investment climate is already favorable, host states gain little by tying themselves to 
international law.   In our case, however, differences in overall investment climate should be already 
reflected in our measure of past foreign investment success—high-risk host states should have lower FDI 
penetration ratios; low-risk states should have higher rates of FDI penetration. 
 
§ 3.5: Model Results & Discussion 
 
 Tables 3.8 and 3.9 present results for the negative binomial models.   Table 3.8 uses a random-
effects estimator, while Table 3.9 uses a fixed-effects estimator.  I test the robustness of the general 
model across five separate specifications of the dependent variable. Model I predicts the number of new 
strong BITs entering into force in a given year.  Strong BITs are those that contain comprehensive, 
effective state pre-consents to investor-initiated international arbitration, as described in the previous 
chapter.  The effects of partisanship should be most noticeable for these kinds of BITs, because pre-
consents provide the principle reason why the treaties might be viewed as incompatible with the 
achievement of traditional leftist policy goals.  Model II predicts strong BIT signings.  Because of the 
difficulty of locating copies of signed but unratified BITs (which is necessary in order to classify the 
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treaties’ dispute-settlement provisions), Model II counts only those signed strong BITs that eventually 
enter into force.  Model III predicts the entry into force of all BITs, including strong and not-strong 
treaties.  Models IV and V predict the number of new signed BITs of all types (again, strong and not-
strong), but Model IV includes only those BITs that eventually enter into force, while Model V includes 
all BIT signings, whether or not the signed treaties ever enter into force.  All models also contain year 
dummy variables, the results of which are not reported.70  Including country dummies leads to serious 
computational difficulties, with most models failing to converge when they are included.  For that reason 
none of the models contain country dummies.   
 
 Table 3.7, immediately below, presents summary statistics for the independent variables used in 
the empirical analysis. 
 
Table 3.7: Summary Statistics, Basic Negative Binomial Model 
Independent Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
# Own Strong BITs Already in 
Force 
3212 0.94 2.20 0 16 
# Own Non-Strong BITs 
Already in Force 
3212 1.25 2.04 0 16 
# BITs in Force in Region 3212 2.47 2.47 0 12.13 
FDI Performance (FDI Inflows, 
% 
GDP) 
3212 
1.48 5.08 -83.02 145.17 
IMF or IBRD Loan Dummy 3212 0.57 0.50 0 1 
Berlin Wall Dummy 3212 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Left Executive 3212 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Berlin Wall*Left Executive 3212 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Note: Summary statistics are from the sample estimated in Table 3.8, Model I, below. 
. 
 Turn now to the presentation of the negative binomial model results, presented below in Tables 
3.8 and 3.9.  For ease of exposition, Table 3.8 and 3.9 reports incident rate ratios (IRRs) rather than 
regression coefficients.  The “rate” reflected an in IRR is the predicted number of events (either BIT 
signings or BIT entries into force) per time period.71 IRRs are calculated by exponentiating the negative 
binomial coefficients of the fitted model.  The IRR represents the estimated rate ratio for the dependent 
 106
variable when the relevant independent variable changes by one unit, holding the other variables in the 
model constant.  For example, an IRR for the partisan government variable of 0.900 would indicate that 
as partisan control of government changed by one unit (from “0” for control by the right to “1” for 
control by the left), the expected number of treaty signings (or ratifications) declines by 10 percent.    On 
the other hand, an IRR of 1.100 would indicate an effect of the opposite direction: a move from right to 
left control of government is associated with a 10 percent increase in the rate ratio.  In this latter example, 
we would expect leftist governments to sign (or ratify) 10 percent more treaties than their rightist 
counterparts. IRRs of less than 1 thus indicate a “negative” average effect on the dependent (count) 
variable; an IRR of greater than 1 indicates a “positive” effect. 
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Table 3.8:  Partisanship and the Willingness to Sign and Ratify Strong BITs—Random Effects Negative Binomial Regression 
 
 I.  New Strong BITs 
In Force 
II. New Strong BITs 
Signed 
III.  All New BITs In 
Force 
IV.  All New BITs 
Signed (Only if EIF) 
V.  All New BITs 
Signed 
# Own Strong BITs 
Already in Force, t-1 
0.941 
(2.00)* 
0.935 
(2.24)* 
0.821 
(6.22)** 
0.827 
(6.18)** 
0.960 
(1.60) 
0.960 
(1.60) 
0.870 
(4.89)** 
0.867 
(5.03)** 
0.863 
(5.51)** 
0.860 
(5.66)** 
# Own Non-Strong 
BITs Already in Force, t-
1 
0.954 
(1.19) 
0.983 
(0.44) 
0.964 
(0.92) 
0.965 
(0.92) 
0.908 
(3.35)** 
0.919 
(3.07)** 
0.843 
(5.49)** 
0.846 
(5.62)** 
0.840 
(5.86)** 
0.845 
(5.91)** 
# BITs in Force in 
Region, t-1 
0.992 
(0.19) 
1.005 
(0.11) 
0.949 
(1.14) 
0.965 
(0.77) 
0.979 
(0.55) 
0.984 
(0.42) 
0.921 
(1.81)a 
0.930 
(1.60) 
0.923 
(1.98)* 
0.931 
(1.75)a 
FDI Performance (FDI 
Inflows, % GDP), t-1 
0.987 
(1.11) 
0.987 
(1.17) 
0.995 
(0.45) 
0.993 
(0.59) 
0.989 
(1.00) 
0.988 
(1.07) 
0.992 
(0.63) 
0.990 
(0.79) 
0.993 
(0.64) 
0.992 
(0.78) 
IMF or IBRD Loan 
Dummy 
1.182 
(0.98) 
1.233 
(1.23) 
1.169 
(0.99) 
1.192 
(1.12) 
1.635 
(3.23)** 
1.753 
(3.72)** 
1.486 
(2.67)** 
1.570 
(3.08)** 
1.497 
(2.85)** 
1.581 
(3.27)** 
Berlin Wall Dummy 16.362 
(3.58)** 
4.567 
(1.99)* 
32.605 
(3.40)** 
31.322 
(3.19)** 
4.748 
(3.31)** 
3.091 
(2.15)* 
4.118 
(2.66)** 
3.851 
(2.52)* 
14.304 
(4.32)** 
5.833 
(3.14)** 
Left Executive 0.289 
(3.20)** 
- 0.375 
(3.27)** 
- 0.698 
(1.50) 
- 0.613 
(2.15)* 
- 0.675 
(1.83)a 
- 
Berlin Wall*Left 
Executive 
3.169 
(2.88)** 
- 2.581 
(3.11)** 
- 1.421 
(1.36) 
- 1.736  
(2.32)* 
- 1.725 
(2.39)* 
- 
Left Legislature - 0.374 
(2.70)** 
- 0.379 
(3.32)** 
- 0.767 
(1.13) 
- 0.620 
(2.12)* 
- 0.672 
(1.85)a 
Berlin Wall*Left 
Legislature 
- 2.513 
(2.46)* 
- 2.702 
(3.36)** 
- 1.328 
(1.13) 
- 1.869 
(2.70)** 
- 1.776 
(2.58)** 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3212 3120 3211 3119 3209 3117 3120 3118 3212 3120 
Countries 146 144 146 144 146 144 146 144 146 144 
Period 1975-
2000 
1975-
2000 
1975-
2000 
1975-
2000 
1975-
2000 
1975-
2000 
1975-
2000 
1975-
2000 
1975-
2000 
1975-
2000 
Χ2 195.05** 195.88** 237.23** 238.33** 188.83** 186.73** 203.90** 213.88** 221.90** 231.29** 
Notes: Estimated using negative binomial regression (using the -xtnbreg- routine in Stata), with random country-specific dispersion levels. Incident rate 
ratios (exponentiated coefficients) are reported, along with absolute-value z-scores in parentheses.  * and ** indicate (two-tailed) significance at the  ≤ 
0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively; a indicates significance at the ≤ 0.10 level. 
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Table 3.9:  Partisanship and the Willingness to Sign and Ratify Strong BITs—Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Regression 
 I.  New Strong BITs 
In Force 
II. New Strong BITs 
Signed 
III.  All New BITs In 
Force 
IV.  All New BITs 
Signed (Only if EIF) 
V.  All New BITs 
Signed 
# Own Strong BITs 
Already in Force, t-1 
0.800 
(7.29)** 
0.796 
(7.59)** 
0.710 
(10.52)** 
0.720 
(10.32)** 
0.854 
(6.04)** 
0.856 
(6.02)** 
0.775 
(8.63)** 
0.773 
(8.91)** 
0.766 
(9.49)** 
 0.764 
(9.81)** 
# Own Non-Strong 
BITs Already in Force, t-
1 
0.837 
(2.87)** 
0.871 
(2.31)* 
0.872 
(2.62)** 
0.860 
(2.93)** 
0.788 
(6.27)** 
0.806 
(6.16)** 
0.732 
(7.98)** 
0.736 
(8.51)** 
0.728 
(8.11)** 
0.734 
(8.63)** 
# BITs in Force in 
Region, t-1 
0.920 
(1.15) 
0.937 
(0.90) 
0.823 
(2.98)** 
0.851 
(2.48)* 
0.876 
(2.24)* 
0.881 
(2.17)* 
0.788 
(3.96)** 
0.803 
(3.73)** 
0.801 
(4.13)** 
0.812 
(3.91)** 
FDI Performance (FDI 
Inflows, % GDP), t-1 
0.988 
(0.89) 
0.986 
(1.00) 
1.001 
(0.09) 
0.999 
(0.07) 
0.991 
(0.64) 
0.990 
(0.73) 
1.000 
(0.01) 
0.997 
(0.20) 
0.999 
(0.10) 
0.997 
(0.26) 
IMF or IBRD Loan 
Dummy 
0.900 
(0.57) 
0.970 
(0.17) 
1.052 
(0.31) 
1.068 
(0.40) 
1.463 
(2.26)* 
1.637 
(2.93)** 
1.389 
(2.12)* 
1.503 
(2.70)** 
1.409 
(2.28)* 
1.523 
(2.86)** 
Berlin Wall Dummy 5.113 
(2.51)* 
5.933 
(2.35)* 
56.206 
(3.92)** 
44.126 
(3.67)** 
38.062 
(6.04)** 
34.081 
(5.81)** 
20.253 
(5.50)** 
19.761 
(5.50)** 
20.099 
(5.38)** 
4.014 
(3.43)** 
Left Executive 0.180 
(4.01)** 
- 0.267 
(4.07)** 
- 0.353 
(3.51)** 
- 0.325 
(4.24)** 
- 0.378 
(3.86)** 
- 
Berlin Wall*Left 
Executive 
3.907 
(3.20)** 
- 2.808 
(3.26)** 
- 2.363 
(2.84)** 
- 2.575 
(3.62)** 
- 2.492 
(3.64)** 
- 
Left Legislature - 0.253 
(3.45)** 
- 0.274 
(4.13)** 
- 0.415 
(3.05)** 
- 0.339 
(4.18)** 
- 0.375 
(3.92)** 
Berlin Wall*Left 
Legislature 
- 2.974 
(2.75)** 
- 3.045 
(3.62)** 
- 2.064 
(2.49)* 
- 2.780 
(4.03)** 
- 2.574 
(3.87)** 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2321 2271 2448 2395 2433 2383 2538 2485 2696 2617 
Countries 106 104 111 109 111 109 115 113 122 119 
Period 1975-
2000 
1975-
2000 
1975-
2000 
1975-
2000 
1975-
2000 
1975-
2000 
1975-
2000 
1975-
2000 
1975-
2000 
1975-
2000 
Χ2 219.24 221.15** 302.72** 292.34** 201.57** 201.42** 268.62 282.30** 288.77** 305.13 
Notes: Estimated using negative binomial regression (using the -xtnbreg- routine in Stata), with fixed country-specific dispersion levels. Incident rate 
ratios (exponentiated coefficients) are reported, along with absolute-value z-scores in parentheses.  * and ** indicate (two-tailed) significance at the  ≤ 
0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively; a indicates significance at the ≤ 0.10 level. 
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 We see in both the fixed- and random-effects negative binomial models that the number of 
strong BITs already in force in a particular developing country is consistently negatively correlated with 
the number of new BITs that the developing country signs or ratifies, and that this negative relationship 
(indicated by IRRs of less than one) is statistically significant across nearly all of the negative binomial 
models.  The result is intuitive and as predicted.  Developing countries that already have entered into 
large numbers of strong BITs have less objective need to enter into even more BITs, and they have fewer 
potential BIT partners to choose from.  Similar results obtain for the variable measuring the number of 
non-strong BITs already in force.  In 16 of the 20 negative binomial specifications, developing countries 
with larger numbers of non-strong BITs in force have lower rates of new BIT signings and ratifications. 
This suggests that developing countries at least to some extent view non-strong BITs as acceptable 
substitutes for strong BITs. 
 
 We also see very little evidence that the willingness to enter into BITs is driven by competitive 
dynamics of the sort described by EGS, in which competitive pressures increase as more and more 
competing states adopt BITs.  In the random effects models presented in Table 3.8, the number of BITs 
in force in the relevant region is statistically significant in only one of the ten specifications (Model V, 
Column One).  And even in that specification, the variable is “wrongly” signed.  The IRR of 0.923 
suggests that the number of BITs in force in regional competitors is associated with lower rates of new 
BIT signings and ratifications.  This result is, of course, consistent with my own model of competition, 
which suggests that where a developing country’s regional competitors have already entered into greater 
numbers of BITs, the particular developing country under analysis will sign and ratify fewer BITs of its 
own.  In the fixed-effects model presented in Table 3.9, we see similar results.  The regional BIT variable 
is significant across eight of the specifications, but again the variable is “wrongly” signed from the 
perspective of EGS.  IRRs are consistently less than unity, suggesting that as more regional competitors 
enter into BITs, incentives to enter into new BITs decline.  
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 We also find little support for the idea that developing countries are entering into BITs in a sort 
of rationalistic response to past poor performance at attracting FDI.  In none of the models does our 
measure of past “FDI penetration” (FDI/GDP) achieve anything close to a standard level of statistical 
significance.   As a sensitivity test, I re-ran the negative binomial models substituting a five-year moving 
average measure of FDI penetration and a measure of the given host state’s past share of world FDI 
inflows as measures of past FDI performance.  Neither of these substitutions led to substantively 
different results than those presented in the Tables. 
 
 Finally, Tables 3.8 and 3.9 provide relatively strong support for the suspicion that the popularity 
of BITs is driven in particular by pressure from powerful international financial institutions.  In three of 
the five models we see that developing countries that are under an IMF or World Bank loan program 
have statistically and substantively much more likely to sign or ratify BITs (undifferentiated by dispute 
settlement provisions) than are countries not benefiting from IMF or World Bank lending, with incident 
rate ratios of approximately 1.5 or higher.  However, the IMF-World Bank lending variable fails to attain 
conventional levels of statistical significance in the first two models of either Table, which model the 
likelihood that a developing country will sign or ratify strong BITs in particular.  The negative binomial 
results thus provides little evidence that the IMF and World Bank influence which kinds of BITs 
developing countries adopt, as long as they adopt a BIT of one kind or another.  It is worth emphasizing 
that in the reported models I have assumed that IMF and World Bank influence takes place in the same 
period as the treaty signing or entry into force.  Lagging or leading the IMF-World Bank lending variable 
by one period might be appropriate if we assume that the IMF and World Bank make entering a BIT a 
precondition or a reward of lending, respectively.  Empirically speaking, leading or lagging the IMF-World 
Bank variable does not radically change the reported results.  The IMF-World Bank variable tends to 
remain (or to become) significant in most, but not all, models.   
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 Of most theoretical interest, of course, are the results for the partisanship variables and their 
interaction with the Berlin Wall dummy variable.    In the Tables the results for both of these key 
variables are reported in boldface type where statistically significant at the ≤ 0.05 level (two-tailed) or 
better.   The first thing to note is that theoretical expectations for the partisanship variables are generally 
strongly confirmed across the various count models.  Having a leftist executive or a leftist legislature is 
significantly associated with a substantively meaningful in the rate of strong BIT signings and entries into 
force in both the random effects and fixed effects specifications (Models I and II).  For example, in the 
random effects model of the entry into force of strong BITs (Table 3.8, Model I), we see that countries 
governed by leftist executives have a predicted rate of treaty entries into force that is over 70 percent 
lower than the rate for non-leftist countries.  (The relevant IRR is 0.289).  In the equivalent fixed-effects 
model, Table 3.9, Model I), we see that a leftist executive is associated with a rate of strong BIT entries 
into force that is more than 80 percent lower than the rate for non-leftist executives. We see substantively 
equivalent, confirmatory results for the partisanship variables (both executive and legislative) in all of the 
fixed effects models, and in six of the ten random-effects estimations.  Across all of the successful 
models, left-controlled governments are predicted to sign or ratify between approximately one third and 
two thirds fewer BITs than non-left-controlled governments.   
 
 The partisanship variables perform the most poorly in the random effects estimations of the 
entry into force of all BITs (undifferentiated by dispute settlement provisions, Table 3.8 Model III), and 
of the signing of all BITs (undifferentiated by dispute settlement provisions, and including BITs that 
never entered into force, Table 3.8, Model V).  This failure is not entirely surprising.  We would expect 
any link between partisanship and BITs to be the weakest, statistically speaking, when the treaties are 
undifferentiated by dispute settlement provisions. In Models III and V the sample includes a relatively 
significant number of treaties that are substantively low-cost—low cost precisely because they do not 
contain guaranteed investor access to international arbitration.  And because these are relatively low-cost 
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from a classically leftist economic and political perspective, leftist governments should not necessarily be 
any less willing to enter into them than their rightist counterparts.  
 
 But recall that because the models are interactive, with the partisanship variables multiplied 
against the Berlin Wall dummy variable, the results for the partisan government component of the 
interaction term represent the effects of partisanship on BIT signings or entries into force only when the 
Berlin Wall dummy variable equals zero.  Substantively, this means that the consistently negative effects 
of left partisanship on rates of BIT signings and entries into force that we discussed immediately above 
are only relevant to the years prior to 1990.  On the other hand, the results for the interaction term itself 
can be interpreted as representing the effects of partisanship on treaty signings and ratifications as the 
Berlin Wall dummy variable moves from zero to one.  That is, the interaction variable represents the 
effects of partisanship in the years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and theory would suggest that in 
the post-Wall years the differences in the willingness of leftist and no-leftist governments to enter into 
BITs should decrease, even to the point, perhaps, that partisanship is no longer a statistically significant 
predictor of treaty signings or ratifications.  In fact, the results suggest an empirical relationship rather 
different than expectations, but nonetheless quite interesting.  In the post-1989 years the relationship 
between left control of government and the willingness to enter into BITs actually reverses direction.  In 
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 the IRR for the interaction term is consistently greater than one (indicating that left-
controlled governments are more likely to enter into BITs than non-left governments), and that this 
positive relationship is statistically significant across 18 of the 20 negative binomial specifications.  IRRs 
for the interaction term are generally well over 2.00, indicating that in the post-1989 years left-controlled 
governments could be expected to sign or ratify more than double the number of BITs than non-left-
controlled governments.  
 
 The admittedly counterintuitive results for the partisanship-Berlin Wall interaction term are not 
necessarily inconsistent with theory, as they indeed suggest that leftist governments radically changed 
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their ideas about the value of the role that BITs and FDI might play in helping them to achieve their 
development objectives.    The specific result—that leftist governments are more likely to enter into BITs 
in the post-1989 era than their rightist counterparts— is also not necessarily inconsistent with reported 
partisan differences in pursuing economic liberalization more generally.  For example, there is some 
evidence that leftist governments in post-1989 Eastern Europe were more likely to adopt radical market-
opening reforms than their rightist counterparts.72 As way of explanation, it may be the case that once 
leftist governments decided to begin relying on and promoting FDI inflows as part of their development 
strategies, they perceived a need to publicly signal their change of heart to skeptical investors.  BITs 
provide such a signal by, in effect, offering a sort of legally enforceable warranty that these “new” leftist 
governments are sincere in repudiating the left’s earlier hostility to foreign investment.73 
 
 Tables 3.10 and 3.11, below, present some suggestive (but certainly not definitive) evidence that 
left-dominated governments have historically had something of an investment-related image problem, 
and that BITs might reasonably be viewed as useful in mitigating it.   
 
 Consider Table 3.10 first.  The Table shows pairwide correlation coefficients between the left 
partisanship variable (leftist control of the executive) and a number of different expert-survey-based 
measures of various kinds of foreign investment-related “risks”, “attitudes”, and policies.  The MERA 
variable represents the expert-perceived risk of “nationalization” specifically in the mineral-extraction 
sectors of the economy, and is only available for a number of very recent years.  The variable is derived 
from BERI, S.A.’s Mineral Extraction Risk Assessment study, which BERI, S.A. conducts for the 
Japanese Oil, Gas, and Metals Corporation, and covers up to 145 countries.  The BERI Investment 
Attitude and Policy Continuity measures are also compiled from experts surveyed by BERI, S.A., and tap 
expert perceptions of the non-sector-specific foreign investment environment for a sample of up to 53 
countries.  The ICRG measure is derived from PRS Group Inc.’s International Country Risk Guide and 
represents expert perceptions of the quality of developing countries’ policies relating to “contract 
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viability”, “profits repatriation”, and “payments delays”.  The ICRG measures cover up to 140 countries.  
Higher ratings represent a more investor-friendly environment for all four measures.   
 
Table 3.10: Bivariate Relationship between Leftist Control of the Executive and Investment Risk 
 Years Obs. Correlation Coefficient 
MERA 
Nationalization Risk 
1998-2000 362 -0.13* 
1980-2000 695 -0.43** 
1980-1989 317 -0.52** 
BERI Investment 
Attitude 
1990-2000 378 -0.33** 
1980-2000 695 -0.03 
1980-1989 317 0.12* 
BERI Policy 
Continuity 
1990-2000 378 -0.18** 
1984-2000 2275 -0.08** 
1984-1989 589 -0.13** 
ICRG Investment 
Profile 
1990-2000 1134 -0.03 
* and ** indicate (two-tailed) significance at the  ≤ 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
 
 Note in particular that in most cases the relationship between the various investment-related 
survey measures and leftist-controlled government is negative and statistically significant.  For example, 
experts are significantly more likely to view leftist-controlled governments as having a higher level of 
“nationalization risk” (the MERA measure) and to have worse “investor attitudes” (the first BERI 
measure).  More subtly, we see some evidence that expert opinions of leftist-controlled governments 
have improved somewhat in the recent past—perhaps a recognition that the “new left” is not the “old 
left”.  For example, for the BERI “investment attitude” measure, the correlation coefficient is 
significantly lower for the the 1990-2000 period than for the 1980-1989 period.  And for the ICRG 
“investment profile” measure, we see that in the 1990-2000 the relationship between leftist government 
and the investment profile measure is statistically non-significant, while it is negatively signed and highly 
significant in the pre-1989 period.  The one contrary indicator is the BERI “policy continuity” variable, 
which suggests that experts’ opinions along this metric have become less favorable in recent years.  
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 The next table provides suggestive evidence that BITs might be useful in improving expert 
perceptions, though the results are sensitive to the precise expert measure used.  The table presents 
pairwise correlation coefficients between the same expert measures used in the previous table and a 
weighted count variable of the number of strong BITs in force in each developing country.  The 
construction of the weighted BIT variable is described in more detail in the following chapter.  Note that 
there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the BIT variable and the MERA 
measure of nationalization risk and for the ICRG investment profile measure, although breaking down 
the latter measure into two time periods suggests that adopting strong BITs did not have a statistically 
significant effect on expert perceptions in the years prior to 1989.  Results for the BERI measures are 
generally a statistical wash (perhaps due to the relatively small number of countries that BERI covers).   
 
Table 3.11: Bivariate Relationship between Weighted Strong BITs in Force and Investment Risk 
 
 Years Obs. Correlation Coefficient 
MERA 
Nationalization Risk 
1998-2003 736 0.16** 
1980-2003 793 0.04 
1980-1989 320 0.16** 
BERI Investment 
Attitude 
1990-2003 473 -0.01 
1980-2003 793 -0.04 
1980-1989 320 -0.06 
BERI Policy 
Continuity 
1990-2003 473 0.02 
1984-2003 2135 0.29** 
1984-1989 599 -0.02 
ICRG Investment 
Profile 
1990-2003 1536 0.26** 
Note: * and ** indicate (two-tailed) significance at the  ≤ 0.05 and 0.01 levels 
respectively. 
 
 Pairwise correlation analysis is an exceedingly weak means of testing causal arguments, and the 
point here is simply to suggest that investors seem, fairly or not, to perceive leftist governments to be less 
investor-friendly than non-leftist governments, and that BITs might reasonably be viewed as helping to 
overcome this investor bias.  If leftist governments are adopting BITs in an attempt to whitewash over 
poor reputations, the strategy may be a reasonably one.  This is not the same as saying that BITs succeed 
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in encouraging investors to actually invest more in countries that adopt the treaties.  That particular 
question is explored in detail in the following chapters. 
 
§ 3.6: Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 In this Section I explore the robustness of the negative binomial analysis discussed above to two 
important changes.  First I present results from a model in which I dichotomize the dependent variable 
(the number of new BITs signed or entering into force) and estimating the resulting model using Logit 
techniques.  The results are largely confirmatory.  Second, I present results from a negative binomial 
model in which the dataset is aggregated into five-year periods.  Here the results are noticeably weaker 
but not necessarily disconfirmatory.  In short, the Section provides important supporting evidence that 
partisanship indeed “matters” in terms of the willingness to sign and ratify BITs, and especially in terms 
of the willingness to sign and ratify the strongest treaties. 
 
§3.61: Logit Analysis 
 
 Because the annual count data of treaty signings and entries into force contains relatively few 
observations in which the count is greater than one, it is worth considering whether the model is better 
estimated using logistic regression, where the dependent count variable is transformed into a binary 
variable in which “0” indicates no new treaty signings or entries into force in a given year, and “1” 
indicates at least one new treaty signing or entry into force.  In practice, epidemiologists routinely 
substitute Poisson (count) estimation techniques for binomial logit techniques, and studies suggest that 
coefficient estimates and standard errors will often be largely identical using either technique when the 
sample size is relatively large and the probability of a positive event occurring is relatively small.74  On the 
other hand, in the present context substituting logit for Poisson analysis entails some loss in information:  
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logit requires us to treat observations characterized by multiple new treaty signings or ratifications as if 
only one treaty signing or ratification occurred.   
 
 Tables 3.12 and 3.13, presented immediately below, present model results where I have 
converted the dependent count variable to a binary variable.  The model parameters are identical to those 
presented in the previous tables; only the construction of the dependent variables and the estimation 
strategy has changed.  The model presented in Table 3.12 is estimated using a random effects logit 
estimator, and I present the full model results.  The model presented in Table 3.13 is estimated using a 
fixed effects logit estimator.  For ease of interpretation, both Tables present the results as odds ratios 
rather than as coefficients.   
 
 Odds ratios are roughly analogous to IRRs.  For a one-unit change in the particular independent 
variable, the odds of a positive outcome on the dependent variable is predicted to change by the factor 
indicated by the odds ratio, holding all other independent variables constant.  For example, an odds ratio 
of 0.50 for the partisanship variable would indicate that leftist governments have ½ the odds of non-
leftist governments of signing (or ratifying) at least one BIT.  Likewise, an odds ratio of 1.50 on the same 
independent variable would indicate that leftist governments have 1.5 time greater odds signing (or 
ratifying) at least one BIT.  The partisanship and interaction variables are again boldfaced where 
statistically significant. 
 
 I should caution at the outset that random effects logit estimation in a panel setting presents can 
present certain difficulties that render results less than reliable.  The potential difficulties stem from 
Stata’s use of Gauss-Hermite quadrature to calculate the random-effects estimator.75  In particular, where 
group sizes are large (e.g. where there are many time points per country) or where there are large 
correlations within groups the random-effects estimated coefficients can vary greatly depending on the 
number quadrature points used in the estimation.  Sensitivity tests using Stata’s –quadchk– routine 
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suggest that for some of the variables reported in Table 3.12, which reports results for the random effects 
logit estimations, coefficient estimates may vary by over one percent depending on the number of 
quadrature points used.  This variability suggests that the random effects results may not be sufficiently 
reliable.  Fortunately, fixed effects logit estimators are not estimated using quadrature.  The analytic 
tradeoff, however, is that the fixed effects logit estimator, like its fixed effect negative binomial 
counterpart, necessarily leads to a loss in sample size as all-zero countries are dropped from the 
estimation. 
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Table 3.12  Partisanship and the Willingness to Sign and Ratify Strong BITs—Random Effects Logit Regression 
 I.  New Strong BITs In 
Force 
II. New Strong BITs 
Signed 
III.  All New BITs In 
Force 
IV.  All New BITs 
Signed (Only if EIF) 
V.  All New BITs Signed
# Own Strong BITs 
Already in Force, t-1 
1.046 
(1.12) 
1.034 
(0.82) 
0.848 
(4.07)** 
0.850 
(4.08)** 
1.041 
(1.16) 
1.037 
(1.07) 
0.891 
(3.17)** 
0.898 
(3.00)** 
0.875 
(3.91)** 
0.880 
(3.77)** 
# Own Non-Strong BITs 
Already in Force, t-1 
0.940 
(1.36) 
0.964 
(0.85) 
0.959 
(0.83) 
0.954 
(0.96) 
0.909 
(2.44)* 
0.919 
(2.25)* 
0.821 
(5.12)** 
0.828 
(5.23)** 
0.811 
(5.47)** 
0.823 
(5.50)** 
# BITs in Force in Region, 
t-1 
0.983 
(0.42) 
0.992 
(0.19) 
0.929 
(1.38) 
0.947 
(1.04) 
0.960 
(0.93) 
0.966 
(0.78) 
0.902 
(1.94)a 
0.913 
(1.72)a 
0.906 
(2.08)* 
0.918 
(1.82a 
FDI Performance (FDI 
Inflows, % GDP), t-1 
0.986 
(1.03) 
0.985 
(1.06) 
0.990 
(0.68) 
0.989 
(0.76) 
0.988 
(0.88) 
0.987 
(0.94) 
0.986 
(0.92) 
0.984 
(1.07) 
0.989 
(0.82) 
0.988 
(0.94) 
IMF or IBRD Loan 
Dummy 
1.405 
(1.78)a 
1.439 
(1.89a 
1.367 
(1.56) 
1.346 
(1.49) 
1.907 
(3.63)** 
2.025 
(3.93)** 
1.774 
(3.12)** 
1.881 
(3.46)** 
1.663 
(2.93)** 
1.766 
(3.29)** 
Berlin Wall Dummy 13.72 
(3.19)** 
4.998 
(2.02)* 
33.234 
(3.30)** 
29.164 
(3.00)** 
4.358 
(2.77)** 
2.806 
(1.79)a 
3.669 
(2.18)* 
3.023 
(1.84)a 
16.738 
(4.19)** 
5.155 
(2.64)** 
Left Executive 0.299 
(2.96)** 
- 0.325 
(3.25)** 
- 0.743 
(1.10) 
- 0.578 
(2.00)* 
- 0.621 
(1.83)a 
- 
Berlin Wall*Left 
Executive 
3.229 
(2.75)** 
- 2.990 
(3.07)** 
- 1.437 
(1.22) 
- 1.878 
(2.15)* 
- 1.858 
(2.19)* 
- 
Left Legislature - 0.395 
(2.42)* 
- 0.348 
(3.13)** 
- 0.805 
(0.82) 
- 0.563 
(2.15)* 
- 0.600 
(2.00)* 
Berlin Wall*Left 
Legislature 
- 2.607 
(2.38)* 
- 3.55 
(3.63)** 
- 1.411 
(1.18) 
- 2.411 
(3.06)** 
- 2.291 
(3.01)** 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3212 3120 3211 3119 3209 3117 3210 3118 3212 3120 
Countries 146 144 146 144 146 144 146 144 146 144 
Period 1975-2000 1975-2000 1975-2000 1975-2000 1975-2000 1975-2000 1975-2000 1975-2000 1975-2000 1975-2000
Χ2 188.79** 187.99** 191.55** 191.20** 171.39** 169.84** 174.41* 183.39** 189.14** 195.56** 
Notes: Estimated using logit regression (the -xtlogit- routine in Stata), with a random (unit) effects estimator. Odds ratios are reported, along with absolute-vale z-
scores in parentheses.  * and ** indicate (two-tailed) significance at the  ≤ 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively; a indicates significance at the ≤ 0.10 level. 
  
120 
Table 3.13:  Partisanship and the Willingness to Sign and Ratify Strong BITs—Fixed Effects Logit Regression 
 I.  New Strong BITs In 
Force 
II. New Strong BITs 
Signed 
III.  All New BITs In 
Force 
IV.  All New BITs 
Signed (Only if EIF) 
V.  All New BITs 
Signed 
# Own Strong BITs 
Already in Force, t-1 
0.810  
(5.02)** 
0.796 
(5.42)** 
0.689 
(7.76)** 
0.694 
(7.83)** 
0.878 
(3.50)** 
0.876 
(3.56)** 
0.760 
(6.42)** 
 
0.772 
(6.22)** 
0.743 
(7.41)** 
0.754 
(7.21)** 
# Own Non-Strong BITs 
Already in Force, t-1 
0.787  
(3.33)** 
0.817 
(2.99)** 
0.859 
(2.37)* 
0.847 
(2.66)** 
0.784 
(5.51)** 
0.797 
(5.36)** 
0.720 
(6.75)** 
0.731 
(7.02)** 
0.707 
(7.05)** 
0.721 
(7.35)** 
# BITs in Force in 
Region, t-1 
0.878  
(1.55) 
0.885 
(1.45) 
0.776 
(3.16)** 
0.803 
(2.76)** 
0.827 
(2.75)** 
0.826 
(2.75)** 
0.743 
(4.03)** 
0.754 
(3.87)** 
0.759 
(4.21)** 
0.773 
(3.95)** 
FDI Performance (FDI 
Inflows, % GDP), t-1 
0.986  
(0.92) 
0.985 
(0.99) 
0.992 
(0.50) 
0.991 
(0.58) 
0.990 
(0.63) 
0.989 
(0.72) 
0.988 
(0.71) 
0.985 
(0.89) 
0.991 
(0.67) 
0.989 
(0.79) 
IMF or IBRD Loan 
Dummy 
1.028  
(0.11) 
1.183 
(0.66) 
1.100 
(0.39) 
1.130 
(0.51) 
1.769 
(2.56)** 
2.114 
(3.36)** 
1.572 
(2.07)* 
1.805 
(2.72)** 
1.489 
(1.89)a 
1.717 
(2.57)* 
Berlin Wall Dummy 131.187 
(5.23)** 
9.260 
(2.68)** 
68.031 
(3.91)** 
290.919 
(4.77)** 
23.007 
(5.22)** 
5.075 
(2.69)** 
29.391 
(5.07)** 
23.313 
(4.68)** 
136.036 
(6.59)** 
9.699 
(3.47)** 
Left Executive 0.141  
(3.91)** 
- 0.194 
(4.06)** 
- 0.396 
(2.71)** 
- 0.311 
(3.52)** 
- 0.346 
(3.39)** 
- 
Berlin Wall*Left 
Executive 
4.339  
(3.02)** 
- 3.398 
(3.12)** 
- 2.064 
(2.14)* 
- 2.513 
(2.82)** 
- 2.412 
(2.81)** 
- 
Left Legislature - 0.211 
(3.39)** 
- 0.215 
(3.95)** 
- 0.460 
(2.36)* 
- 0.307 
(3.63)** 
- 0.337 
(3.50)** 
Berlin Wall*Left 
Legislature 
- 3.226 
(2.61)** 
- 4.014 
(3.65)** 
- 1.869 
(1.91)a 
- 3.237 
(3.64)** 
- 3.053 
(3.60)** 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2321 2271 2448 2394 2433 2383 2538 2485 2696 2617 
Countries 106 104 111 109 111 109 115 113 122 119 
Period 1975-2000 1975-
2000 
1975-
2000 
1975-
2000 
1975-
2000 
1975-
2000 
1975-
2000 
1975-
2000 
1975-
2000 
1975-
2000 
Χ2 304.84** 309.49** 329.43 330.29** 214.53** 214.67** 259.64** 265.74 290.29** 292.48** 
Notes: Estimated using logit regression (the -xtlogit- routine in Stata), with a fixed (unit) effects estimator. Odds ratios are reported, along with absolute-vale 
z-scores in parentheses.  * and ** indicate (two-tailed) significance at the  ≤ 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively; a indicates significance at the ≤ 0.10 level. 
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 I will not spend much time discussing the logit results for the various control 
variables, though in general the control variables perform substantively the same as in the 
negative binomial models.  BITs already in force are relatively consistently associated with 
lower odds of signing or ratifying new BITs; past FDI performance remains a consistently 
non-significant influence; and Elkins et al.’s “competitive pressure” hypothesis is wholly 
unsupported.  Note in particular that the number of regional BITs in force achieves an 
adequate level of statistical significance in only one of the random-effects logit models.  And 
while the variable is significant in  eight out of ten of the fixed-effects logit models, it 
remains “wrongly” signed in the sense that greater regional popularity of BITs is associated 
with lower odds of a developing country signing or ratifying its own new BITs.   Finally, note 
that that we again have some evidence that the IMF and World Bank positively and 
significantly impact the willingness of developing countries to sign and ratify BITs.  The 
effect is again not statistically significant when we look exclusively at strong BITs, though 
note that in Table 3.12, Models I and II, the IMF-World Bank lending variable approaches 
statistical significance.  In the models which do not differentiate BITs by dispute settlement 
provisions, the IMF-World Bank lending variable is statistically significant at the ≤ 0.01 level, 
with odds ratios ranging from 1.572 (Table 3.13, Model IV) to 2.025 (Table 3.12, Model III).  
These results suggest that developing countries that are under an IMF or World Bank loan 
have between 50 and 100 percent greater odds of signing or ratifying a BIT in a given year 
than do developing countries that are not availing themselves of IMF or World Bank lending 
facilities. 
 
 As to the performance of the partisanship and interaction variables, note that the 
results of the logit specifications are quite consistent with the results of the negative binomial 
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estimations.   In sixteen out of twenty of the logit specifications we see that developing 
countries controlled by leftist executives or legislatures were significantly and substantively 
less likely to enter into new BITs in the pre-1990 era.  In the successful logit models odds 
ratios for the partisanship variables range from 0.141 (Table 3.13, Model I) to 0.600 (Table 
3.12, Model V).   This suggests that at the lower bounds left-controlled governments in the 
pre-1990 era had just one-seventh the odds of entering into BITs in a given year than did their 
non-leftist counterparts.  At the upper bounds the estimated effect is more modest, but still 
important: an odds ratio of 0.600 implies that left-controlled governments had three fifths 
the odds of non-left governments of entering a BIT.  
 
 We also see very consistent results for the interaction term.  In seventeen of the 
twenty logit specifications the interaction term is statistically significant and “positively” 
signed, with odds ratios greater than unity.  This again suggests quite strongly that in the 
post-1989 era the relationship between left partisanship and BITs reversed quite 
dramatically.  Whereas we have strong evidence that left governments in the earlier era 
tended to avoid using BITs to attract FDI, and to especially avoid strong BITs, in the post-
1989 era leftist governments were much more likely to enter into BITs.  This relationship 
holds whether we consider only strong BITs, or whether we consider BITs undifferentiated 
by dispute settlement, whether we focus on dates of signing or of entry into force, whether 
we focus on left control of the executive or of parliament, and whether elect to model 
country-level fixed or random effects.  The odds ratios for the interaction terms range from 
a low of 1.858 (Table 3.12, Model V) to a high of 4.339 (Table 3.13, Model I).  In other 
words, in a given (post-1989) year left-controlled governments have odds of signing or 
ratifying BITs that are nearly two to over four times greater than the equivalent odds for 
non-left governments. 
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§ 3.62: Five-Year Period Analysis 
 
 As a further sensitivity analysis, I re-estimated the negative binomial models after 
converting the original dataset’s annual observations into six five-year periods.  The first 
period begins in 1975 and runs through 1979; the last period begins in 1995 and runs 
through 1999.  The dependent variables are constructed by subtracting the cumulative 
number of BITs signed (or in force) at the beginning of the particular five-year period from 
the cumulative number signed or in force at the end of the particular five-year period.  The 
most immediate effect of this alternative calculation is to increase the number of non-zero 
“counts” of new BITs beyond those contained in the annualized data.  The Table 
immediately below shows the frequency of different values of the dependent variable “New 
Strong BITs In Force, 5-Year Difference”, as used in Table 3.16, Model I.  The data remains 
overdispersed, which suggests that negative binomial rather than Poisson estimation remains 
more appropriate. 
 
Table 3.14:  New Strong BITs EIF, Five-Year Periods 
Count Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent  
0 462 74.16 74.16 
1 57 9.15 83.31 
2 39 6.26 89.57 
3 16 2.57 92.13 
4 19 3.05 95.18 
5 7 1.12 96.31 
6 10 1.61 97.91 
7 4 0.64 98.56 
8 2 0.32 98.88 
9 2 0.32 99.20 
10 2 0.32 99.52 
11 3 0.48 100.00 
 Note:  Sample corresponds to that estimated in Table 3.16, Model I. 
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 Model parameters are essentially the same as those for the annualized models 
presented above.  However, each variable has been reconstructed to reflect the five-year 
periodicity of the new model.  In particular, the variables measuring the number of strong 
and non-strong BITs in force in the observed country are now lagged five periods.  The 
measure of the “competition for capital” (the number of BITs in force in geographically 
proximate developing countries, divided by the number of countries in the region) has been 
converted into a period average, as have the FDI performance and the IMF-World Bank 
lending variables.   The Berlin Wall dummy variable remains dichotomous. Each period 
entirely comprises either pre- or post-Wall years, and is coded as “0” or “1” accordingly. 
 
 The partisan government variables are also calculated as period averages.  This 
means, for example, that if a given developing country was governed by a leftist executive 
for two out of the five years of a given period, the left executive variable would take on a 
value of 0.20.  In practice, in almost all cases countries are either governed by leftist leaders 
over the entire period (producing a score of 1) or not at all (producing a score of 0).  The 
Table immediately below tabulates the partisan chief executive variable for the sample of 
observations used in Table 3.16, Model I.  Note that one observation in the sample has a 
value of 0.75, while another has a value of 0.33.  This reflects the fact that data on 
partisanship was available for those observations for only four and three of the five years in 
the particular periods, respectively. 
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Table 3.15: Partisan Executive, 5-Year Period Average 
Value Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
0 366 58.75 58.75 
.2 19 3.05 61.80 
.33 1 0.16 61.96 
.4 21 3.37 65.33 
.6 13 2.09 67.42 
.75 1 0.16 67.58 
.8 11 1.77 69.34 
1 191 30.66 100.00 
Note: Sample corresponds to that estimated in Model I, Table 3.16 
 
 Unlike the models using the annualized dataset, the period models do not contain 
time (period) dummy variables.  Including period dummies causes unacceptable levels of 
multicollinearity between the dummies and the Berlin Wall dummy variable and forces Stata 
to drop the latter variable from the analysis.  Country dummies are also again omitted 
because including country dummies causes certain of the models to refuse to converge. 
 
 The results for the control variables are generally consistent with the results for the 
control variables in the annualized models.  We see once again that there is little evidence 
that BIT signings and ratifications are driven by “competitive” pressures.  The adjusted 
number of BITs in force in the geographic region is statistically insignificant in all but two of 
the 19 models.∗  Past FDI performance is also a consistently insignificant predictor of BIT 
signings and entry into force.  We also again see mixed but generally confirmatory evidence 
that BIT signings and ratifications are driven in part by the influence of the IMF and World 
Bank.  In all of the random-effects models the fact that a developing country is under an 
IMF or World Bank loan significantly and positively influences the rate of BIT signings and 
                                                 
∗ Table 3.16, Model IB failed to converge.  Results are omitted from the Table because they could not 
be obtained. 
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entries into force.  In the fixed-effects period models the IMF-World Bank variable is 
statistically significant and positively signed in half of the estimated models. 
 
 The periodized models generally perform less consistently with the annualized 
models as to the main variables of interest. For example, the partisanship variables attain 
statistical significance in only four of the nine random-effects models (Table 3.16, Models 
IA, IIA, IIB, & IIIA).  In the fixed-effects models, the partisanship variable attains statistical 
significance in six of the ten models (Table 3.17, Models IA, IB, IIA, IIIA, IIIB, IVA).  The 
periodized models thus provide rather mixed evidence that left-controlled governments were 
less willing to sign or ratify BITs in the pre-1990 era than non-left-controlled governments.  
But it is encouraging that the left partisan variables are generally significant in the models 
predicting the signing or entry into force of strong BITs, because it is in relation to these 
kinds of BITs that we would most expect partisanship to matter. 
 
 The results for the interaction variable in the periodized models represent the effects 
of partisanship on BIT signings and ratifications in the post-1989 period, just as they did in 
the annualized models.  Recall that in the annualized models we found very consistent 
evidence that leftist-controlled governments in the 1990s were significantly more likely than 
non-left governments to sign and ratify BITs.  Here the evidence is less consistent, but more 
in accord with the original theory that partisan differences should become less noticeable in 
the post-1989 era.  For example, the interaction variable is significant in only two of the nine 
random-effects models (Table 3.16, Models IA, IIA).  Positive IRRs in those models suggest 
that when developing countries whose executives are controlled by leftist parties are 
predicted to enter into between two and three times as many strong BITs as non-left-
controlled developing countries.   But when BITs are aggregated and undifferentiated by 
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dispute settlement provisions, partisanship fades from significance.  We see very similar 
results in the fixed-effects models presented in Table 3.17 (Models IA, IIIA).
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Table 3.16:  Partisanship and the Willingness to Sign and Ratify Strong BITs—Random Effects Negative Binomial Regression, 
Five-Year Period Averages 
 
I.  New Strong BITs In 
Force, 5-Year 
Difference 
II. New Strong BITs 
Signed, 5-Year 
Difference 
III.  All New BITs In 
Force, 5-Year 
Difference 
IV.  All New BITs 
Signed (Only EIF), 5-
Year Diff. 
V.  All New BITs 
Signed, 5-Year 
Difference. 
 
A B A B A B A B A B 
# Own Strong BITs 
Already in Force, t-5 
1.137 
(4.78)** 
- 0.941  
(1.22) 
0.952  
(0.92) 
1.127 
(4.39)** 
1.127 
(4.38)** 
0.964  
(0.83) 
0.970  
(0.69) 
0.981  
(0.44) 
0.989  
(0.24) 
# Own Non-Strong 
BITs Already in Force, 
t-5 
1.027  
(0.83) 
- 1.048  
(1.22) 
1.041  
(1.07) 
1.028 
(0.92) 
1.023 
 (0.76) 
0.959  
(1.18) 
0.958  
(1.22) 
0.955 
(1.33) 
0.956 
(1.25) 
# BITs in Force in 
Region, Period Avg. 
1.017  
(0.60) 
- 1.040 
(1.07) 
1.044  
(1.15) 
1.004 
(0.16) 
1.012  
(0.43) 
1.017  
(0.49) 
1.026  
(0.76) 
1.021 
(0.68) 
1.027 
(0.86) 
FDI Performance 
(FDI Inflows, % 
GDP), Period Avg. 
0.996  
(0.25) 
- 0.988 
(0.58) 
0.987  
(0.65) 
0.995 
(0.34) 
0.992  
(0.47) 
0.989  
(0.58) 
0.987  
(0.69) 
0.996 
(0.27) 
0.994  
(0.39) 
IMF or IBRD Loan 
Dummy,. Period Avg. 
1.698 
(3.01)** 
- 1.845 
(3.03)** 
1.725 
(2.68)** 
1.799 
(3.59)** 
1.764 
(3.41)** 
2.002 
(3.67)** 
1.897 
(3.36)** 
1.806 
(3.37)** 
1.682 
(2.92)** 
Berlin Wall Dummy 3.520 
(5.55)** 
- 3.860 
(6.36)** 
3.862 
(6.07)** 
2.403 
(4.41)** 
2.474 
(4.39)** 
2.867 
(5.32)** 
2.862 
(5.13)** 
2.881 
(5.56)** 
2.919 
(5.43)** 
Left Executive, 
Period Avg. 
0.273 
(2.78)** 
- 0.403 
(2.58)** 
- 0.504 
(2.24)* 
- 0.662  
(1.51) 
- 0.714 
(1.30) 
- 
Berlin Wall*Left 
Executive 
3.206 
(2.30)* 
- 2.190 
(2.05)* 
- 1.904 
(1.79)a 
- 1.443  
(1.18) 
- 1.470 
(1.28) 
- 
Left Legislature, 
Period Avg. 
- - - 0.513 
(1.96)* 
- 0.602 
(1.69)a 
- 0.776  
(0.94) 
- 0.826  
(0.75) 
Berlin Wall*Left 
Legislature 
- - - 2.077 
(1.94) 
- 1.708  
(1.50) 
- 1.407 
(1.09) 
- 1.364  
(1.03) 
Period  Dummies No No No No No No No No No No 
Observations 623 - 623 605 623 605 623 605 623 605 
Countries 146 - 146 143 146 143 146 143 146 143 
Last Year in Each 5-
Year Period 
’79, ’84, 
’89, ’94, 
‘99 
’79, ’84, 
’89, ‘94, 
‘99 
’79, ’84, 
’89, ’94, 
‘99 
’79, ’84, 
’89, ’94, 
‘99 
’79, ’84, 
’89, ’94, 
‘99 
’79, ’84, 
’89, ’94, 
‘99 
’79, ’84, 
’89, ’94, 
‘99 
’79, ’84, 
’89, ’94, 
‘99 
’79, ’84, 
’89, ’94, 
‘99 
’79, ’84, 
’89, ’94, 
‘99 
Χ2 138.17** - 121.86 118.08 119.59 119.91 91.73** 88.96** 100.29** 96.57** 
Notes: Estimated using negative binomial regression, with random country-specific dispersion levels. Incident rate ratios (exponentiated coefficients) are 
reported, with absolute-value z-scores in parentheses.  * and ** indicate (two-tailed) significance at the  ≤ 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
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Table 3.17:  Partisanship and the Willingness to Sign and Ratify Strong BITs—Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Regression,  
Five-Year Period Averages 
 
I.  New Strong BITs In 
Force, 5-Year Difference
II. New Strong BITs 
Signed, 5-Year 
Difference 
III.  All New BITs In 
Force, 5-Year Difference
IV.  All New BITs 
Signed (Only EIF), 5-
Year Diff. 
V.  All New BITs Signed, 
5-Year Difference 
 
A B A B A B A B A B 
# Own Strong BITs 
Already in Force, t-5 
0.844 
(2.78)** 
0.839 
(2.90)** 
0.790 
(4.15)** 
0.795 
(4.07)** 
0.931  
(1.48) 
0.931  
(1.51) 
0.852 
(3.29)** 
0.857 
(3.20)** 
0.856 
(3.26)** 
0.859 
(3.22)** 
# Own Non-Strong 
BITs Already in Force, 
t-5 
1.140 
(2.04)* 
1.138 
(1.97)* 
1.140 
(2.35)* 
1.144 
(2.43)* 
0.889 
(2.44)* 
0.886 
(2.52)* 
0.905 
(2.49)* 
0.907 
(2.47)* 
0.896 
(2.78)** 
0.896 
(2.78)** 
# BITs in Force in 
Region, Period Avg. 
1.217 
(2.59)** 
1.240 
(2.77)** 
1.096  
(1.52) 
1.113 
(1.73) 
1.086  
(1.45) 
1.103 
(1.67) 
1.013  
(0.24) 
1.028  
(0.53) 
1.045  
(0.92) 
1.058  
(1.16) 
FDI Perf. (FDI Inflows, 
% GDP), Period Avg.. 
0.957  
(1.16) 
0.953  
(1.23) 
0.984  
(0.55) 
0.981  
(0.62) 
0.977 
(0.74) 
0.974 
(0.83) 
0.997 
(0.11) 
0.994 
(0.23) 
1.004 
(0.14) 
1.000 
(0.03) 
IMF or IBRD Loan 
Dummy,. Period Avg. 
1.523  
(1.16) 
1.744  
(1.54) 
1.491 
(1.33) 
1.509  
(1.38) 
1.814 
(1.92) 
2.054 
(2.33)* 
1.830 
(2.25)* 
1.862 
(2.34)* 
1.808 
(2.29)* 
1.820 
(2.34)* 
Berlin Wall Dummy 4.009 
(5.44)** 
4.461 
(5.63)** 
4.465 
(6.63)** 
4.425 
(6.64)* 
3.002 
(4.97)** 
3.111 
(4.95)** 
3.657 
(6.30)** 
3.578 
(6.02)* 
3.454 
(6.17)** 
3.474 
(6.01)** 
Left Executive, 
Period Avg. 
0.221 
(2.82)** 
- 0.357 
(2.62)** 
- 0.317 
(2.99)** 
- 0.491 
(2.21)* 
- 0.570 
(1.83) 
- 
Berlin Wall*Left 
Executive 
3.161 
(2.09)* 
- 1.824  
(1.47) 
- 2.475 
(2.20)* 
- 1.386  
(0.97) 
- 1.419 
(1.07) 
- 
Left Legislature, 
Period Avg. 
- 0.324 
(2.21)* 
- 0.492 
(1.82)a 
- 0.417 
(2.33)* 
- 0.620  
(1.49) 
- 0.686 
(1.22) 
Berlin Wall*Left 
Legislature 
- 2.187  
(1.49) 
- 1.721  
(1.35) 
- 2.088 
(1.80) 
- 1.381 
(0.94) 
- 1.342  
(0.89) 
Period  Dummies No No No No No No No No No No 
Observations 421 411 446 440 444 434 464 458 492 486 
Countries 86 85 91 90 91 90 95 95 101 101 
Last Year in Each 5-
Year Period 
’79, ’84, 
’89, ’94, ‘99 
’79, ’84, 
’89, ‘94, ‘99
’79, ’84, 
’89, ’94, ‘99
’79, ’84, 
’89, ’94, ‘99
’79, ’84, 
’89, ’94, ‘99
’79, ’84, 
’89, ’94, ‘99
’79, ’84, 
’89, ’94, ‘99
’79, ’84, 
’89, ’94, ‘99
’79, ’84, 
’89, ’94, ‘99
’79, ’84, 
’89, ’94, ‘99
Χ2 100.16** 103.81** 125.12** 122.51** 87.61** 89.61** 97.50** 94.39** 103.07** 101.47** 
Notes: Estimated using negative binomial regression with fixed country-specific dispersion levels. Incident rate ratios (exponentiated coefficients) are reported, with 
absolute-value z-scores in parentheses.  * and ** indicate (two-tailed) significance at the  ≤ 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
BITS & FDI: A REPLICATION & CRITIQUE OF EXISTING STUDIES 
 
§4.1: Introduction 
 
 Neumayer and Spess recently published in the journal World Development an article of great 
practical importance to the world’s capital-hungry developing countries.1  Their article presented the first 
published, peer-reviewed, methodologically sophisticated econometric analysis of the effects that BITs 
might have on FDI inflows.  To skeptics of the utility of international law generally, and of the 
desirability of BITs specifically, the results are startling.  The authors present what they describe as robust 
evidence that developing states that sign BITs enjoy relatively massive increases in FDI inflows.  The 
article seems to put the lie to the assertion of Sornarajah, a prominent critic of BITs, that the effect of 
BITs on FDI is an “untested hypothesis” and merely an “assumption,” and that “[s]tability and other 
factors have a greater influence on investment flows than do investment treaties.”2 
 
 Or does it?  In this Chapter I discuss, replicate, and critique Neumayer and Spess’s study.  In 
short, the Chapter attempts to take seriously Bueno de Mesquita’s recent point that “findings” do not 
begin to “take on the role of knowledge” unless they are “capable of being replicated using different data 
sets” and “different measures.”  Let me emphasize at the outset, though, that my overall aim here is not to 
criticize Neumayer and Spess’s work as shoddy (it certainly is not) or as “mistaken.”   It is instead simply 
to 
 
bolster confidence that [their] research findings are not merely tied to a particular 
moment in time or to a particular way of defining a concept….If a hypothesis, model, or
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 theory is viewed as a plausible account of how some aspect of international relations 
works, then findings that falsify or challenge that account are an important part of the 
scientific process.  Indeed, discovery of such falsifying or challenging evidence through 
replication is fundamental to the acquisition of reliable knowledge.3 
 
Falsification is especially important in the social sciences, which for a number of reasons, largely 
institutional in nature, tend to promote and encourage the dissemination of “positive” findings that 
confirm theory rather than negative ones that do not.  This Chapter tries in its own small way to correct 
for that inherent confirmatory bias, not to be contrary, but precisely because the research question is so 
important.   
 
§4.2: The Basic Replication Model—Dependent Variables 
 
 There are three obvious metrics for examining the effectiveness of BITs (or of any other policy 
change) at attracting FDI.  First, and most crudely, we can examine whether BITs are associated with an 
increase in absolute flows of investment.  Second, if we tend to view developing countries as primarily engaged 
in a “competition” with other countries for FDI that would be made in one country but not another, 
then we might wish to examine whether BITs are associated with an increase in a given country’s share of 
world FDI inflows.  States that capture a greater slice of the total pie are, presumably, closer to victory in 
the competition than others who must content themselves with a smaller portion.  Neumayer and Spess 
primarily adopt this “competition” view of BITs, and with some justification, as the competition story 
also motivates Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons’ recent study of the reasons why developing states have 
signed the treaties.4   Finally, and in my view most reasonably of all, it seems fair to assume that 
developing countries themselves are primarily interested in increasing the importance of FDI in their domestic 
economies, especially where the investment is market-seeking and where, therefore, the “competition” for 
the investment is necessarily muted.  If Wal-Mart is willing to invest in Venezuela, for example, than it 
hardly seems as if Venezuela should care that Wal-Mart is also investing (and perhaps investing more) in 
Mexico and China.  Here what matters is whether BITs are associated with an increase in FDI inflows as 
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a share of the domestic economy, which we can measure as FDI inflows as a percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP).  We can usefully think of this metric as one of FDI “penetration”,5 and I refer to it as 
such below.   Neumayer and Spess’s models include only the first two metrics.  I follow their example in 
this section, but include an analysis of the effect of BITs on FDI inflows as percent of GDP in Chapter 
V, where I present a more fully specified and original empirical model.    
 
 My dependent variables in the models analyzed in the current Section are, accordingly, the 
constant-dollar value of net FDI inflows that a given host country receives in a given year, and the value 
of those of those inflows as a proportion of total world FDI inflows in the same year.6  FDI data is taken 
from UNCTAD and from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).  Neumayer and 
Spess take the natural log of their dependent variables.  I argue in Section IV of this Chapter that this 
transformation is probably not justified, but for the moment I follow their example, albeit with one 
important caveat.  A number of observations (generally over 100, depending on the sample) contain 
negative entries, which represent the fact that foreign investors have, in a given year and on net, removed 
more FDI from the country than they have brought in.  Net disinvestment is particularly pronounced in 
the 1970s, when certain countries, such as Chile, engaged in mass expropriations and other investor-
unfriendly behavior, but there are also instances of net disinvestment across the years of the sample.  The 
problem this poses for logarithmic transformations is that the log of a negative number, like the log of 
zero, is undefined.  Neumayer and Spess cure this problem by arbitrarily re-coding negative observations 
as a small number between zero and one, and leaving positive observations unchanged, and then logging 
the altered series.  But to add a constant to some but not all observations in a series is methodologically 
unsound, and the better approach is to add a “start”, equal to some value just greater than the absolute 
value of the most extreme negative observation, to all of the observations in the series, and then to log 
the uniformly shifted series.  That is the approach taken here. 
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§4.3 The Basic Replication Model—Independent Variables 
 
 Neumayer and Spess follow previous studies in focusing on the effect of signed BITs on FDI 
inflows, without regard for when, or whether, a given BIT has entered into force.  This is conceptually 
difficult to justify if we view the importance of BITs as lying in their legally binding nature, because BITs, 
for the most part, do not legally bind state-parties until they have entered into force.   Investors are 
unlikely to place much credible commitment weight on a BIT until it has been ratified by both parties and 
become legally binding. And as a practical matter, it is generally much more difficult for investors to 
determine whether a BIT has been signed, or what a BIT contains, until it has been ratified, entered into 
force, and more widely published or publicized.    In the next Chapter I restrict the analysis to in-force 
BITs, but for the moment I follow Neumayer and Spess in constructing my principle explanatory variable 
by counting the cumulative number of BITs that a given host state has signed in the current year or past 
years.   The source of Neumayer and Spess’s BIT “count” is unclear, but it appears as if they relied on 
two UNCTAD compilations.7  For the replication I rely on UNCTAD’s list, corrected for the obvious 
mistakes and omissions discussed in Chapter Two and including BIT-equivalent commercial treaties.  I 
have also extended the count of signed BITs through 2002; Neumayer and Spess count signed BITs only 
through 2001. 
 
 Neumayer and Spess make a cogent argument that the best practice is to weight this count by the 
importance of the treaty partner as a potential source of foreign capital.  Thus signing a BIT with the 
United States should, intuitively, be worth “more” than signing a BIT with Denmark or Switzerland, 
because in a given year the United States supplies far more of the world’s foreign investment than do 
these smaller countries.  I follow Neumayer and Spess in weighting my count of BITs by each partner 
country’s share of world FDI outflows, which I calculate as a five-year moving average.  The BIT variable 
is in proportion form.  This means, for example, that a BIT with the United States in 1985 would be 
worth approximately 0.25, corresponding to the United States’ 25% share of world FDI outflows in that 
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and surrounding years, while a BIT with France would be worth approximately 0.05, corresponding to 
that country’s share of FDI outflows of 5%.  For a developing country that has signed a BIT with both 
the United States and France, and with  no other capital exporting country, the value of its BIT variable 
would be 0.30. 
 
 Neumayer and Spess include in their counts of signed BITs only those BITs between developing 
and OECD countries, with membership in the OECD standing in as a proxy for a country’s status as a 
major source of investment capital.  As the OECD now contains a number of not-quite-developed 
countries, such as Mexico, the Slovak Republic, and Turkey, as well as recently-developed countries that 
provide little in the way of foreign capital, such as Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Turkey, a more 
theoretically defensible strategy is to actually identify those countries that have historically tended to 
provide the lion’s share of FDI, and to “count” only BITs that involve one of those countries.  I take that 
latter strategy here, using the same methodology described in Chapter Two.  This selection strategy has 
the effect of adding a number of wealthier countries, such as Ireland, Greece, and Portugal, which are 
excluded from Neumayer and Spess’s analysis and whose FDI inflows Neumayer and Spess do not 
attempt to explain.  But in justification of these countries’ inclusion in the sample, let me note that until 
recently these additional countries were generally considered to be “developing” as well, that today the 
economies of many “developing” countries, like South Korea, are as “developed” as those of countries 
like Greece and Portugal, and that the best means of accounting for differences in levels of development 
is to directly control for those differences in the regression equation (as I do below), and not by excluding 
countries that take extreme values on a particular variable of analytical relevance. 
 
 Neumayer and Spess include in their models a small number of largely uncontroversial economic 
control variables.  It is often argued in economic and political-economic studies of FDI flows that foreign 
investors are particularly attracted to large, rich, and growing markets.  Neumayer and Spess accordingly 
control for population (a measure of market size), per capital GDP (a measure of market wealth), and 
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economic (GDP) growth rates.  They also control for inflation, which serves as a proxy for 
“macroeconomic stability,” and for openness to trade, which they proxy through variables indicating 
membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) or free trade agreements (FTAs).  Because I 
include membership in BIT-like FTAs in my BIT count variable, I follow a somewhat different (but very 
common) approach in measuring trade openness.  Using Gleditsch’s “Expanded Trade and GDP” 
database,8 I construct a “trade openness” variable measuring the value of each country’s imports and 
exports divided by GDP. Higher values indicate greater openness to trade.  Finally, Neumayer and Spess 
control for the “intensity” of a country’s current exploitation of natural resources, arguing that “intense” 
exploitation attracts FDI.  I argue in Section IV that the more appropriate measure is one of exploitable 
natural resource stocks, and that these stocks are largely time-invariant and not thus not appropriate to 
include in analyses, like Neumayer and Spess’s, that separately control for country-specific, time-invariant 
“fixed effects.”  But for the moment I follow their example and include their “intensity” measure, as 
estimated by the World Bank.9 
 
 The most original aspect of Neumayer and Spess’s model is their assertion that BITs can be 
expected to have conditional effects on FDI—conditional, that is, on the pre-existing propensity or 
ability of a given host state to keep its (presumably favorable) promises to investors.  Where, for instance, 
a state’s political institutions are rife with “veto points” that make policy change difficult, investors may 
view the risk of such change to be relatively slight, and the extra security that a BIT provides might be 
viewed as so much icing on an already adequately iced cake—desirable, perhaps, but by no means of 
decisive import.   
 
 Neumayer and Spess model this conditional relationship in the standard way, by including in their 
models an interaction term that multiplies their count of signed BITs against any of a number of different 
measures of what might, in very loose shorthand, be called “political risk.”   
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 Their model takes the following basic form: 
 
y = x + z +x*z + control variables, 
 
where y is FDI inflows, x is the weighted BIT count, z is a measure of political risk, and x*z is the 
multiplicative product of the first two variables.  Neumayer and Spess run models using either of two 
alternative classes of measures of political risk: an objective measure of institutional “political constraints” 
or “veto points” developed by Henisz,10 and a subjective measure produced by the International Country 
Risk Group (ICRG) that is based on expert surveys.11   
 
 In Neumayer and Spess’s analysis, Henisz’s measure of political constraints is systematically 
insignificant.  I have replaced the Henisz measure with a very similar measure of institutional “veto 
points” produced by the World Bank, where higher numbers of veto points suggest greater policy 
stability due to the ability of veto players to block policy change.  Neumayer and Spess also report 
(generally successful) results using the ICRG “composite” measure of political risk that includes 
subcomponents measuring expert perceptions of “investment” risk, “government stability”, and “law and 
order.”12  I accordingly rely principally on this measure of political risk in the analyses below.   
 
 To correctly interpret the various regression outputs it is important to keep in mind that higher 
ratings on the ICRG measure indicate lower degrees of risk, just as higher numbers of veto points are also 
said to indicate greater policy stability.  It is also worth noting that the veto point and ICRG measures of 
political risk appear to be tapping rather different underlying phenomena.  The two measures share a 
bivariate correlation coefficient of only 0.17.  It will thus not be surprising to see that results vary 
significantly between the two measures. 
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§ 4.4 The Basic Replication Model—Results 
 
 Table 4.1 summarizes Neumayer and Spess’s main empirical findings.  Using the ICRG risk 
variable, Neumayer and Spess find that their measures of the weighted number of signed BITs and of 
political risk are consistently significant and positive, while the multiplicative interaction of these two 
variables is consistently significant and negative.   
 
Table 4.1: Summary of Neumayer & Spess Main Results 
Variable Result Implication 
Weighted Signed # BITs Significant & + More BITsÆMore FDI when Political Risk 
Rating = Zero (e.g. When Risk is High) 
“Political Risk” Rating Significant & + Higher Risk Rating (Less Risk)ÆMore FDI 
when BIT Count = Zero 
“Political Risk” * # BITs Significant & – 
 
Less Risk Æ Less Effect of BITs on FDI 
 
What are the implications?  Interpreting regression results involving interaction effects poses certain 
complexities that are discussed in more detail below.  But in brief, the authors claim to have uncovered 
strong evidence that BITs and political risk have a conditional relationship on FDI inflows.  BITs 
positively impact FDI inflows, but that positive effect declines as political risk ratings increase (and thus 
as political risk decreases).   Moreover, the apparent size of the effects of BITs on FDI is quite 
impressive.  Neumayer and Spess report that their results imply that a one-standard-deviation increase in 
their BIT variable “is predicted to increase its FDI inflow by 43.7% and 93.2%.”13 
 
 Table 4.2 reports results from my replication of their analysis.  The model specifications are quite 
similar to Neumayer and Spess’s, although I have corrected the count of signed BITs (as detailed in the 
previous Chapter).  I have also used a different strategy of identifying “capital-exporting countries.”  
Neumayer and Spess identify capital-exporting countries on the basis of membership in the OECD.  As 
described in the previous Chapter, I use historical trends in actual FDI outflows to identify the top 
eighteen capital-exporting countries.  Finally, Neumayer and Spess control for trade openness by 
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including dummy variables indicating membership in a free trade agreement (FTA) or the WTO.  I have 
replaced Neumayer and Spess’s FTA and WTO dummy variables with a standard measure of trade 
openness because my count of BITs already contains BIT-equivalent FTAs.  The time period of my study 
also varies slightly from Neumayer and Spess’s study.  Depending on the specification, my replication 
covers the years 1976-2001 or 1985-2002.  Neumayer and Spess’s analysis covers the periods 1970-2001 
and 1985-2001.  Following Neumayer and Spess, I estimate the models presented in Table 4.2 using 
generalized least squares (GLS) with mean-averaged fixed (country) effects and robust standard errors.14 
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Table 4.2: Replicating Neumayer and Spess (Net FDI Inflows in Constant Dollars & Net FDI 
Inflows as Percent of Total World Inflows) 
 
 I (Constant $) II (Constant 
$) 
III (% World) IV (% World) 
Weighted # Signed BITs 0.030 
(0.58) 
-0.019 
(0.22) 
0.021 
(0.81) 
0.081 
(2.63)** 
Institutional Veto Points -0.011 
(2.71)** 
- 0.004 
(2.01)* 
- 
BITs*Veto Points 0.032 
(3.09)** 
- -0.003 
(0.76) 
- 
ICRG Political Risk - -0.007 
(3.343)** 
- -0.000 
(0.58) 
BITs*ICRG Pol’l Risk - 0.009 
(2.08)* 
- -0.003 
(2.10)* 
Log per capita GDP 0.182 
(5.05)** 
0.392 
(6.55)** 
0.020 
(0.95) 
0.062 
(2.88)** 
Log Population -0.210 
(2.82)** 
-0.231 
(3.10)** 
-0.029 
(1.42) 
-0.015 
(1.10) 
GDP Growth -0.001 
(1.50) 
-0.000 
(0.06) 
-0.000 
(0.43) 
0.001 
(3.07)** 
Inflation -0.000 
(3.10)** 
-0.000 
(3.28)** 
-0.000 
(2.31)* 
-0.000 
(1.89) 
Natural Resource Rents -0.004 
(1.18) 
-0.001 
(1.22) 
-0.000 
(0.22) 
0.000 
(0.64) 
Trade Openness 0.000 
(2.77)** 
0.000 
(0.88) 
0.000 
(0.77) 
-0.000 
(0.16) 
     
Observations 2431 1581 2431 1581 
Countries 130 108 130 108 
Period 1976-2001 1985-2002 1976-2001 1985-2002 
R-Squared (within) 0.16 0.27 0.01 0.04 
Notes: Regressions estimated using GLS with fixed effects with robust (non-clustered) standard 
errors.  Absolute t-values are reported in parentheses.  Models I and II include year dummy 
variables (results omitted).  Each independent variable is lagged one period.  * and ** indicate 
significance at the  ≤ 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
 
 The dependent variable in Models I and II is logged net FDI inflows measured in constant U.S. 
dollars.  This dependent variable represents the absolute net amount of FDI that a country receives in a 
given year, with amounts comparable across years.  The dependent variable in the second two models is 
logged net FDI inflows as a percent of total world inflows.  This dependent variable is reasonably viewed 
as representing a country’s relative performance in the “competition” for FDI.    
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 We are not terribly interested in interpreting the performance of the economic variables, except 
so far as to note that the results are roughly analogous to what Neumayer and Spess report.   Wealthier 
markets (as measured by per capita GDP) appear, depending on the model specification, to attract more 
FDI, while larger markets (as measured by population) counter-intuitively appear to receive less, at least 
in Models I and II.  This latter result, while surprising, is consistent with Neumayer and Spess’s results.  
Inflation is negatively associated with FDI inflows in all four models, suggesting that stable and effective 
monetary policy environments are important to foreign investors.  The trade openness and natural 
resource measures are largely insignificant predictors of FDI.   This insignificance is not necessarily 
surprising, because the effects of trade openness and natural resource endowments on net FDI flows are 
theoretically ambiguous.   
 
 Take trade openness first. On the one hand, it is clear that high trade barriers can induce market-
seeking FDI by encouraging investors to “jump” over high import tariffs by establishing production 
facilities in-country.  The archetypal example is the Brazilian automobile industry.  In the 1960s, the 
Brazilian government explicitly sought to persuade foreign auto manufacturers to locate production 
facilities in Brazil by raising tariffs on automobile imports to prohibitive levels.15  On the other hand, a 
reduction in trade barriers, which would discourage tariff-jumping FDI, might be expected to encourage 
export-oriented FDI by making it cheaper for the foreign-based manufacturer to obtain production 
inputs from the least-cost supplier rather than from the host state.16  It is impossible to model these 
differential and potentially off-setting effects of trade openness with the relatively crude empirical 
measures of FDI and of trade openness that are at hand.   
 
 As to natural resources, Neumayer and Spess, among others, suggest that countries with large 
stocks of natural resources will naturally attract more FDI than countries with poorer endowments.17  
This is in some respects a very reasonable assumption, because it is undeniable that certain kinds of 
investors (e.g. those that seek access to and control over natural resources) will understandably seek to 
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operate in localities where such resources are most readily available in the desired quantities.  On the 
other hand, at least since the mid-1970s natural-resource-oriented FDI has accounted for a small and 
declining proportion of total world FDI flows.18  This suggests that even if abundant natural resources do 
on net increase FDI inflows, the effects are not likely to be very large or significant.  The italics around the 
words on net serve to flag a more serious problem—the possibility that abundant natural resources may 
increase natural resource-oriented FDI inflows while decreasing a country’s attractiveness as a destination 
for other kinds of FDI.  If the latter effect swamps the former, we might reasonably expect abundant 
natural resource endowments to decrease overall FDI inflows.  This may be the case, for instance, if 
natural resource-abundant countries are systematically “cursed” with poor economic performance or 
weak institutions that drive away FDI in other sectors.19  In any event, the natural resource intensity 
variable is insignificant in all models, suggesting that the contradictory theoretical effects of the variable 
on net FDI inflows tend to cancel each other out in practice. 
 
  The coefficients and significance of the BIT and political risk variables are also not of much 
inherent interest.  This is because interpreting regression coefficients in the presence of a multiplicative 
interaction term poses certain subtleties.20  In particular, the coefficient on a component of an interaction 
term (here, the BIT or political risk variables) indicates only the effect of that component when the other component 
is equal to zero.21   Unlike coefficients on variables in models that do not include interaction terms, the 
coefficients on the components do not indicate some sort of general or average relationship between the 
component and the dependent variable.  In cases where the value of one component never equals zero in 
the “real world”, the significance of the components is especially meaningless.  For example, our World 
Bank measure of institutional veto points never equals zero.  Neither does the ICRG variable.  A “finding” 
that the BIT component of a BIT-Political Risk interaction is significant thus tells us absolutely nothing 
of practical interest, because we will never observe a country that has zero political risk under either 
measure.  
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 We are not even particularly interested in whether the interaction term is significant in the 
standard regression output.  While the sign on the interaction term indicates the direction of the 
conditional relationship (so that a negative sign means that the effect of one component of the 
interaction term declines as the value of the other component increases, and vice versa), it is far more 
meaningful to calculate the significance and magnitude of the marginal effects of changes of the value of one 
component of the interaction term on the dependent variable across various values of the other 
component.  I do this in Figures 4.1 through 4.2, below, following the approach described and advocated 
by Brambor et al.22  The Figures illustrate the marginal effects of signing additional (weighted) BITs on 
FDI inflows at varying levels of political risk, with FDI inflows measured in either logged absolute real 
dollars or as a logged share of world FDI inflows, and political risk modeled either as “veto points” or 
using the ICRG composite measure.  The marginal effects of the BIT variable are displayed along the y-
axis, while the observed levels of political risk are displayed across the x-axis.  The diagonal solid line 
represents the point estimate of the marginal effects, while the dotted lines around the marginal effects 
line illustrate the 95% confidence interval of the point estimation.23  The solid horizontal line is the x-axis 
at zero (“the zero line”).  Where both the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval are positive 
(above the zero line) or negative (below the zero line) the effect of BITs on FDI inflows is statistically 
significant in the direction indicated by the point estimate.  Where the confidence interval straddles the 
zero line, we cannot reliably say whether or not BITs have positive or negative effects on FDI. 
  
 Figures 4.1 and 4.2, directly below, correspond to Models I and II in Table 4.2.  The dependent 
variable in both cases is logged FDI inflows in absolute real dollars.  In Figure 4.1 we see that the 
weighted number of signed BITs has a consistently and reliably positive effect on FDI (as the confidence 
intervals are almost everywhere above the zero line), and that this positive effect increases in magnitude 
as the number of veto points increases and thus, presumably, as the level of policy stability increases as 
well.   The effect of BITs on FDI can be impressive.  At the highest levels of political risk, the BIT 
variable has a coefficient of nearly 0.6, suggesting a nearly 60 percent increase in FDI inflows.  This 
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indicates that BITs have a statistically significant positive effect on FDI across the range of observed 
values, even if the rather wide confidence intervals suggest that the particular point estimates may not be 
all that precise at the highest levels of veto points. 
Figure 4.1: Marginal Effect of Signed BITs on FDI as Political Risk Changes, Neumayer & 
Spess Replication 
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Figure 4.2: Marginal Effect of Signed BITs on FDI as Political Risk Changes, Neumayer & 
Spess Replication 
 
  
  
 Figure 4.2 shows a similar general trend with the ICRG risk variable.  BITs appear to be 
positively associated with FDI inflows measured in constant dollars, and the positive effect increases in 
magnitude as the ICRG political risk rating increases, and thus as political risk decreases.  However, note 
that the confidence interval straddles the zero line at the lowest risk ratings; this suggests that the 
predicted positive effect of BITs on FDI is not statistically significant for those riskiest countries.  But for 
the least risky countries, such as those enjoying risk ratings above 20 on the ICRG scale, the effects of 
BITs on FDI inflows are again impressive.  The point estimates suggest that in these cases the marginal 
effect is equivalent to an increase in FDI inflows ranging between twenty and thirty percent. 
 
 But from the perspective of Neumayer and Spess’s conditional theory of the effect of BITs on 
FDI, the problem should be immediately obvious.  In Figures 4.1 and 4.2 the conditional relationship is 
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precisely opposite to that which we would expect.  As risk decreases, BITs become more effective.  I will 
refrain from attempting to offer much in the way of substantive explanation for this counterintuitive 
conditional relationship, except to note that there is little direct empirical evidence that “veto points” are 
meaningfully related to the underlying concept that they are supposed to tap: investors’ subjective 
perceptions of the likelihood that government policy will remain stable.    Measuring such perceptions is 
difficult, but BERI, a well-known private risk-rating agency, has produced an expert-survey measure of 
perceived “policy continuity” for a moderate number of developed and developing countries since 1980.  
Higher ratings on the BERI policy continuity measure indicate a lower risk of policy change.  For the 33 
countries that are both in my sample and covered by the BERI measure, the Polity IV and BERI 
measures have a correlation coefficient of only -0.17.  The coefficient is statistically insignificant (at the 
0.11 level), and in any event if it were significant the negative sign would suggest that investor perceptions 
of the risk of policy change increase as veto points increase.  Given theoretical expectations of a positive 
association between policy continuity and veto points, this is a quite troublesome relationship.  At the 
least, it suggests that the seemingly strange conditional relationship between BITs and veto points 
evidenced in Figure 4.1 is potentially due to a severe mismatch between what the veto points variable 
represents in theory and what it actually measures in practice.   
 
 Why the ICRG model also fails is a more difficult question to answer.  Let me suggest more 
broadly that it is worth considering whether including a multiplicative interaction term is worth the 
theoretical candle.  Standard hierarchical F-tests, which can be used to test whether an interaction effect 
meaningfully “exists” in the statistical sense, do indicate that the interaction effects illustrated in Figures 
4.1 and 4.2 are statistically meaningful.  This is unsurprising, given the large number of degrees of 
freedom in the models.  More relevant for present purposes is that including interaction terms explains 
such a small amount of additional variance that, as a practical matter, it matters little overall whether an 
interaction term is or is not included.  For example, the “within” r-squared for the model illustrated in 
Figure 4.1 increases from 0.1591 to 0.1619 with the inclusion of the interaction effect; for the model 
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illustrated in Figure 4.2, the “within” r-squared increases only from 0.2677 to 0.2701.  These meager 
increases suggest the potential wisdom of abandoning the interpretive complexities that interaction 
effects tend to involve in favor of a simpler additive model approach. 
 
 But putting that issue aside, let us return to the replication results, and in particular to Table 4.2 
Models III and IV, which report results from the replication model using each country’s logged percent 
share of world FDI inflows.  This, recall, is our measure of a country’s position in the “competition for 
capital.”  The key result to note is that the interaction terms are now negatively signed, as they were in 
Neumayer and Spess’s analysis.  This suggests a confirmation of their hypothesized conditional 
relationship:  as political risk ratings increase (and political risk declines), BITs should become less 
effective at inducing FDI inflows.  Figures 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate just such a pattern: as political risk 
decreases (e.g. as veto points increase, or as the ICRG risk rating increases), the marginal effect of BITs 
on FDI share decreases. 
Figure 4.3: Marginal Effect of Signed BITs on FDI as Political Risk Changes, Neumayer & 
Spess Replication 
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The problem in Figure 4.3 is not difficult to spot.  The Figure shows that when the institutional veto 
points variable is our measure of political risk, the marginal effect of BITs on political risk is statistically 
insignificant at all levels of veto points.  The failure of the veto points model is most likely a result of the 
poor match between the concept and what it is supposed to measure.  As we have seen above, a 
country’s number of veto points has little relation to investors’ perceptions of policy stability. 
 
 Figure 4.4, below, presents more encouraging findings.  Here we see that BITs have their greatest 
(positive) effect on FDI share at high levels of risk (and thus at low ICRG ratings), and that the effect 
declines, eventually reaching zero, as risk decreases.  Here we have, then, relatively strong confirmation of 
Neumayer and Spess’s theory and findings, with one caveat: note that the direction of the marginal 
effects is statistically insignificant where the ICRG risk rating exceeds approximately 20, as the 
confidence interval begins to span the zero line.  In more practical terms this means that for roughly 
thirty percent of the countries in our sample BITs do not have a statistically significant positive effect on 
FDI share.24  Perhaps more discouragingly, even where the effect is reliably positive, it is not necessarily 
of great substantive magnitude.  For example, at our sample-observed minimum ICRG risk rating of 2.4, 
the marginal effect of BITs on FDI is approximately 0.075.  Because the model is log-linear (with a 
logged dependent variable and non-logged independent variables) this suggests that a one-unit change in 
the weighted BIT variable can be expected to result in a 7.5 percent change in a country’s FDI share.  For 
example, if a developing country has a current world FDI share of 0.20 percent (roughly the mean in our 
sample), the marginal effect of a one-unit change in the BIT variable suggests an increase in share from 
0.20 percent to 0.2015 percent.  We can easily translate this hypothetical increase into absolute dollar 
values.  In 1985 world FDI inflows totaled approximately $55,000 million, in current dollars.  An increase 
in share from 0.20 to 0.2015 suggests an increase in FDI inflows from $110 million to $110.825 million—
only 825,000 thousand dollars.  To put that amount in further (diminished) perspective, recall that the BIT 
variable is a proportion, so that signing a BIT with a particular capital exporting country will necessarily 
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lead to a change in the BIT variable of far less than a “unit.”  Take France, for example, which regularly 
provides roughly five percent of world FDI outflows.  Figure 3D suggests that for our hypothetical high-
risk country, which at the present enjoys an FDI share of 0.20 percent, signing a BIT with France would 
be expected to lead to a marginal increase in FDI flows of only only (0.05 * $825,000)—just $41,000. 
 
Figure 4.4: Marginal Effect of Signed BITs on FDI as Political Risk Changes 
 
 
§4.5 Sensitivity of the Basic Replication Model 
   
 It is helpful to summarize the results of the replication exercise up to this point.  First, we have 
found very inconsistent evidence in support of Neumayer and Spess’s conditional theory of the effects of 
BITs on FDI.  In three of the four replication models, the conditional relationship was either wholly 
insignificant (in the sense of straddling the zero-line in our figures) or the opposite of what we would 
theoretically expect.  On the other hand, we have produced some evidence that BITs might matter, 
statistically and positively speaking, in terms of attracting FDI.  Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.4 all suggest some 
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degree of a significant, positive relationship between BITs and FDI.  Of the four models, Table II, Model 
IV (illustrated in Figure 4.4) performs the most successfully.  BITs appear to have a positive, significant 
effect on FDI share across all observed levels of political risk, and that relationship is conditional in the 
expected direction.  However, recall that the size of the marginal effects of BITs on FDI share is much 
smaller than Neumayer and Spess report.  Indeed, it is so small to be of questionable substantive 
relevance.  It is probably safe to assume that the costs of signing a BIT in terms of litigation risk, policy 
inflexibility and the like would surely outweigh so small a benefit in additional capital. 
 
 The replication is, in other words, neither a complete failure nor a smashing success.  In this 
subsection I examine how well the best-performing model—Model IV—holds up to five important but 
very justifiable changes in specification and estimating strategy:  
 
- correcting standard errors for country-level correlation by “clustering”;  
- de-logging the dependent variable;  
- estimating the model using panel-corrected standard errors and a lagged dependent variable;   
- re-specifying the interaction term to take into account the worldwide number of BITs in force;  
- disaggregating the BIT variable to take into account differences in dispute settlement provisions.   
 
My results are not encouraging.  In most cases the changes either substantively alter the direction of key 
relationships or render those relationships statistically insignificant. 
 
 Sensitivity to Clustering.  The error terms in time-series cross-section (TSCS) analysis (i.e. analysis 
of the type performed here) are often correlated within classes or groups of observations. As Williams 
explains, 
 
There are many situations where data are observed in clusters such that observations 
within a cluster are correlated while between clusters are uncorrelated, so-called cluster-
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correlated data.  For example, the typical teratology screening experiment involves 
administration of a compound to pregnant dams of a rodent species, followed by 
evaluation of the fetuses in a litter for various types of malformations.  In this situation, 
the fetuses within a particular litter are correlated while any two fetuses from different 
litters are independent…. 
 
 … 
 
 A major statistical problem with cluster-correlated data arises from intracluster 
correlation, or the potential for clustermates to respond similarly.  This phenomenon is 
often referred to as overdispersion or extra variation in an estimated statistic beyond 
what would be expected under independence.  Analyses that assume independence will generally 
underestimate the true variance and lead to test statistics with inflated Type I errors.25 
 
In other words, where within-group correlations are high, we can expect tests of statistical significance to 
be biased toward unjustifiably rejecting the null hypothesis of no statistically significant relationship.  The 
danger is such that applied econometricians increasingly recognize that controlling for intra-class 
correlations is an “essential need…in estimating standard errors of regression parameter estimates.”26  
Cluster-robust standard errors are widely used in sample-survey research to correct the problem.  The 
technique is easily extended to other kinds of analyses, it is perfectly compatible with the simultaneous 
conclusion of group fixed effects or group dummy variables, and there is nothing inappropriate about 
including in a given model country fixed effects while at the same time also controlling for within-country 
variance correlation through clustering.  Fixed effects are usually employed solely to control for potential 
omitted-variable bias affecting the estimated coefficients.  Clustering addresses the entirely different 
problem of within-group correlation of variance, and it “works”, in most cases, by adjusting standard 
errors upward.  Clustering will not affect coefficient estimates, while including fixed effects nearly always 
will.27 
 
 Here, evidence suggests that clustering is indeed desirable.  Within-group correlation coefficients, 
calculated using one-way random-effects ANOVA techniques, are remarkably high.28  For our measure of 
(logged) FDI share the intra-class correlation coefficients are 0.31 and 0.68, depending on whether the 
sample is defined by the veto points or ICRG political risk variables.  In either case, the coefficient is 
extremely high, and clustering is probably warranted.   
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 Figure 4.5 illustrates the statistical effects of clustering on the most successful replication model.  
We see that clustering did not affect the model’s coefficients: note that the marginal effects line is 
identical to the line illustrated in Figure 4.4 (the equivalent unclustered analysis).  But clustering does 
increase the standard errors, and hence the spread of the confidence interval.  The effect is significant (in 
the statistical and non-statistical senses), as now the lower bound in consistently below the zero line, 
indicating that BITs do not have a statistically significant directional impact on FDI share at any value of 
political risk.  In other words, the only more-or-less successful replication result that I am able to obtain 
in Table 4.2, Model IV is non-robust to clustering.  And while I cannot say for certain whether clustering 
would similarly impact a precise duplication of Neumayer and Spess’s model, it seems likely that the 
process would have a substantially deleterious effect on their reported results as well. 
 
Figure 4.5: Marginal Effect of Signed BITs on FDI as Political Risk Changes, Clustered SEs 
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 Sensitivity to Non-Transformation of the Dependent Variable.  Neumayer and Spess log 
transform their dependent variable “to reduce the skewness of its distribution.” They allow that “[t]his 
increases model fit substantially”.29  The proffered justification for the transformation is something of a 
non sequitur, as statistical theory makes no substantively relevant assumptions about the shape of the 
distribution of the dependent (or independent) variables.  Statistical theory does demand that the residual 
errors be more or less normally distributed, and in many cases where the errors are skewed (e.g. bunched 
to the right or left) or exhibit kurtosis (e.g. are excessively or inadequately peaked) the values of the 
dependent variable will be non-normal as well.  In these cases it might be acceptable to log transform the 
dependent variable as a way of forcing the errors to more closely approximate a normal distribution.  
However, non-normal distribution of the residuals becomes less of a problem as sample sizes grow 
larger, and in the present analysis sample sizes (of over 1500 observations) are fairly large.  Furthermore, 
when models contain multiplicative interaction terms, as ours do, the relationship between the 
distribution of the dependent variable and the residuals often tends to weaken.  This means that a non-
normally distributed dependent variable will not necessarily indicate that the residuals are problematically 
non-normal, and that a “correction” of the distribution of the dependent variable will not necessarily 
“correct” the distribution of the residuals. 
 
 Neumayer and Spess’s analytical caveat that “model fit” is improved by log transformation is also 
very curious, because the most important question is not whether model fit—e.g. the amount of variance 
explained, as measured by the model’s r-squared—necessarily improves, but whether the log 
transformation affects the statistical significance and magnitude of the correlation between the key 
independent variables and the dependent variable.  They provide no indication of whether or not log 
transformation indeed makes or breaks their principal results. 
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 In other words, what we are really interested in is whether models with a non-logged dependent 
variable show problematically non-normal distributions of residual error; whether log-transforming the 
dependent variable substantially improves that distribution; and, finally, whether the transformation 
renders key relationships statistically significant where before they were not.  Let us take on the first 
inquiry first.  Figure 4.6 illustrates the marginal effects of Neumayer and Spess’s weighted BIT variable 
on FDI share as the ICRG political risk variable varies in value.  It should be immediately evident that 
de-logging the dependent variable renders the relationship between BITs and FDI share statistically 
insignificant, in the confidence-interval sense, across the entire observed range of political risk.  Whether 
FDI share should be logged or not is thus a question upon which Neumayer and Spess’s key findings 
necessarily hang.  
 
Figure 4.6: Marginal Effect of Signed BITs on FDI as Political Risk Changes, Non-Logged DV 
 
  
 The remaining and essential question, then, is whether a log transformation is methodologically 
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-.25
0
.25
.5 
.75
1
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ffe
ct
 o
f S
ig
ne
d 
B
IT
s 
on
 F
D
I
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
 ICRG Risk Rating (Higher Rating Means Less Risk)
 
Marginal Effect of Signed BITs
95% Confidence Interval
 Dependent Variable: Non-Logged FDI Inflows as Percent of World Inflows 
 
 
 161
all on the distribution of the residuals.  Figures 4.7 and 4.8 depict standardized normal-probability (P-P) 
plots of the residuals from the logged and non-logged models of FDI share, using the ICRG political risk 
variable.  P-P plots and their close equivalents, normalized quantile distribution (Q-Q) plots, are the best 
way to detect non-normality and its severity.  Normal-distributed residuals will cluster along the upward-
sloping diagonal line in the P-P plots.  Here we see that the residuals from the logged and non-logged 
models exhibit largely equivalent deviations from normality.  A similar pattern is evident on Q-Q plots, 
which I do not reproduce here, but which, if anything, indicate that the residuals from the logged model 
are the relatively more problematic.  Figures 4.9 and 4.10 present frequency histograms of the residuals of 
the logged and non-logged models.  Again, the differences between the two distributions do not appear 
too jarring to the naked eye.  Both distributions seem to exhibit relatively high degrees of kurtosis (e.g. 
both distributions are highly peaked), but both also appear to be relatively non-skewed.   
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Figure 4.7: Normal-Probability Plot of Residuals, Logged DV 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Normal-Probability Plot of Residuals, Non-Logged DV 
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Figure 4.9: Histogram of Residuals, Logged DV 
 
Figure 4.10: Histogram of Residuals, Non-Logged DV 
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 It is also instructive to quantify the degree of skewness and kurtosis in the two samples.  Using 
the standard formulas in Stata, the residuals for the non-logged model have a skewness of 3.56, indicating 
a slight rightward skew, and a kurtosis of 85.98, indicating that the sample is highly peaked.  (Normally 
distributed data have a skewness of 0 and a kurtosis of 3).  For the logged model, the levels of skew and 
kurtosis are somewhat less (1.37 and 36.70 respectively).   
 
 The take-away point is that logging the dependent variable somewhat improves quantitative 
measures of skewness and kurtosis, but these improvements are far from obvious upon visual inspection 
of the data.   And improved or not, it is by no means clear in the first place that the degree of non-
normality in the non-logged residuals is statistically problematic given the large sample size.  Especially 
given the arithmetic difficulties in logging a dependent variable that, like ours, takes on negative values, 
the results of the present exercise suggest that it may be inferentially better, and certainly analytically 
more cautious, to avoid the log transformation absent more compelling evidence that transformation is 
indeed statistically necessary and meaningfully beneficial. 
 
 Sensitivity to Panel-Corrected Standard Errors with Lagged DV.  In what has become one of the 
most-cited methodological articles in the empirical international relations literature, Beck and Katz argue 
that applying traditional GLS estimation methods to TSCS data can lead to “dramatic underestimates of 
parameter variability in common research situations.”30  In plainer terms, Beck and Katz make the 
theoretical case, and show empirically via Monte Carlo analysis, that GLS may lead to overconfident 
estimates that a given relationship is statistically significant.  GLS is especially problematic where, as here, 
the number of time periods analyzed is less than the number of cross-sections (countries).  Beck and 
Katz recommend estimating TSCS models using OLS and “panel-corrected standard errors” (PCSE).  
Elsewhere Beck and Katz recommend including in the OLS-PCSE model a lagged dependent variable 
(LDV), which serves to capture dynamic tendencies in the causal relationship.31  (A dynamic relationship 
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exists when past values of the dependent variable are causally related to present values).  Keele and Kelly 
have recently shown that this latter advice is usually well-taken.32   OLS-PCSE-LDV estimation has 
become very common in political science,33 and PCSEs are especially useful in dealing with panel-level 
heteroskedasticity, in which variances systematically differ in magnitude by cross-sectional groups.  Wald 
tests for groupwise heteroskedasticity in the fixed-effects models reported in Table 4.2 reject the null 
hypothesis of groupwise homoskedasticity at the 0.0000 level, indicating that heteroskedasticity is indeed 
a potential problem.  This provides significant evidence that PCSEs are especially appropriate.34 
 
 It is, in other words, well worth considering whether a change in estimation strategy from GLS to 
the Beck and Katz method meaningfully changes model results.  In fact, and as Figure 4.11 shows, the 
results change quite substantially.35  The marginal effects line is very nearly horizontal, which strongly 
suggests that the conditional relationship hypothesized by Neumayer and Spess is so slight as to be 
substantively meaningless.  Just as importantly, the effect of BITs on FDI is statistically insignificant 
across all values of the ICRG risk variable.   
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Figure 4.11: Marginal Effect of Signed BITs on FDI as Political Risk Changes, PCSE 
 
 
 It is also worth noting that the LDV is massively significant, with a z-score of over 13 and a large, 
positive coefficient.  This indicates that there is a strong dynamic relationship between present and past 
values of a country’s FDI share. The significance of the LDV should not be surprising.  As Keele and 
Kelly suggest, “[t]he preponderance of the evidence in both economics and political science is that many 
if not most cross-temporal processes are dynamic,”36 and there are strong theoretical reasons to believe 
that the processes that generate FDI are dynamic as well.  For example, in her well-researched case study 
of Intel’s surprising selection of Costa Rica as the site for a $300 million semiconductor assembly and 
testing plant, Spar describes Intel’s practice of consulting with existing foreign investors in Costa Rica.  
These interviews, upon which Intel “relied heavily,” allowed Intel to “assess Costa Rica’s record in 
delivering on its promises.”37  Spar concludes that 
 
Costa Rica got on Intel’s list because other investors had already gone there and were 
beginning to spread word of the country’s attractions.  This follow-the-leader process 
supports what the data on FDI already suggest: it is highly concentrated in a handful of 
-.05 
-.025 
0 
.025 
.05 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ffe
ct
 o
f S
ig
ne
d 
B
IT
s 
on
 F
D
I 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 
 ICRG Risk Rating (Higher Rating Means Less Risk)
 
Marginal Effect of Signed BITs
95% Confidence Interval
 Dependent Variable: Logged FDI Inflows as Percent of World Inflows
 
 
 167
top recipient.  Because companies such as Intel rely so extensively on word-of-mouth 
reports from existing investors, each round of investment seems to generate its own 
offspring, and success in attracting FDI begets success.  Part of this follow-the-leader 
behavior may be motivated by commercial considerations: firms may follow their 
customers to new markets or lead suppliers along with them.  But the preponderance of 
investment clusters suggests a more basic driver as well: firms invest in countries that 
already have a proven track record of attracting foreign investors and treating them 
well.38 
 
This general idea—that foreign investors tend to invest where others have already invested—is “well 
established” and supported by “broad empirical evidence” in the economic literature on the determinants 
of foreign investment.39  This literature suggests that any analysis of the effects of BITs on FDI inflows 
will necessarily need to take into account a host state’s past success in attracting foreign investment, as 
long as the relevant data is stationary and the model is correctly specified so as to render the residuals 
white noise.  Not surprisingly, previous empirical studies of the policy determinants of FDI inflows tend 
to control for the effects of past levels of inflows.40  Given strong theory and evidence that, in the 
present context, the past indeed matters, models of the effects of BITs on FDI that fail to control for 
past values of the dependent variable are likely to suffer from serious omitted variable bias.  It is thus not 
surprising that changing the estimation strategy from fixed effects GLS to OLS-PCSE-LDV weakens 
Neumayer and Spess’s results substantially. 
 
 Sensitivity to Re-Specification of the Interaction Term.  Though it is not typically noted, one of 
the most important implications of the “competition for capital” thesis, in which BITs primarily serve as 
a tool for developing countries to divert FDI headed to other countries into their own, is that BITs 
should decline in effectiveness as more and more host states conclude the treaties.  To see why this is the 
case, consider a simple model of the “competition.”  Imagine four developing countries, A, B, C, and D, 
which are competing for a given FDI project.  Imagine that the foreign investor compares the four 
countries along five dimensions (quality of infrastructure, policy stability, and the like) and finds that the 
countries are evenly matched.  On the investor’s checklist, each country rates a five out of five.  In this 
situation, the investor’s decision will essentially be determined by chance, and each country stands a 25 
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percent probability of winning the project.  This is the situation represented in Column I of Table 3C, 
below. 
Table 4.3: The BIT Game (Investor-Friendly Index / Percent Chance of Winning Investment 
Project) 
 
 I II III IV 
State A 5 / 25% 6 / 100% 6 / 33% 6 / 25% 
State B 5 / 25% 5 / 0% 6 / 33% 6 / 25% 
State C 5 / 25% 5 / 0% 6 / 33% 6 / 25% 
State D 5 / 25% 5 / 0% 5 / 0% 6 / 25% 
 
Now imagine that it becomes feasible to sign and ratify a BIT, and that doing so would raise a country’s 
investment rating by one.  State A concludes a BIT, and its score increases to 6.  State A is now a 
noticeably more attractive place to invest than its competitors.  State A will win the project with 100 
percent certainty, as indicated in Column II.  Now notice what happens in Column III.  Here, States B 
and C have followed A’s lead and also entered into BITs, raising their own probability of winning the 
project from zero percent to 33 percent, but lowering A’s probability of success from 100 percent to 33 
percent as well.  When State D finally follows suit, the developing countries are back in the same 
(relative) positions they were in before the BITs were feasible.  Each stands an equal, 25 percent chance 
of winning the project.   
 
 This simple model suggests that the effects of BITs on the distribution of FDI inflows will be the 
greatest when BITs are few and far between.  When State A is the only state bound by a BIT, it will 
always win competitive FDI projects given equality on all other factors that matter to investors.  On the 
other hand, when all states are bound by BITs, the treaties have no effect on who wins a particular 
project.  Notice that this suggests a conditional relationship rather different from that posited by 
Neumayer and Spess:  as the worldwide number of BITs in force increases, the effectiveness of one 
state’s own BITs at diverting FDI from other countries should decrease. 
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 We can examine this conditional relationship in the regression context by including an 
appropriate multiplicative interaction term.  In the Table and Figure below I interact a weighted, running 
count of worldwide in-force BITs with the weighted number of the host state’s own signed BITs.  I 
adjust the running count by subtracting the particular host state’s number of in-force BITs from it.  The 
models otherwise include all of the variables in the replication of Neumayer and Spess’s analysis 
presented in Table 4.2, Model IV, including the ICRG risk variable as an additive term in the regression 
equation.  For analytic simplicity, I do not interact the ICRG risk variable with the host-state-
BIT/World-BIT interaction term, as three-way, continuous-variable interaction terms can be difficult to 
interpret.  (However, I do present the results for a three-way interactive analysis in the following Chapter 
of this dissertation).  I estimate the re-specified interactive model using Neumayer and Spess’s preferred 
strategy of GLS with robust, unclustered standard errors and fixed effects, and a log-transformed 
dependent variable (logged percentage share of world FDI). 
 
 Table 4.4 presents the full regression output, while Figure 4.12 shows the more helpful marginal 
effects curve.  Note that the marginal effectiveness of BITs declines as the number of worldwide BITs in 
force increases, just as theoretically expected.  While signing BITs appears to be significantly and 
positively associated with greater shares of world FDI inflows when few other BITs are in force, this 
effect declines to near zero as BITs become more popular, just as our simple model predicts. 
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Table 4.4: Replicating Neumayer & Spess (Worldwide BITs) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Marginal Effect of Signed BITs on FDI as World BIT Count Changes 
 
 
 Log FDI, % World FDI 
Host’s Weighted #   Signed BITs 0.125 (4.44)** 
Weighted, Adjusted World BITs in 
Force 
-0.000 (0.81) 
Host BITs*World BITs -0.000 (4.05)** 
ICRG Political Risk -0.000 (0.36) 
Log per capita GDP 0.080 (3.78)** 
Log Population 0.023 (1.48) 
GDP Growth 0.001 (2.62)** 
Inflation -0.000 (1.81) 
Natural Resource Rents 0.000 (0.84) 
Trade Openness 0.000 (0.62) 
  
Observations 1586 
Countries 109 
Period 1985-2002 
R2 (within) 0.06 
Notes: Regressions estimated using GLS with fixed effects with robust (non-clustered) 
standard errors.  Absolute t-values are reported in parentheses.  Each independent 
variable is lagged one period.  * and ** indicate significance at the ≤ 0.05 and 0.01 levels 
respectively. 
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 I should emphasize (though I don’t illustrate here) that the downward-sloping direction of the 
conditional relationship between BITs and world BITs in force is robust to clustering of the standard 
errors, to de-logging the dependent variable, and to estimation using OLS-PCSE and a lagged dependent 
variable.  Figure 4.13, below, shows the marginal effects for the OLS-PCSE-LDV model while 
controlling for the interactive effect of the world BIT count.  We see that the number of world BITs in 
force substantially affects the effectiveness of signing a BIT, so much so that at current worldwide levels 
of BITs the point estimate of the marginal effects of BITs on FDI share is negative. 
 
Figure 4.13: Marginal Effect of Signed BITs on FDI as World BIT Count Changes, PCSE 
 
 
 
 These results raise important doubts about the soundness of Neumayer and Spess’s analysis, and 
also about the soundness of Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons’ recent and important analysis of the 
diffusion of BITs.  They argue that rationalistic, competitive dynamics between developing states mean 
that a given host state will face the greatest incentives to sign a BIT when more of its competitors have 
already signed BITs, and they report strong empirical support for their theory.  But as the model 
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illustrated in Table 4.3 suggests, and as Figures 4.12 and 4.13 seem to show empirically, in a competition 
for capital incentives to sign a BIT are greatest precisely when none of one’s competitors have signed a 
BIT.  Just as importantly, those incentives decline dramatically as more states sign up to the treaties.  
Given that BITs impose important costs on developing countries, it seems likely that at some point, 
where many competitors have already signed BITs, the remaining holdouts may find that the incentives 
to sign BITs are actually negative—the small increase in probability of winning investment projects are 
outweighed by the substantial sovereignty costs of “tying oneself to the mast” of international law.  
Indeed, Figures 3L and 3M suggest strongly that this point has already been reached. 
 
 Sensitivity to Disaggregation of the BIT Variable.  In Chapter Two I suggested that we can 
usefully categorize BITs according to the character (or strength) of their dispute settlement provisions.  
Figures 4.14 through 4.17 illustrate the impact of disaggregating the BIT variable in this way on 
Neumayer and Spess’s basic model. 
 
 As explained in Chapter Two, the coding exercise makes it is necessary to include in the analysis 
only those BITs that have entered into force.  This is because the texts of BITs that have been signed but 
have not entered into force are often difficult if not impossible for the researcher (and the foreign 
investor!) to obtain, making it correspondingly difficult if not impossible to code the content of the 
particular treaty’s dispute settlement provisions.   
 
 The estimated model includes an interaction term between a weighted count variable measuring 
the number of each type of BIT a given host state has in force, and includes four separate product terms 
that multiply each BIT variable with the ICRG measure of political risk.  The other control variables in 
the model are the same as those presented in Table 4.2, Model IV, and I again estimate the model using 
GLS with robust unclustered standard errors and fixed effects, and with the dependent variable in log 
form (Neumayer and Spess’s preferred estimation strategy).  The four figures thus separately illustrate the 
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marginal effects of each type of BIT at different levels of political risks when counts of all kinds of BITs, 
and their interactions with political risk, are included in a single model.  
 
Figure 4.14: Marginal Effect of Strong BITs on FDI as Political Risk Changes 
 
Figure 4:15: Marginal Effect of Partial Pre-Consent BITs on FDI as Political Risk Changes 
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Figure 4.16: Marginal Effect of Promissory BITs on FDI as Political Risk Changes 
 
 
Figure 4.17: Marginal Effect of Weak BITs on FDI as Political Risk Changes 
 
 
 The most basic point to note is that the four figures support my general assertion that differences 
in dispute settlement provisions “matter”.  The direction of the conditional relationship between BIT 
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counts and FDI inflows strongly depends on the particular type of treaty.  Strong BITs, which contain 
comprehensive, effective pre-consents to investor-initiated arbitration, show the basic pattern suggested 
by Neumayer and Spess:  BIT effectiveness declines as political risk decreases.  There is a similar 
negative, conditional relationship between promissory BITs, political risk, and FDI.  But in the case of 
BITs with partial pre-consents to arbitration, and in the case of the weakest BITs, which contain no 
provisions for investor-initiated dispute settlement, the conditional relationship is the opposite of what 
we would expect.  These latter kinds of BITs appear to become more effective at attracting FDI as 
political risk decreases, though the wide confidence intervals suggest that we are especially unable 
determine whether the effect is positive or negative at any particular level of risk. 
 
 The more important point is evident in Figure 4.14, which illustrates the effects of strong BITs 
on FDI share.  We would expect strong BITs to be the most effective at attracting FDI, and for the causal 
effect to be statistically significant and positive across most if not all of the range of values of political 
risk.  In other words, if BITs matter, it should be these BITs that matter most, and that matter most 
indisputably.   
 
 But Figure 4.14 instead shows indisputably that strong BITs do not matter.  First, note that the 
point estimate is negative for a majority of countries in our sample.  The median level of political risk on 
the ICRG scale is 17, and the marginal effects line crosses the zero line at approximately 14.  Second, 
note that the direction of the estimated effect statistically unidirectional only at the very lowest levels of 
political risk.  The only arguably clear success of the model is its indication that the weakest BITs, 
illustrated in Figure 4.17, have no statistically significant, positive effect on FDI inflows.  This is, indeed, 
precisely what we would expect if the key to the (potential) effectiveness of BITs as credible commitment 
devices lies in their formal dispute settlement mechanisms, and not in diffuse host state concerns about 
developing a “reputation” for obeying their substantive treaty obligations. 
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 In sum, then, where does the replication analysis leave us?  Neumayer and Spess’s evidence that 
BITs are effective at increasing FDI flows appears to rest on quite unstable ground.  Only one of the four 
models illustrated in Table 4.2 reasonably succeeds in replicating their basic results, and this modest 
success is quite sensitive to a number of justified changes in estimation strategy and methodology.  
Disaggregating BITs on the basis of material differences in dispute settlement provisions only further 
muddies the analytic waters.  The direction, magnitude, and significance of the effect of BITs on FDI 
share seems to depend on the formal remedial content of the treaties, but the differences are not always 
intuitive.  The clearest finding is, perhaps, also the most dispiriting, at least from the perspective of 
developing countries eager to use BITs to attract greater shares of world FDI: the usefulness of BITs in 
the “competition for capital” appears to decline substantially as more BITs enter into force, suggesting 
that the golden age of BITs is long over. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
BITS & FDI: A FRESH START 
 
§5.1: Introduction 
 
 The previous Chapter made the case that the most convincing evidence to date that BITs succeed 
in promoting FDI is far less robust than the casual reader of that original study would assume.  The point 
is an important one, as policymakers in developed countries are no doubt using Neumayer and Spess’s 
study to promote their own BIT programs, just as leaders in developing countries are undoubtedly taking 
the study into account when deciding whether to sign up.   
 
 In the present Chapter I move beyond replication to present results from a less parsimonious but 
more theoretically complete model of the determinants of FDI.  The inconsistency of the results 
presented above suggests in part that the underlying model is poorly specified.  First, and in particular, 
Neumayer and Spess, like most other empirical BIT analysts, wrongly assume that BITs are the only 
potentially meaningful law-based means by which host states can attempt to credibly commit to treat 
investors favorably.  In fact, host states can invoke international law, broadly construed and to the benefit 
of foreign investors, through investment contracts, through non-BIT treaties, and by participating in 
investment insurance regimes.  Second, reforms in municipal (domestic) laws related to foreign 
investment are likely to play a large role in promoting FDI.  Ignoring these other legal changes and policy 
devices for encouraging FDI risks injecting serious omitted variable bias into the analysis. 
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The analysis in this Chapter provides the most comprehensive attempt to date to control for these other 
ways in which host states might seek to attract FDI.  The subsections below briefly describe my 
independent variables.  I then present the results for a simple but more fully specified additive model.  
And finally, I examine how adding interaction effects between BITs and political risk and BITs and 
between host state BITs and world BITs changes the implications of the analysis.  In short, the additive 
model suggests that BITs are of no help in the “competition for capital”, but that they may be of some 
use in promoting increases in FDI penetration as long as the host state is willing to commit to international 
arbitration.  However, these modestly positive results largely disappear once we control interactively for 
the number of BITs in force worldwide and for the level of democracy in the host state.  The interactive 
analyses suggest, in short, that developing countries today should expect to receive no significant increase 
in FDI as a result of entering into a BIT.  
 
 In the sections immediately below I discuss in detail the various control variables that must be 
included in any sound statistical analysis of the effects of BITs on FDI flows.  The discussion here draws 
explicitly on the arguments advanced in Chapter Two.   
  
§5.2 Legal Alternatives to BITs—the Investment Contract 
 
 I argued in Chapter Two that foreign investors have long had both the desire and capacity to 
negotiate with developing countries on the terms of their entry and operation well before BITs rose to 
prominence, and that in many instances they were able to legally secure the fruits of those negotiations 
through contractually based arbitration agreements. International arbitration clauses began to appear 
regularly in petroleum concessions in the middle of the last century and quickly came to be viewed as a 
necessary complement to contracts made in that particularly volatile sector.1  Today arbitration clauses in 
foreign investment contracts are standard across economic sectors.  Some municipal investment 
framework laws even expressly provide that foreign investors must enter into a foreign investment 
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contract with the host state, and that the contract shall contain an international arbitration clause.2  These 
arbitration clauses, and any resulting awards, are enforceable in the same way, and with the same ease, as 
treaty-based arbitration agreements and treaty-based arbitral awards.    
 
This suggests that our key empirical task at hand is to determine the extent to which a given host 
state is willing to use an investment contract to induce and investment to take place when the investor 
would not otherwise invest.  Unfortunately, obtaining an accurate and comprehensive indicator of the use 
or content of investment contracts is impossible because the contracts are not systematically collected 
and published.  But best-guess estimates suggest that investment contracts have been and remain an 
essential component of the modern regime of foreign investment protection,3 and that many of those 
contracts do indeed contain host state pre-consents to investor-initiated international arbitration.4   
 
In the analysis below I proxy a host state’s willingness to enter into contractual arbitration 
agreements with foreign investors by recording whether a host state has ratified the ICSID and the New 
York Conventions.  These are admittedly imperfect proxies, but they are not necessarily unreasonable 
ones.  While ratifying the ICSID Convention does not by itself require states to arbitrate disputes with 
foreign investors, states that have no intention of doing so are unlikely to see much value in joining the 
treaty.  We can thus view failure to ratify the ICSID convention as a strong sign that a host state rejects 
investor-state arbitration on principle as an undesirable intrusion on host state sovereignty.  And ratifying 
the New York Convention, a highly successful treaty governing the recognition and enforcement of 
international commercial arbitration agreements more generally is also arguably a strong signal that a host 
state is generally willing to view international tribunals as an acceptable substitute for domestic courts. 
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§ 5.3 LEGAL ALTERNATIVES TO BITS: OTHER INVESTMENT-RELATED TREATIES 
 
 Although it is not often noted in the empirical BIT literature, a number of important 
international treaties contain investor-protection provisions that closely mirror some of the core 
provisions of BITs.  The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is the prime example.  The treaty is, quite literally, 
a multi-lateral “BIT” between over 50 (mostly European) states that promotes and protects investments 
in the energy sector.  The ECT contains the same substantive and remedial provisions of the most 
modern BITs, including comprehensive state pre-consents to binding, enforceable investor-initiated 
international arbitration.  Other notable and relevant treaties include formal applications to join the 
European Union (EU), which generally guarantee EU foreign investors favorable treatment in BIT-like 
language; the European Convention on Human Rights, which contains a “takings” clause, similar to 
Article V of the United States Constitution, that protects the property rights of foreign investors and 
which now provides for independent enforcement of those rights by an international tribunal;5 and the 
OECD’s various Declarations and Codes on foreign investment.6  Given their potential to act as effective 
BIT substitutes, we should control for host state adherence to these international legal instruments.   I 
accordingly include dummy variables indicating whether a host state has joined either of these four BIT 
alternatives. 
 
§5.4 INTERNATIONAL LAW ALTERNATIVES TO BITS: INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT INSURANCE 
 
 The BIT literature commonly overlooks the extent to which international investment insurance 
can function as a substitute for BITs.  Almost all major capital-exporting states have set up state-
sponsored or state-subsidized insurance programs for their foreign investors.7    For example, the United 
States’ Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) regularly issues millions of dollars in insurance 
against expropriation, currency transfer, and other “political” risks. The World Bank has also recently 
entered the insurance arena through its Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).  The 
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development of such programs has generally been widely supported by multinational corporations as an 
important means of reducing investment risk.8 
 
 The widespread availability of state-sponsored investment insurance programs poses potentially 
significant problems for the hypothesis that BITs should be expected to have a major, positive impact on 
FDI inflows, because it is not at all clear that the “extra” benefits that BITs provide to investors, 
compared to the benefits already provided by insurance, are all that great.  To receive investment 
insurance the investor has to go through an application process, and he has to pay (often not very large) 
insurance premiums.  For example, MIGA typically charges between 30 and 100 basis points per year for 
its coverage (0.30 percent to 1.00 percent of the value of the coverage).  OPIC rates are of a similar 
magnitude, and are widely viewed as providing foreign investors with a subsidy. 
 
 BITs, of course, provide their protections to all comers, no application required and free of 
charge.  But this does not mean that investors would necessarily prefer the protections of a BIT to the 
protections of investment insurance, because insurance virtually guarantees recovery in the event of a 
host state breach, regardless of the host state’s willingness or ability to pay.  BITs promise recovery, but 
only after potentially long and uncertain international arbitration proceedings and, possibly, costly award 
enforcement proceedings before national courts.  Where a home state is already relatively generous in 
issuing investment insurance, then the fact that it subsequently enters into a BIT with a developing state 
might cause investors to forgo investment insurance (which is now largely but not completely redundant), 
but it will not necessarily promote much new FDI. 
 
 I include as independent variables the total exposure value of new investment insurance issued by 
MIGA or OPIC to cover investment projects in a given host state in a given year, measured in real 
millions of dollars.  MIGA and OPIC are the most important investment insurance programs, but they 
certainly are not the only ones.  The United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Switzerland, for instance, 
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have similar programs, as do the Japanese.  Unfortunately I was able to obtain data only for the United 
Kingdom and German programs (and only after making the equivalent of Freedom of Information Act 
requests under those countries’ own laws), and the data obtained goes back only to the early 1990s.  
Including the United Kingdom and German data would have unacceptably limited the sample. 
  
§5.5 DOMESTIC LAW REFORM: CAPITAL CONTROLS 
 
 Non-specialists tend to assume that a host state’s decision to enter a BIT is necessarily a decision 
to significantly liberalize FDI policy in the sense of removing barriers to entry or of preventing the host 
state from imposing burdensome performance requirements as a condition for entry.  With the potential 
exception of United States BITs, which require national treatment at the pre-investment stage, this is 
simply not the case.  Most BITs do not require host states to accept more investment, nor do most BITs 
prevent host states conditioning the right to establish an investment on the investor’s acceptance of 
potentially onerous conditions of operation.  Instead, what might be called the overall “liberality” of a 
host state’s FDI regime is primarily determined by “promises”—in both actual and figurative sense— 
that are extended to investors through municipal law.  For example, municipal law defines which sectors 
of the economy are open to foreign investment and on what particular terms; it determines tax rates, the 
availability of investment incentives, and conditions of operation.  The vast bulk of what matters legally 
to foreign investors is supplied by municipal law, and indeed, this is unavoidable because BITs, as quite 
brief and general statements of the law applicable to investments of all types, are necessarily unable to 
provide investors or host states with a sufficiently detailed and self-contained legal regime.  It is 
unsurprising that for much of recent history municipal investment “framework” laws have been the 
primary means both of promoting and controlling foreign investment in the developing world. because 
they provide a much greater opportunity to fine-tune the FDI regime according to the special needs of 
particular sectors.9 
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 This is not to deny that the “law on the books” is always the same as the “law on the ground.”  
In order to be effective formal laws must be administered and enforced, and it is undeniable that in many 
developing countries, in many time periods, and in many issue areas, there has been considerable slack 
between what the law books say and how those laws are applied.  For example, in his study of 
Colombia’s attempts in the 1970s to “control” foreign investment, Lombard argues that Colombia’s strict 
regime was adopted largely for domestic political reasons, and that officials were often willing to grant 
foreign investors much more favorable terms of entry and operation as an exercise of discretion.10 
Tugwell has found a similar practical and mitigating flexibility in the application of Venezuela’s formally 
and harshly nationalistic oil-sector foreign investment laws in the 1960s and 1970s.11   And as Robinson 
details in his comparative study of national systems of “control of foreign business entry”, developing 
countries often simply lack the administrative capacity to monitor and enforce the operation of 
(restrictive) FDI laws.12  But these reality-based caveats aside, I think it inarguable that formal legal 
rules—are inevitably taken seriously by foreign investors, whether those rules are international or 
domestic in nature. 
 
 Figure 5.1, below, shows the results from an attempt to code changes in the favorableness of 
formal domestic-law foreign investment regimes in Latin American countries over the past three decades.  
To compile the figure I had a research assistant coder fluent in Spanish create historical time-lines of 
changes in the formal domestic “rules of the game” governing foreign investments in twenty countries, 
ranging in time from the early 1970s to 2003 (dependent on data availability).  The coder gauged the level 
of “investor friendliness” of each domestic law regime on a scale of 1 to 5 (from least to most favorable), 
based wherever possible on hard copies of the relevant domestic laws.  To identify those laws, and to 
cross-check his own evaluations of the important aspects of the laws and any changes, the research 
assistant conducted extensive country-specific searches of electronic databases of articles from the 
Economist weekly news magazine, the Financial Times, and the Wall Street Journal.  The research 
assistant also consulted relevant law review articles.  The coder used Chile’s foreign investment law 
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regime of 1971-1973 under the Socialist president Allende as a baseline example of a “1”—the least 
favorable rating, Argentina’s post-1992 regime as a baseline example of a “5”—the most favorable.  
Regimes were evaluated along a variety of axes, including the extent to which investment laws restricted 
or allowed foreign investments in particular sectors, the extent of mandatory registration or reporting 
requirements, the extent of promises of favorable treatment, currency repatriation, and the like.  The final 
ranking represents the coder’s subjective evaluation of the overall favorableness of the formal regime, 
relative to the two baselines.  After coding the entire set of countries an initial time, the coder revisited 
each case to double-check the reasonableness of the evaluations and his consistency between countries.  
The rough model for the exercise was Stoever’s attempt to map and analyze changes in the relative 
favorableness of Korean foreign investment law.13 
 
Figure 5.1: Changes in Domestic Foreign Investment Laws in Latin America, 1970-2003 
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Let me emphasize that the results of the coding exercise are inherently subjective, and their suitability for 
use in regression analyses is debatable.  It would be desirable, at the least, to have additional coders 
evaluate an overlapping sample of country-years in order to calculate inter-coder reliability coefficients.  
More generally, and less technically, accurately measuring changes in domestic FDI legal regimes for a 
sufficiently large number of countries and time periods is quite difficult.  Investor-relevant laws are often 
scattered across a motley mixture of statutes, decrees, and administrative regulations, and are especially 
difficult to locate for more distant years, or to locate in a language readable by the researcher.  Some of 
these problems are evident in Figure 5.1, where blank spaces indicate the impossibility of finding reliable 
domestic legal information for a number of Central American countries for a relatively large number of 
years.  But for what it is worth, Figure 5.1 does illustrate the basic point of this Section: that over the 
course of the 1980s and early 1990s there has been a widespread liberalization of domestic foreign 
investment laws.  In many cases these favorable changes have taken place concurrently with expansions 
in the particular country’s BIT program, a fact that raises obvious problems of separating out the causal 
effects on FDI flows of one type of legal change, essentially domestic in nature, and the other, essentially 
international in nature.  
 
 Extending this type of in-depth comparative over-time analysis of domestic foreign laws to 
include more countries, in more regions, for as equally extensive a number of years, is a task well beyond 
the scope of this dissertation, and probably beyond the scope of any single researcher.  This does not 
mean that reasonable proxies are unavailable.  For example, Asiedu and Lien have compiled IMF data on 
three major categories of capital controls (including whether a country imposes exchange restrictions, 
restrictions on export proceeds, or restrictions on capital account).14  These are relatively macro-level 
restrictions, and it is fair to suggest that foreign direct investors care more about finer-grained legal 
restrictions on their activities that are more intimately related to foreign direct investment than to 
measures aimed mostly at controlling “capital” flows of the portfolio sort.  Nonetheless there is some 
evidence that IMF-measured capital controls do matter to foreign direct investors:  Asiedu and Lien find 
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that the absence of these capital controls was significantly and positively related to FDI inflows during 
the 1990s.  And as Figure 5.2, below, shows, Asiedu and Lien’s data is significantly correlated with my 
own evaluations in the expected direction.  The Figure shows a scatterplot of the data illustrated in Figure 
5.1 with Asiedu and Lien’s composite measure of capital controls, with the Asiedu and Lien data plotted 
along the x-axis.  (Data points have been “jiggered” to give a better sense of their distribution).  Higher 
numbers along the x-axis mean more extensive capital controls.  My own FDI regime data is plotted 
along the y-axis.  There, higher numbers indicate a greater level of “investor-friendliness”.  We see that 
countries with high levels of capital controls also tend to have less favorable domestic-law FDI regimes, 
as indicated by the downward sloping bivariate regression line.  The two variables share a correlation 
coefficient of -0.33, statistically significant at the 0.0000 level.  
 
Figure 5.2.: Bivariate Relationship between Asiedu and Lien Capital Control Data and Subjective 
Ratings of Domestic Foreign Investment Laws 
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In the models analyzed below, I accordingly control for changes in the capital control regime using the 
Asiedu and Lien data (which I extended to 2003). 
 
§5.6 DOMESTIC LAW REFORM: PRIVATIZATION OF STATE ASSETS 
 
 It is also clear that developing country privatization reforms have great potential to encourage 
FDI inflows by opening up important sectors of the economy to foreign participation.  In many cases 
privatization reforms were legally and/or temporally closely linked to broader domestic reform efforts.15  
I accordingly include a variable measuring the total proceeds that a host government receives in a given 
year from privatization, measured in real millions of dollars.   I use privatization data collected by the 
World Bank, and for the years 1985-1987, from data collected by Nancy Brune.16  Unlike other variables 
in the analysis, I do not lag the privatization variable because FDI linked to privatization efforts will likely 
be invested in the same year that the host state receives the proceeds. 
 
§5.7 OTHER CONTROL VARIABLES: MARKET & ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
 
  I include a number of standard controls for relevant economic conditions.  GDP (as a measure 
market size); GDP per capita (as a measure of market wealth); GDP growth (measuring market 
performance); the rate of inflation (as a proxy for macroeconomic stability); and trade openness 
(constructed as the value of imports plus export divided by GDP).  The three GDP variables are taken 
mostly from the World Bank WDI, with missing values filled in with data from Gleditsch’s “Expanded 
Trade and GDP” database.  Inflation data (in GDP deflator form) is also from the WDI, and trade 
openness data is constructed from WDI data and from Gleditsch’s data set.  All values are untransformed 
(i.e. not logged) and, where relevant, they are measured in constant millions of dollars.  Because GDP 
growth tends to be relatively volatile year-to-year, and because foreign direct investors presumably have 
relatively long-term timelines, I have converted the growth variable into a five-year moving average.  
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However, substituting year-over-year GDP growth, lagged one period, does not affect the reported 
results for the other variables. 
 
§5.8 OTHER CONTROL VARIABLES: POLITICAL REGIME 
 
 The international relations literature suggests quite strongly that a host state’s regime type matters 
to foreign investors.  Regime type is usually understood as the degree to which a host state is democratic 
or autocratic.  Jensen, for instance, has found that democracies attract more FDI inflows than 
autocracies, and Li has found that democracies are less likely to need to use tax incentives to attract 
FDI.17  The causal story is typically one of “veto points.”  As Li puts it, citing Jensen and Henisz,  
 
One reason that democracy and autocracy adopt different levels of tax incentives is 
because they differ systematically in terms of property rights protection and policy 
credibility. The possibility of property rights violations, such as expropriation, seizure of 
assets, contract repudiation, and government corruption weigh heavily in the calculus of 
FDI decisions.  Democratic institutions, such as the dispersion of power, the 
constrained executive, the large number of veto players over public policy, legislative and 
judicial power, the diversity of views in the legislature, and the independent judiciary, 
collectively serve to strengthen the rule of law and secure private property rights. These 
institutions constrain the power of the leaders, allow political representation of various 
interests, and raise the costs of supplying private benefits, all of which make state 
commitment to the rule of law credible.18 
 
In the analysis below I accordingly include the widely used 21-point Polity IV scale of democracy and 
autocracy as a measure of host state regime type.  I have rescaled the measure so that it runs from 0 (the 
highest level of autocracy) to 20 (the highest level of democracy).   
 
 It is worth noting, however, that there is very little direct evidence that investment professionals 
actually consider developing-country democracies to be safer places to invest.  Figures 5.2 and 5.3, 
immediately below, illustrate the bivariate relationship between the level of democracy, on the one hand, 
and subjective measures of policy continuity and risk of nationalization on the other.  The policy 
continuity and nationalization risk measures are constructed by BERI, SA based on expert surveys.  As 
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used in the figures below, the policy continuity measure covers 782 country-year observations over the 
period 1985-2003.  The nationalization-risk variable covers 120 developing countries in the year 2002.  
We see that the bivariate relationship between democracy and the survey measure very inconsistent.  
Figure 5.2 shows that investor perceptions of policy continuity are negatively correlated with democracy.  
Counter-intuitively, more democratic developing countries are perceived to have less stable policy 
environments.  The correlation coefficient, however, is not terribly great (-0.17), though it is statistically 
significant at the 0.000 level.  In Figure 5.3 we see an opposite and more intuitive relationship.  More 
democratic developing countries have higher nationalization risk ratings, with higher ratings indicating 
less risk.  Here the correlation coefficient is more substantial (0.28) and statistically significant at the 0.002 
level. 
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Figure 5.3: Bivariate Relationship between Democracy and Perceptions of Policy Continuity 
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Figure 5.4 Bivariate Relationship between Democracy and Perceptions of Nationalization Risk 
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 I have not included a separate measure of “veto points” because the measure performed poorly 
in Neumayer and  Spess’s original study and in my replication above, and because the Polity IV data is 
available for more recent years.  However, it is worth noting that the WDI measure of veto points is 
highly correlated with the Polity IV measure of democracy, with a correlation coefficient of 0.67 
(significant at the 0.0000 level).  In that respect, including a measure of democracy would seem to proxy, 
to a reasonable degree, a “veto points” concept of political risk. 
 
§5.9 RESULTS FROM THE ADDITIVE MODEL 
 
 Table 5.1 presents summary statistics for the variables used to estimate the simple additive 
models analyzed in the present Section.  Table 5.2, which immediately follows, presents results for the 
models themselves, using three dependent variables: FDI inflows measured in constant dollars, FDI 
inflows as a percent of total world inflows (our measure of whether a developing state is winning the 
“competition for capital”), and FDI inflows as a percent of host state GDP, our measure of foreign 
capital “penetration.”  (Substituting FDI inflows as a percent of total FDI inflows to developing 
countries for the FDI share variable in Model II produced results substantively similar to those presented 
below).  Each of the three models is estimated using OLS-PCSE.  Models I and II contain an LDV, but 
the third model does not.  This is because diagnostic tests of Model III indicate that including an LDV 
induces significant first-order serial autocorrelation where, absent the LDV, there is none.19  In any event, 
including an LDV in Model III does not substantively change the key results, and the LDV itself is 
statistically insignificant.  I briefly discuss the results for the various control variables, leaving the more 
in-depth discussion of the key variables of interest—the disaggregated BIT variables—for the end of the 
subsection. 
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Table 5.1: Summary Statistics for Table 5.2, Model III 
 
 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Dependent Variable FDI, % GDP 2.49 6.41 -83.02 145.17 
ECHR .10 .30 0 1 
ECT .06 .24 0 1 
EU .08 .27 0 1 
BIT-Like Treaties 
OECD Decl’n .06 .25 0 1 
ICSID .71 .45 0 1 Openness  to 
Arbitration NY Conv’n .58 .49 0 1 
MIGA, $ Insured 4.99 23.55 0 333.60 Investment Insurance 
OPIC, $ Insured 17.66 72.53 0 1026.91 
Capital Controls 2.35 1.23 0 4 Domestic Investment- 
Related Policy Privatization $ 116.29 492.49 0 9803.63 
GDP Per Capita 2403.62 3403.33 56.50 27226.46 
GDP Growth 3.38 4.13 -32.02 39.31 
Inflation 28.04 89.38 -29.17 968.54 
Economic 
Environment 
Trade Openness 83.78 179.27 0 4146.29 
Political Regime Polity IV 11.12 7.01 0 20 
Strong Dispute Settlem’t 0.14 0.20 0 0.87 
Partial Pre-Consent 0.02 0.09 0 0.69 
Promissory Pre-Consent 0.01 0.03 0 0.24 
Weighted BITs in 
Force 
No Dispute Settlement 0.08 0.10 0 0.53 
Note: Based on same 1,994 country-year observations as estimated in Table 5.2, Model III. 
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Table 5.2: Reanalysis of the Determinants of FDI  
 
 
 
 
  I.  FDI Inflows, 
Millions Real $ 
II.  FDI, % 
World 
III.  FDI, % GDP
ECHR 238.659 (1.21) 0.023 (0.43) -0.216 (0.26) 
ECT -271.520 (1.54) -0.068 (1.89) -1.142 (2.18)* 
EU -254.001 (0.90) -0.019 (0.34) 0.353 (0.69) 
BIT-Like Treaties 
OECD Decl’n 518.938 (0.73) -0.198 (1.40) -0.009 (0.02) 
ICSID 188.878 (1.08) -0.007 (0.16) 0.655 (2.05)* Openness  to 
Arbitration NY Conv’n -38.408 (0.31) 0.028 (0.68) 0.672 (2.17)* 
MIGA, $ Insured 3.773 (1.60) 0.000 (0.49) 0.009 (3.24)** Investment 
Insurance OPIC, $ Insured -0.298 (0.37) -0.000 (0.09) 0.002 (1.79)a 
Capital Controls -63.729 (1.53) -0.004 (0.48) -0.369 (3.07)** Domestic 
Investment- 
Related Policy 
Privatization $ 1.223 (6.00)** 0.000 (4.49)** 0.0006 (5.98)** 
GDP 0.019 (4.52)** -0.000 (0.85) - 
GDP Per Capita 0.306 (1.59) 0.000 (1.83) 0.0009 (5.38)** 
GDP Growth 20.671 (3.04)** 0.006 (4.16)** 0.445 (3.77)** 
Inflation -0.528 (0.97) -0.000 (0.77) 0.005 (3.23)** 
Economic 
Environment 
Trade Openness 0.034 (0.34) -0.000 (1.04) -0.008 (1.37) 
Political Regime Polity IV -11.009 (1.84) -0.003 (2.14)* 0.077 (3.36)** 
Lagged DV Lagged DV 0.495 (6.36)** 0.449 (5.52)** - 
Strong Dispute 
Settlement 
-717.607 (1.61) -0.119 (1.34) 1.245 (2.17)* 
Partial Pre-Consent 1265.467 (0.65) 0.706 (0.81) 2.748 (2.15)** 
Promissory Pre-
Consent 
3522.198 (1.79) 1.100 (1.70) 7.527 (3.08)** 
Weighted 
BITs in 
Force20 
No Dispute 
Settlement 
-253.961 (0.21) -0.011 (0.04) -0.238 (0.11) 
Unit Effects Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
 Observations 2004 2004 1994 
Countries 128 128 127 
Period 1985-2003 1985-2003 1985-2003 
 
R2 0.86 0.79 0.38 
Notes: Estimated using OLS with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors.  Z-scores are in parentheses, and Models I 
& II are corrected for first-order autocorrelation.   * and ** indicate significance at the ≤ 0.05 and 0.01 levels 
respectively. 
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 The economic variables do not deserve much comment, except to note that they perform 
reasonably well and generally as expected.  It is particularly noteworthy that the lagged dependent 
variables are among the most statistically and substantively significant of the bunch.  Model I, for 
example, suggests that a one dollar in past investment flows is associated with nearly 50 cents of 
investment in the present period.  Likewise, Model II suggests that a one percent increase in past FDI 
share is associated with an increase in FDI share of over 40 percent in the present period.  Both results 
provide extremely strong support for the “follow the leader” theory of investment decision-making.  
Foreign investors appear to pay very strong attention to whether or not the behavior of other investors 
demonstrates confidence in the particular host economy. 
 
 As to the policy- and law-related variables, first take a look at the four treaty-based alternatives to 
BITs.  The results here are disappointing in the sense that the variables are mostly insignificant.  None 
are significant in the first or second model, and only the ECT variable is significant (but wrongly signed) 
in Model III, our model of FDI penetration.  With the exception of this latter, counterintuitive result, the 
general insignificance of the non-BIT treaties may be due, in large part, to the fact that these non-BIT 
treaties generally lack guaranteed access to international dispute settlement, lending their investor-friendly 
promises less inherently credible.  The ECT result is more difficult to explain, though it is worth pointing 
out that the ECT is sector-specific, while my dependent variables are not.  It may be the case that the 
ECT succeeds in promoting energy-sector FDI to host states that otherwise tend to under-perform in 
attracting FDI more generally and on net. 
 
 A host state’s general openness to international arbitration, as proxied by ratification of the 
ICSID and New York Conventions, is not a significant predictor of FDI inflows in the first two models.  
But in the model of FDI penetration, both are significant and signed as expected.  This suggests, at least 
tentatively, that a greater willingness to arbitrate investment disputes gives investors greater confidence to 
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invest.   The measures of the use of investment insurance perform similarly.  Both the MIGA and OPIC 
measures are insignificant in the first two models, but the MIGA variable is significant and correctly 
signed in the FDI penetration model, while the OPIC variable approaches statistical significance.  This 
latter result for the MIGA variable provides what is, to my knowledge, the first statistical evidence that 
investment insurance serves to promote investment that would not otherwise have taken place, rather 
than simply to subsidize insurance that would have been made even absent the insurance. 
 
 The Polity IV democracy variable, which the international relations literature suggests might 
reasonably be viewed as a proxy for political risk or of the overall quality of government institutions, 
performs inconsistently.  In the FDI penetration model, it is significant and signed, just as international 
relations theory would lead us to expect.  More democratic countries, which presumably enjoy greater 
degrees of policy stability, appear to receive greater FDI inflows as a percent of GDP.  The Polity IV 
variable is also significant in Model II, but here it is negatively signed, implying that more democratic 
countries tend to receive smaller shares of world FDI.  I offer no explanation for the contradictory 
findings, except to suggest that more work on the effects of democracy on foreign investment certainly 
deserve further and deeper study.  It is worth noting that in Jensen’s own study of the effects of 
democracy on FDI, he reports results only for a model using FDI penetration as the dependent variable.  
The result reported in Model II is thus not necessarily inconsistent with his findings.   
 
 The two variables measuring domestic investment-related law reforms generally perform as 
expected.  The privatization dummy variable is very highly significant and correctly signed in all three 
models.  This in turn suggests that past success at attracting FDI may, to some degree, be unsustainable 
in the future, as developing states simply run out of state assets to privatize. The capital controls variable 
is insignificant in the first two models, but is significant and correctly signed in Model III: restrictive 
capital controls are associated lower levels of FDI penetration. 
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 The BIT variables are the major variables of interest, and the results here are likewise mixed.  On 
the one hand, all of the BIT variables are statistically insignificant in the first two models.  What is 
especially surprising given Neumayer and Spess’s findings is that Model II provides no support for the 
notion that BITs are useful in the “competition for capital.”  Entering into large numbers of BITs, 
whether strong or otherwise, has no statistically significant effect on a developing country’s share of 
world FDI.    It is important to note too that multicollinearity does not appear to explain the models’ 
failures.  The average variance inflation factors (VIFs) for Models I and II are just over 3.2, and a small 
number of individual variables have VIFs of over 30.  Particularly problematic are the GDP per capita 
variable and the ICSID variable, the latter of which appears to be highly collinear with certain of the 
country dummy variables.  But systematically deleting these latter, high VIF variables from the models 
does not substantively affect the BIT variables.   In fact, in most cases the BIT variables become less 
significant as high VIF variables are removed. 
 
 Our theoretical expectations are met, however, in the third model, which also generally 
performed as expected as to the other, non-BIT variables.  In Model III we see that weak BITs (e.g. BITs 
that do not grant investors guaranteed access to international arbitration of investment disputes), are 
insignificant predictors of FDI penetration, while strong BITs, BITs with partial pre-consents, and 
promissory BITs are all significant, positive predictors of penetration.  The magnitude of the effect of the 
non-weak BITs is relatively substantial.  The analysis suggests that a one-standard-deviation increase in 
the strong BIT variable—roughly akin to entering into a BIT with a capital exporting country of the 
magnitude of the United States—can be expected to lead, on average, to an increase in FDI penetration 
of 0.27% (i.e. from 2.0% to 2.27%).  This in turn implies an increase in FDI inflows of approximately 
122 million dollars for an economy with a GDP roughly equal to the median country in the sample.  Note 
that the coefficients on the partial pre-consent and promissory BIT variables are several times greater 
than the coefficient on the strong BIT variable.  This result is admittedly counterintuitive, as there is no 
good reason to expect BITs with weaker dispute settlement mechanisms to be more effective at attracting 
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FDI than stronger treaties.  In fact, the result for the partial pre-consent BIT variable is driven entirely by 
the special case of China, one of the most successful developing countries at attracting FDI in the past 
decade, and also one of the most prolific signers of BITs with partial pre-consents to arbitration.  When 
China is excluded from the analysis, partial pre-consent BITs become statistically insignificant predictors 
of FDI.  The exceptionally large coefficient on the promissory BIT variable is more difficult to explain, 
though one possibililty is that the legal nuance behind the distinction may in fact be too nuanced to be 
noticed by non-lawyers typically involved in the investment decision-making process.   Instead, 
promissory BITs are perhaps better viewed as functionally equivalent to strong BITs, with the difference 
in magnitude of estimated effect on FDI penetration being largely an artifact of the relatively small 
number of promissory BITs in the sample.  In any event, combining the promissory and strong BIT 
variables into a single measure returns very similar results to those reported in the Table. 
 
 The key results of the additive models are largely robust to changes in model specification and to 
estimation strategy.  Adding the ICRG political risk variable used by Neumayer and Spess does not 
substantively affect the results for the BIT variables, nor does replacing the democracy variable with the 
World Bank measure of veto points used in the previous analyses. Logging the dependent variable does 
not change the BIT results substantively either.  The results are also largely robust to using an unweighted 
count of BITs in force, in which each BIT counts as “1.”  The unweighted BIT variables in Models I and 
II remain stubbornly non-significant, but the BIT variables in Models III are now non-significant as well.  
In other words, un-weighting the BIT variables produce results that consistently suggest that BITs do not 
have a meaningful effect on FDI inflows, however measured.  Estimating the models using GLS, robust 
and country-clustered standard errors and fixed effects also did not improve the performance of the BIT 
variables; indeed, when GLS was used without a lagged dependent variable, performance worsened in the 
sense that the BIT variables in Model III became insignificant, while the strong BIT variables in Models I 
and II became significant and negatively signed—results implying that entering into the strongest of 
investment treaties makes developing countries less desirable places to invest.  Assuming an adequately 
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specified model, this result is quite difficult to explain, except that it suggests that the GLS results are 
unreliable, and that an OLS-PCSE-LDV estimation strategy is more appropriate.  Again, multicollinearity 
is not behind the failure to find that BITs play a role in promoting FDI inflows.  In the fixed effects GLS 
models average VIFs are well below 3.0, with no single variables having a VIF above 5.0. 
 
 As an additional sensitivity test I ran the models using three “undifferentiated” BIT variables that 
do not take account of differences in dispute settlement provisions.  The first variable simply summed 
the four aggregated BIT variables.  The second alternative BIT variable was the weighted sum total of 
signed BITs, but including only those BITs that eventually entered into force.  The third BIT variable is a 
weighted count of signed BITs, regardless of whether the particular BIT ever entered into force.  (This 
third variable is identical to that used in Chapter Four, in my replication of Neumayer and Spess’s original 
analysis).  Partial results are presented below in Table 5.3. 
   
Table 5.3: Aggregating the BIT Variable (Partial Model Results) 
 
 
 Table 5.3 suggests that there is some, but perhaps not overwhelming, analytic utility to 
differentiating among BITs on the basis of dispute settlement provisions.  On the one hand, aggregating 
the BIT variables into single counts has no overall affect on the significance or direction of the estimated 
 I.  FDI Inflows, 
Millions Real $ 
II.  FDI, % World III.  FDI, % GDP 
BITs – In force, weighted, undifferentiated -600.105 (1.38) 0.072 (0.70) 1.442 (2.59)** 
    
BITs – Signed, weighted, undifferentiated, including only 
BITs that will enter into force 
-600.106 (1.38) -.041 (0.35) 1.151 (2.02)* 
    
BITs – Signed, weighted , undifferentiated, including 
BITs that never entered into force (following Neumeyer 
and Spess) 
-157.337 (0.31) 0.117 (0.14) 1.987 (3.11)** 
    
Notes: All models include the same control variables as the models presented in Table 5.2 and were estimated using the 
same PCSE estimation strategy. 
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affect of BITs on FDI inflows.  Models I and II continue to suggest that BITs have no statistically 
significant impact on absolute dollar amounts of FDI inflows, or on FDI share.  Model III, on the other 
hand, continues to suggest that BITs generally do significantly and positively impact FDI penetration.   
But by disaggregating the BIT variable we are able to say something more nuanced about Model III, and 
something ultimately potentially more helpful to developing countries—if LDCs wish to have much hope 
of attracting additional FDI through BITs, they should be prepared to sacrifice their historical immunity 
to suit by foreign investors through pre-consents to investor-initiated arbitration.  And unless they are 
China, a special case if there ever were one, those pre-consents should be broad-based, covering most or 
all investment disputes that might arise under the treaties.  
 
§5.10: Residual Analysis of the Additive Models 
 
 Figures 5.5 through 5.10, immediately below, illustrate the results of post-estimation 
examinations of the residuals from Models II (FDI share) and III (FDI penetration).  In the interest of 
space I have omitted comparable figures for the first model, in which the dependent variable is the 
absolute value of FDI inflows.  Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show standardized normal probability plots of the 
residuals (using the -qnorm- routine in Stata).  Figures 5.7 and 5.8 plot the residuals against the fitted 
values of the dependent variables.  And finally, Figures 5.9 and 5.10 examine the distribution of residuals 
over time.     
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Figure 5.5: Standardized Normal Probability Plot, FDI Inflows as Percent of World Inflows 
710
710
20571071070
70
820710
70651100160820
1606714071560101140
140925602353147585067235140802 547
2358 071692081067169055316 20931626405129840732903507180326702 5164516928 073762 504860135422965 081 5
81670368411035771163 504 2705 18247690938 06921 153605641 59750363 75667 2907453 8663201521 613401597301847564 0139849 54072819 3541 031872592306681984509783681467 2093 795716024216344 093246018757290681358490724 614320493581752703188552603941626530481773 3062848175061829 734990451290376153021587906326175803915037664518254034 1289802413572043698124 3587 06471240769512079764539 91024
710583239780159239 816048734 2150688494210566891732046 51027396127803959 41278093376102458731205666 9130847825195 042835107928310572669 3404265180925464105199203354626 87103534708163657 24087915023849974 127650347162757803681908486512749 1054967243180539762935018396245 0261570432504739508512964083187960168152303 97156702510628508464 038123640517928213 0614557701843563 0159 39830528907473514272740611352 07205566103561249 8
087 19920821417 0321556 16638 0947561 153278 071 532 51 08429756086 1135407 28 575608711678 02 5392012925140239 5
61 0850023570316509216731054820416085
14070560710160
70670140
71070710710
710710710
710670710
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
R
es
id
ua
l
-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Inverse Normal
Note: 710 indicates China
 
Figure 5.6: Standardized Normal Probability Plot, FDI Inflows as Percent of Host GDP 
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Figure 5.7: Residuals versus Fitted Values, FDI Inflows as Percent of World Inflows 
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Figure 5.8: Residuals versus Fitted Values, FDI Inflows as Percent of Host GDP 
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 The post-estimation diagnostics do not indicate any obvious, serious problems with the data.  
The normal probability plots suggest that the residuals are largely normally distributed, as they generally 
remain close to the diagonal reference line.1  Deviations from the reference line are most pronounced at 
the tails of the distribution, and, as the figures indicate, these deviations are due a small set of particular 
countries: China where the dependent variable is FDI inflows as a percent of world inflows, and 
Equatorial Guinea and Liberia where the dependent variable if FDI penetration.  Removing these outliers 
from the statistical analysis does not substantively change the reported results for the FDI penetration 
model.  However, removing China from the FDI share model causes the strong BIT variable—which 
remains negatively signed—to become statistically significant at the 0.02 level.  This is a theoretically 
problematic result, because it suggests that developing countries that enter into BITs are less competitive 
at attracting FDI than are developing countries that forgo BITs.  The plots of the residuals versus fitted 
values illustrate a generally cloud-shaped pattern around the zero-line, though see once again that China 
(in the FDI share model) and Equatorial Guinea and Liberia (in the FDI penetration model) are quite 
noticeable outliers.  Again, however, removing these outliers from the statistical analysis does not 
improve results for the BIT variables. 
 
 Figures 5.9 and 5.10 perform a final post-estimation diagnostic analysis.  Here I have plotted he 
residuals over time.  The plots indicate that the residual values are largely independent of time, though 
again China, Equatorial Guinea, and Liberia stand out as outliers. 
                                                 
1 Histograms of the residuals (not shown) indicate that the distributions are highly peaked, but otherwise 
roughly normal (e.g. not severely skewed) in distribution.  Logging the dependent variables does not 
improve residual distribution or eliminate outliers. 
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Figure 5.9: Residuals versus Time, FDI Inflows as Percent of World Inflows 
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Figure 5.10: Residuals versus Time, FDI Inflows as Percent of Host GDP 
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§5.11: Sensitivity to Multiplicative Interaction Effects 
 
 The analysis presented in the previous subsection is open to the criticism that an additive model 
ignores one of the central insights of Neumayer and Spess’s article: that the relationship between BITs 
and political risk should be a multiplicative one, and that as risk decreases, so should the marginal effects 
of BITs on FDI.  It also ignores the underlying logic of the “competition for capital” by failing to include 
an interaction term controlling for the number of other BITs in force.  The current subsection explores 
the effects of adding either interaction term to the additive model.  I also present results for a model that 
includes both interactions, modeled as a three-way interaction term. 
 
 Interacting BITs and Political Risk: The ICRG Measure.  Recall that the most successful of the 
additive models is Table 5.2, Model III, which uses FDI penetration as the dependent variable. Model 
III is also arguably the model of most inherent interest to developing countries, which are likely to care 
more about FDI penetration of their domestic economies than about their share of world FDI.21  
Figures 5.11-5.15 show the results of adding an interaction effect between the ICRG composite measure 
of political risk and each of the four disaggregated BIT variables to the FDI penetration model and for a 
model that aggregates all of the BIT variables into a single measure.  I present results for the aggregated 
model first.  I estimate the models using OLS-PCSE, and, except for the interaction effect and the ICRG 
risk component variable, all of the independent variables are the same as those presented in Table 5.9, 
Model III. 
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Figure 5.11: Marginal Effect of Aggregated BITs on FDI Penetration as Political Risk Changes
Figure 5.12: Marginal Effect of Strong BITs on FDI Penetration as Political Risk Changes
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Figure 5.13: Marginal Effect of Partial Pre-Consent BITs on FDI Penetration as Political Risk 
Changes 
Figure 5.14: Marginal Effect of Promissory BITs on FDI Penetration as Political 
Risk Changes 
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Figures 5.11-5.15 provide substantial support for Neumayer and Spess’s interactive theory, and for my 
own theory that the BITs that matter are those that contain some reference to investor-initiated 
arbitration.  Figure 5.11, for instance, shows that for all BITs considered together, undifferentiated by 
strength of dispute settlement, the estimated positive effect of BITs on FDI penetration declines as the 
ICRG measure increases in value, and thus as political risk decreases.  And except for the lowest levels of 
risk, the confidence interval remains on the positive side of the zero line, suggesting that for most of the 
range of observed values of risk BITs have a statistically meaningful positive effect on FDI, as expected.  
This same general pattern is repeated in Figures 5.12-5.14, which examines the marginal effects of strong 
BITs, partial pre-consent BITs, and promissory BITs on FDI penetration.  Again, the marginal effects 
line decreases as political risk decreases, and the effect of BITs on FDI penetration is significantly 
positive at most levels of risk, though again I caution that the results for partial pre-consent BITs are 
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Figure 5.15: Marginal Effect of Weak BITs on FDI Penetration as Political Risk 
Changes 
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driven largely by the special case of China, and that the results for promissory BITs are less reliable (as 
indicated by the wider confidence intervals) because of the relatively small number of observations.  The 
more important caveat, however, deals with Figure 5.12, which illustrates the marginal effects of strong 
BITs.  Recall that the median value of the ICRG risk variable in the sample is approximately 17.  Figure 
5.12 suggests that at political risk ratings of 22 or greater (representing approximately 17 percent of the 
sample observations) we cannot have confidence that BITs have positive rather than negative effects on 
FDI.  
 
 Compare these first four figures with Figure 5.14, which illustrates the marginal effects of weak 
BITs as the ICRG risk rating increases.  Here we see that across the entire range of values of the risk 
index the confidence interval spans the zero line, indicating statistical insignificance.  In other words, 
Figures 5.11-5.15 allow us to say with some confidence that BITs can help at least some developing 
countries to increase FDI penetration at lower levels of risk.  Figure 5.15 adds a quite important nuance:  
the positive effect is unlikely to obtain if the treaties do not contain at least some provision for investor-
initiated arbitration. 
 
 Interacting BITs and Political Risk: Polity IV.  Figures 5.16-5.20, below, repeat the interactive 
exercise using the Polity IV measure of democracy as a proxy for political risk.  The take-away lesson is 
that the direction of the conditional relationship, and the ranges of values over which the relationship is 
statistically significant, depends to a great degree on how we measure political risk, as the results here are 
markedly different than those obtained using the ICRG risk variable.   Note for example that in Figures 
5.16 and 5.17 (illustrating results for all BITs and for strong BITs respectively) that the marginal effects 
line slopes upward, indicating that as democracy increases, and as political risk decreases, that BITs become 
more effective at increasing FDI penetration.  On the other hand, we can have confidence that the effect 
on FDI is positive only at the highest levels of democracy.  Figures 5.16 and 5.17 suggest that the 
conditional effects of BITs on FDI penetration are significantly positive only when the level of 
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democracy is above approximately 12-14.  The median Polity IV rating in the sample is just under 12, 
suggesting that for half of the observations in the sample, disaggregated and strong BITs can not be said 
to positively impact FDI penetration.   
 
 In other words, the evidence presented here is decidedly mixed that strong BITs, or all BITs 
considered in the aggregate, “matter” in the expected direction.  Results are more consistently in line with 
theory as to weak BITs.  Figure 5.20 shows a very weak conditional relationship between weak BITs and 
levels of democracy; furthermore, that relationship is never statistically significant. 
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Figure 5.17: Marginal Effect of Strong BITs on FDI Penetration as Democracy Changes
Figure 5.16: Marginal Effect of Aggregated BITs on FDI Penetration as Democracy Changes
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Figure 5.18: Marginal Effect of Partial Pre-Consent BITs on FDI Penetration as Democracy 
Changes 
Figure 5.19: Marginal Effect of Promissory BITs on FDI Penetration as Democracy Changes
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 How to explain the results of the BIT-Democracy interactions?  The results suggest that 
democracy, like “veto points,” is not a conceptually useful proxy for “political risk” of the type that BITs 
are said to reduce.  The Figures make clear that BITs are not a substitute for (lack of) democracy, and 
that, from the perspective of the investor, more democracy is not necessarily a substitute for a BIT.  
Indeed, it is possible, if not likely, that democracies are correlated with some other latent, investor-
friendly characteristic, either structural or policy-related, that is not adequately controlled for in our 
model. 
 
 Interacting Host State BITs and World BITs.  I argued above that the “competition for capital” 
thesis adopted by Neumayer and Spess and advocated by Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons suggests that 
BITs will decline in their competitive effectiveness as world BITs increase.  The two figures below 
illustrate what happens when we add a multiplicative host BIT-world BIT interaction term to the additive 
model.  The dependent variable here is FDI share rather than FDI penetration. A country’s share of 
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Figure 5.20: Marginal Effect of Weak BITs on FDI Penetration as Democracy Changes
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world FDI is a better proxy for success in the competition for capital than FDI penetration, because the 
former proxy more closely taps the notion that “success” is equivalent to getting a larger slice than one’s 
competitors of the total FDI pie. (However, while I do not reproduce the relevant figures here, the same 
negatively-sloping pattern illustrated in Figure 5.21 obtains when substituting FDI penetration for FDI 
share as the dependent variable, suggesting that BITs are becoming less effective at promoting FDI 
penetration as more and more states sign and ratify the treaties). 
 
 The models are again estimated using OLS-PCSE. The control variables are the same as those 
listed in Table 5.9, Model II, except that I include a weighted count of the number of strong BITs in force 
worldwide, which I adjust by subtracting each particular host state’s number of in-force, strong BITs.  I 
multiply this weighted, adjusted count variable with each of the four disaggregated BIT variables and, in a 
separate model, with an aggregated (undifferentiated) BIT variable.  In the interest of space I reproduce 
below only the figures for the all-BIT interaction effect and the strong-BIT interaction effect. 
 
 The results of the exercise provide some, but not perfect, support for theoretical expectations.  
Figure 5.21 shows that a host state’s aggregated count of BITs declines markedly in effectiveness as the 
world count of strong BITs in force increases.  In other words, in today’s investment “market”, entering 
into an additional BIT of any type can be expected to have less positive impact on FDI share than entering 
into an additional BIT in an earlier era, in which BITs were less common.  The analytic caveat, however, 
should be obvious:  the wide confidence intervals continuously span the zero line, suggesting that at no 
point in the history of BITs have they had a statistically significant impact on FDI share.  
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 On the other hand, and looking at the interaction between strong BITs and the world BIT count 
(Figure 5.22, below), we see little evidence that the effectiveness of strong BITs declines as the world BIT 
count increases.  In fact, the point estimate trends slightly upward as world BITs in force become more 
numerous.  At the same time, however, the point estimate is counter-intuitively negative, and the wide 
confidence intervals suggest that we are unable to statistically determine whether the estimated effects of 
strong BITs on FDI share are in fact positive or negative at any level of world strong BITs.  
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Figure 5.21: Marginal Effect of All BITs on FDI as World Strong BIT Count Changes 
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 The interactive results reported in Figure 5.21 are also robust to estimating the models using GLS 
with fixed effects, robust standard errors, clustered or unclustered by country.  The same downward-
sloping relationship is also evident when we use FDI penetration rather than FDI share as the dependent 
variable.  In short, controlling interactively for the number of world BITs in force provides little to no 
evidence that BITs have ever, or currently, effectively serve to promote foreign investment. 
 
 Interacting Host State BITs, Political Risk, and World BITs.  Here I offer a final complication to 
the interactive analyses presented above. If it is theoretically sound to argue that the effect of BITs on 
FDI share is likely to depend on both the number of BITs already in force worldwide and on a host state’s 
background level of political risk, then a properly specified model will need to incorporate a three-way 
interaction term that multiplies a host state’s own number of BITs in force by its level of political risk 
and by the world BIT count. 
 
 
  
-.6   
-.4   
-.2   
0   
.2   
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ffe
ct
 o
f S
tro
ng
 B
IT
s 
on
 F
D
I 
  
0   5   10   15   20 25 30 35 40 
  Weighted World Strong BIT Count 
  
Marginal Effect of Strong BITs  
95% Confidence Interval  
  Dependent Variable: FDI Inflows, Percent of World Inflows 
  
Figure 5.22: Marginal Effect of Strong BITs on FDI as World Strong BIT Count Changes 
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 Figures 5.23-5.26 replicate Table 5.9, Model II, our additive model of FDI share, while including 
three-way interactions between each host state’s BIT count, level of political risk, and the world BIT 
count.  Figures 5.27-5.30 replicate Table 5.9, Model III, our additive model of FDI penetration, while 
again including the three-way interaction term and the term’s individual components.  The general model 
takes the form of 
 
y = x + w + z + xw + xz + wz + xwz + (control variables), 
 
where y is FDI share or FDI penetration, x is the weighted BIT count variable, w is alternately either the 
Polity IV proxy for political risk or the ICRG political risk variable, z the weighted, adjusted count of 
world in-force strong BITs, and xw, xz, wz , and xwz  are multiplicative combinations of those first three 
variables.  To save space I again only present figures for models using the aggregate BIT variable (where 
BITs are undifferentiated by dispute settlement provisions) and the strong BIT variable. 
 
 I follow Brambor et al. in constructing the relevant figures, which are different, and indeed, more 
complex, than those presented previously.22  The x-axis indicates different levels of political risk (or 
democracy), across the range of possible values.  The y-axis indicates the marginal effects of BITs on 
FDI share.  The plotted lines indicate the marginal effects of BITs on FDI share at different levels of 
political risk (or democracy), with a separate line plotted for each of four different levels of world BITs.  The 
weighted world BIT variable ranges in observed value from 0 to nearly 40; I have selected four 
substantively meaningful and equally spaced values across that range.  The solid plotted line represents 
marginal effects at a very low level of worldwide BITs (3); the dashed line represents marginal effects at a 
moderate-low level of worldwide BITs (15); the dotted line, at moderate-high levels of worldwide BITs 
(27); and the dashed-dotted line at high (e.g. current) levels of worldwide BITs (39).  Instead of adding 
confidence intervals, which would unnecessarily clutter the Figures, I have followed Brambor et al. by 
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plotting asterisks (*) indicating the range of point estimates that are statistically significant at the 0.05 
level.   
 
 Figure 5.23 illustrates the marginal effect of all (aggregated) BITs on FDI share as the level of 
democracy changes at different levels of democracy.  There are three main aspects to note.  First, as the 
weighted number of strong BITs in force across the world increase (e.g. as we move from the solid point 
estimate line to the dashed-dotted line at the bottom), the estimated marginal effect of BITs decreases, 
just as theory would predict.  In other words, BITs appear to become less effective at attracting FDI 
share as more and more BITs come into force.  Second, and more problematically for theory, the point 
estimates are statistically insignificant at almost all levels of democracy and of world BITs in force.  BITs 
have a statistically significant effect on FDI share only at the highest level of world BITs (39), and even 
then, only when the particular host state is somewhere between a full democracy and a full autocracy.  
Third, and even more problematically, this statistically significant point estimate is negative—it suggests 
that BITs are actually harmful in the competition for capital. 
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 Figure 5.24, below, repeats the exercise for strong BITs.  Here we are concerned with measuring 
the marginal effects of strong BITs entering into force, at different levels of democracy and of world 
strong BITs.  The results are a complete statistical wash—at no levels of democracy or worldwide BITs 
do strong BITs have a statistically significant effect on FDI share.  The result is especially surprising, 
because, recall, we would expect strong BITs to be most likely to induce FDI flows. 
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Figure 5.23: Marginal Effect of All BITs on FDI Share As Democracy and Weighted World 
Strong BIT Count Change 
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 Figures 5.25 and 5.26 repeat the three-way interaction analysis using the ICRG measure of 
political risk.  Again, the results generally fail to support the thesis that BITs are of any use in the 
competition for capital.  In Figure 5.23 we see that the estimated effect of all BITs on FDI share declines 
as the number of worldwide BITs in force increases—again, as theory would predict.  Furthermore, and 
as the asterisks note, the marginal effects are statistically significant (and correctly signed) only at very low 
levels of worldwide BITs (3), and only where political risk is already relatively low, with the effect increasing as 
political risk decreases. This latter finding runs quite contrary to Neumayer and Spess’s prediction and 
finding that the effect of BITs decreases as political risk decreases.  Figure 5.24 repeats the analysis for 
strong BITs.  Here the results are, again, a statistical wash.  Strong BITs, which should theoretically be 
the most effective of all BITs at inducing FDI flows, have no statistically significant marginal effects on 
FDI share at any level of ICRG political risk or at any level of worldwide strong BITs. 
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Figure 5.24: Marginal Effect of Strong BITs on FDI Share as Democracy and Weighted World 
Strong BIT Count Change 
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Figure 5.25: Marginal Effect of All BITs on FDI Share as Political Risk 
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Figure 5.26: Marginal Effect of Strong BITs on FDI Share as Political Risk and 
Weighted World Strong BIT Count Change
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 For the sake of completeness I have reproduced below the results of the three-way interaction 
analysis using FDI penetration, rather than FDI share, as the dependent variable.  Recall that the additive 
model of FDI penetration in Table 5.3 was the most successful of the three additive models, and it is 
worth considering whether changing our metric of FDI success in the interactive context will again 
substantively affect the conclusions we can draw about the effectiveness of BITs.  Figures 5.27 and 5.28 
illustrate the results from the interaction of the host state’s aggregated BIT count, the Polity IV 
democracy variable, and the world strong BIT count.  Figures 5.29 and 5.30 repeated the exercise using 
the ICRG political risk variable.  Figures 5.27 and 5.29 use the host state’s aggregated count of BITs, 
while Figures 5.28 and 5.30use the strong BIT variable. 
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Figure 5.27: Marginal Effect of All BITs on FDI Penetration as Democracy 
and Weighted World Strong BIT Count Change 
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 As the results from the additive model would perhaps lead us to predict, using FDI penetration 
as the dependent variable significantly improves results in terms of finding statistically significant effects.  
Figures 5.27 and 5.28 show that BITs have statistically significant effects on FDI penetration at a wide 
range of values of democracy and of world strong BITs in force.  Importantly for my theory, however, 
note that as the world count of BITs increases (e.g. as we move from the upper, solid line representing 
only three weighted, strong world BITs in force, to the bottom, dotted-dashed line indicated 39 weighted, 
strong world BITs in force), the estimated positive marginal effects of BITs on FDI penetration decline.  
In short, as more BITs enter into force worldwide, we can expect a host state’s decision to enter into 
additional BITs to be of declining use in attracting more FDI.  It is especially curious to note that at low 
levels of democracy, the predicted marginal effect of BITs on FDI penetration is actually negative.  Only at 
the highest levels of democracy does the model suggest that BITs might have statistically significant, 
positive effects on FDI penetration.  Even more discouragingly, the dotted-dashed lines suggest that at 
current world BIT levels, the marginal effect of BITs on FDI penetration is never statistically significant 
and positive. 
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Figure 5.28: Marginal Effect of Strong BITs on FDI Penetration As Democracy and Weighted 
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 Using the ICRG political risk variable in the three-way interaction term produces roughly similar 
results.  Again, we see very strong evidence that as the world count of strong BITs in force increases, the 
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Figure 5.30: Marginal Effect of Strong BITs on FDI Penetration as Political Risk and Weighted 
World Strong BIT Count Change 
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estimated marginal effectiveness BITs decreases, at least across most ranges of political risk.  
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the marginal effectiveness of BITs is statistically significant and 
positive at current world levels of BITs.  Figures 5.29 and 5.30 indicate that BITs have a significant 
marginal effect on FDI penetration only at very low and moderately low levels of world BITs, and only at 
limited levels of political risk. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
 
 In this concluding chapter I offer a brief summary of the ideas, arguments, and analyses 
presented above, highlight a number of weaknesses, and suggest ways in which the research can be 
improved and supplemented in the near-term future. 
 
 At the most basic level I have argued that formal legal institutions are worthy of theoretical and 
empirical study by political scientists.  The formal rules of the game—and particularly law, whether 
primarily international or domestic in terms of process of origin or of content—certainly structures 
international actors’ expectations about how other actors will respond to their own moves and decisions, 
and by shaping their expectations influences their own behavior.  In this sense, international “law” is not 
fundamentally different from the broader class of international “regimes” or “institutions” that have pre-
occupied international relations for many years.  My contribution, I hope, is to push scholars a bit further 
away from the rather facile point that “international law matters” to consider, with more subtlety and in 
more detail, the conditions under which international law might matter, and how much it might matter.   
 
 In this general vein of inquiry Chapter Two made two important points.  First, that international 
law, and particularly bilateral investment treaties are most likely to matter in the sense of meaningfully 
influencing investor expectations where the treaties contain guaranteed access to effective dispute 
settlement.  It is important to emphasize that this is the case not just because access to dispute settlement 
allows for reliable “enforcement” of the law, but because dispute settlement, and particularly 
authoritative, neutral adjudication allows for the clarification, and indeed, often the making, of 
international legal obligation.  The most important implication of this basic point for empirical scholars 
of investment treaties is that not all treaties are created equal. We as analysts must be particularly sensitive 
to the ways in which dispute settlement provisions differ among the treaties, just as must foreign 
investors who expect the treaties to protect their investments.  The secondary point of Chapter Two is 
also important.  It is that scholars of the formal rules of the international investment game must be more 
sensitive than they have been to alternative legal and policy instruments that serve the same (or closely 
similar) functions as the rules of primary interest.  Here the point is to force analysts to consider 
meaningful policy alternatives—investment insurance as a substitute for a BIT; an investment contract as 
a substitute for investment insurance, and so on.  Functionalist rationalizations of a particular class of 
policy instruments tend to lead analysts to assume, often wrongly, that the particular policy of focus is the 
best, or the only, meaningful way of resolving or addressing a particular problem.  Hence the unjustified 
tendency to analyze BITs as if they are the only meaningful law-based way of credibly committing to treat 
investors fairly.  I hope to have shown that BITs are hardly an inevitable solution to problems of credible 
commitment or of obsolescing bargain.  They may not even be the best.  A very strong argument can be 
made that BITs inject too much rigidity into the international investment law regime by making it 
difficult for host states to adjust their investment policies—e.g. the terms of the deal offered to 
investors—in response to changing political and economic circumstances.  For many years, investors 
relied primarily on investment contracts to secure their interests.  Returning, at least in part, to a true 
bargaining regime, in which particular deal are struck on a case-by-case basis would in my view better 
allow developing countries to adjust and manage their exposure to international arbitration and to the 
policy inflexibility that it can induce, and to ensure that potentially very costly remedial promises are 
extended only to those investors for whom the promises are an essential precondition of the decision to 
invest.  
 
 Chapter Three situated itself within a growing literature in comparative politics addressing the 
role that political partisanship plays in shaping state’s policy choices.  I argued that partisanship can be 
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expected to influence international policy decisions just as it influences purely domestic ones, and that it 
should do so in predictable and relatively stable ways.  My principal theoretical contribution was to 
attempt to tie this partisanship hypothesis to an explanation grounded in the ideational literature of the 
1990s.  The empirical results were promisingly but not perfectly confirmatory.  Where the policy decision 
is most meaningful (in this case, where the decision is whether to enter into a BIT containing strong 
dispute settlement provisions), we have evidence of fairly strong empirical relationships.  Most surprising, 
however, is that the relationships are apparently not stable over time, and that, at least since the late 
1980s and early 1990s, the relationship is the opposite of what many would have suspected.  Left 
governments are now, but have not always been, more likely than right governments to enter into strong 
BITs.  This suggests that what it means to be “on the left” or “on the right” is not as fixed in stone as 
some might expect.  
 
 Chapter Three’s analysis suffers from at least two important weaknesses, however.  The first is 
data-related, the second theoretical.  In particular, the quality of the World Bank data on government 
partisanship is arguably not terribly high. For example, in many cases the coders appear to have relied 
principally on official party labels to classify parties as being on the left or right, even though party labels 
are often misleading.  The better approach, though it is also one that is exceedingly labor-intensive, is to 
classify political parties on the basis of individualized case research by regional or country specialists.  It is 
also worth noting that the World Bank data does not tap the degree to which a governing party is 
meaningfully on the left or on the right, but rather assumes that all left-governing parties are equally left, 
and that all right-governing parties are equally right.  John Stephens and Evelyne Huber are currently 
compiling a more rigorously constructed and researched cross-national dataset of government 
partisanship that, unfortunately, was not available for use in the present study.  
 
 More serious is my failure to provide a more explicit theory of why politicians of certain stripes 
might hold, and hold to, particular policy ideas.  This is perhaps the most fruitful area for future 
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theoretical development.  More work needs to be done, for example, to explore the links between 
domestic political constituents—voters or other politically relevant members of the selectorate—and their 
ideas of where their interests stand and the ideologies (and ultimately policy choices) of the leaders that 
they select.  One means of inquiry might be to examine in more detail the likely economic interests in 
FDI policy of a given party’s constituents on a factoral or sectoral basis, as these sorts of models have 
been used with some success to explain international trade policy choices.  Fordham and McKeown’s 
recent examination of the influence of interest groups on trade policy in the United States, which 
controls separately for the effects of party and ideology and the economic interests of constituents and 
interest groups, provides a potential model that could potentially and with substantial work be extended 
to a cross-national comparative examination of the determinants of FDI policy.1 
 
 Chapters Four and Five analyzed the effects of BITs on FDI inflows.  My basic argument was 
that if BITs should be expected to have much of an effect on investors’ expectations about the security 
of their investments against adverse host-state changes in policy, that effect should be most readily 
observed where the BITs in question were accompanied by strong dispute settlement provisions.  My 
basic contribution to the relevant literature is to provide the first analysis of BITs that distinguishes the 
treaties on the basis of dispute settlement provisions and which control for a wide variety of theoretically 
relevant BIT alternatives.   I showed in Chapter Four that Neumayer and Spess’s supposedly robust main 
finding—that signed, undifferentiated BITs are positively and significantly associated with increased FDI 
shares across all levels of political risk—does not hold up to justifiable changes in model specification 
and estimation strategy.  In the face of those changes, their results fall largely into statistical 
insignificance.  In particular, BITs appear to be rather ineffective tools in the “competition for capital” 
that motivates Neumayer and Spess’s theory and other recent empirical work on BITs once we control 
for the number of BITs in force worldwide.  There are compelling theoretical reasons, and now 
compelling empirical reasons, to suspect that as more and more states sign strong BITs, newcomers to 
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the competition will find their new treaties to be far less effective at diverting competitive capital to their 
shores than did those who joined the BIT party early on.  
 
 But I do not want to exaggerate the extent to which I have shown that “international law 
matters”.  Once we control for BIT alternatives, such as use of investment insurance, privatization 
programs, and domestic law capital controls, it proved very difficult to show that strong BITs had a 
statistically significant and positive effect on FDI inflows.  This is surprising because, as I have said, it is 
these BITs that have the greatest theoretical potential to improve investor confidence and to induce 
greater FDI flows.  I did report some modestly positive results: non-weak BITs do appear to be effective 
at increasing FDI penetration, at least in an additive model.  This finding suggests that while BITs might 
not be all that effective in the “competition for capital,” they may be effective at promoting non-
competitive, market-seeking foreign investment.   To the extent that this limited result is trustworthy, it 
suggests that reputational concerns alone are insufficient to ensure investor perceptions of compliance 
with international legal obligations.  If reputation were an important inducement to comply with 
international law, then we would expect weak BITs to have similar effects on investor confidence or 
interest (indicated by FDI inflows) as strong BITs.  Instead, we find that where BITs do seem to 
“matter,” it is only where they contain important references to international arbitration to enforce treaty 
obligations.  In other words, if developing countries want BITs to “work”, they must be willing to except 
the potentially significant sovereignty costs of agreeing to litigate investment disputes over the application 
and meaning of vague principles of law before arbitral tribunals. 
 
 The inconsistency in the additive results between different metrics of FDI “success” is admittedly 
difficult to explain, though it does suggest that BIT analysts should be very careful to examine the 
sensitivity of their results to the use of different metrics.  One possible explanation for the inconsistency 
is that success at attracting non-competetive market-oriented investments is perhaps better reflected in 
the FDI penetration variable, and that those kinds of investments tend to be more asset-specific, thus 
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more vulnerable to the problem of the “obsolescing bargain” then investments in ultra-competitive 
export-oriented sectors like light manufacturing.  Investors in these competitive sectors may be expected 
to care much less about the presence or absence of a BIT because BITs provide them with largely 
unnecessary protections.  If this is indeed the case, then it might not be particularly surprising that BITs 
don’t help increase FDI share very much, because competitive-sector investors don’t place much 
inherent value on BITs.  If policies prove to be unstable, or if the host state attempts to renegotiate the 
terms of operation, the competitive-sector investor can credibly threaten to exit for more favorable 
countries.  These conclusions and speculations must be tempered, however, by the results of the 
interactive analyses presented in Chapter Five, which suggested that at current worldwide levels of BITs 
the treaties, even the strong ones, can not be said to have statistically significant, positive effects on FDI 
inflows measured as a percent of host state GDP, or to have significant positive effects and many 
observed levels of political risk. 
 
 In this sense my fundamental theoretical claim—that under certain circumstances international 
should “matter”—has not been all that strongly confirmed.  Is the problem one of theory or one of data?  
The best answer is also not particularly satisfying.  That answer is that more work remains to be done on 
the subject.  In particular, statistical models of the type presented here are notoriously bad at shedding 
light on the micro-processes that underlie the theories at hand.  For example, an unstated assumption of 
Neumayer and Spess’s theory of BITs is that foreign investors notice the presence or absence of the 
treaties at the early stages of the investment decision-making process, and that the presence or absence of 
a treaty will in many cases definitively decide the question of whether or not to sink the investment.  My 
own addition to the theory has assumed that investors not only notice the treaties, but take into account 
differences in the content of the treaties, and in a fairly sophisticated way at that.  The problem for these 
assumptions—and they are admittedly big ones—is that there is little to no systematic and reasonably 
direct evidence that investors have had any significant knowledge of the treaties, or of their theoretical 
effects on policy stability.  To my knowledge their have been no major surveys of the extent to which the 
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presence or absence of a BIT actually enters into foreign investment decisions.  But there is suggestive if 
largely anecdotal evidence that it historically investors have not paid much attention to the treaties.  For 
example, a small survey of business executives conducted in 1976 found that only 16 percent of 
respondents were “familiar” with ICSID, that only one quarter of that 16 percent felt that ICSID 
provided “adequate safeguards.”  These results led the authors to conclude that ICSID needed to mount 
a major promotional campaign.2  In my view it is highly unlikely that investor awareness or appreciation 
of specific BITs was any higher in this earlier era.    Perhaps even more revealing is the title of a recent 
practitioner-oriented publication, “Arbitration under Bilateral Investment Treaties: An often overlooked 
tool,” which suggests that additional promotional efforts may still be needed.3  And while anecdotes 
should always be approached with extreme caution, my own informal conversations with practicing 
international lawyers involved on the “deal-making” side of international investment suggest that BITs 
rarely enter into the investment-making process in any concrete and significant way, and that far more 
important are rather mundane considerations relating to what might be called the “ease of doing 
business” and of “getting the deal done.”  Along the same lines, an analyst at a major state-sponsored 
investment insurance agency told me (under condition that I not divulge his name or agency) that the 
impression of his agency colleagues was that, with the possible exception of investors in the oil and gas 
sectors, foreign investors are often “unaware of or unfamiliar with BITs and their existence or lack 
thereof in their countries of interest.”  This is somewhat ironic because investors in the oil and gas 
industry are also the most capable of inserting BIT-like provisions in investment contracts, since in 
almost all cases actual negotiations with host states are a necessary precondition to their investments, and 
because there is a long history of including arbitration, choice-of-law, and law-stability clauses in those 
contracts.   
 
 In brief, while my own contribution to the debates has largely been one of large-n, quantitative 
analysis, there is a great need to engage in the sort qualitative “process tracing” of the sort advocated by 
George and McKeown.4  There is tremendous room to make a meaningful contribution to the BIT 
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debate by conducting social scientifically valid surveys or case studies of the investment decision-making 
process and the extent to which, and ways in which, considerations of international law might or might 
not enter into it.  In other words, if the argument is that foreign investors theoretically should care about 
BITs and dispute settlement provisions, then why not ask them if they care about them?  The first wave of 
modern research on international business-government relations that emerged out Harvard Business 
School in the late 1960s and early 1970s was explicitly empirical and explicitly qualitative, in large part 
because business school professors had access to and were comfortable interacting with business leaders, 
and because computing resources and data availability were such that complex statistical models were 
difficult to build and to test.5  Future research would do very well to return to the methods of these 
earlier scholars.   
 
 This is my own intent.  To follow up the present project, and over the long-term, I plan on 
beginning a complementary project that will combine surveys of the general counsel of Fortune-500 
companies with structured interviews with key foreign-investment decision-makers in multinational 
corporations.  The goal is to identify whether, and if so where and how, knowledge of international law 
enters into the foreign-investment decision-making process.  
 
 In the interim, what should developing countries anxious to attract additional FDI do?  My 
results suggest that the best course of action is one of caution.  Developing countries would be well-
advised to refrain from extending their commitment to investor-initiated, treaty-based arbitration by 
insisting that new BITs or their equivalents shall not contain broad-based arbitral pre-consents and by 
refusing to sign or enter into treaties that do.  This is not so preposterous a proposition.  Australia 
recently and successfully convinced the United States to significantly weaken the international arbitration 
provisions of the investment chapter of the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement.6  If a 
particular investor truly cares about guaranteed access to international arbitration, then let the investor 
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ask for it.  As I have argued above, BITs are not necessary for host states to credibly commit to particular 
terms of bargain.   
                                                 
1 Benjamin O. Fordham & Timothy J. McKeown, Selection and Influence: Interest Groups and Congressional 
Voting on Trade Policy, 57 INT’L ORG. 519 (2003). 
2 John K. Ryans, Jr. & James C. Baker, The International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 10 J. WORLD 
TRADE L. 65, 70 (1976). 
3 Freyer D.H., Garfinkel B.H., Gharavi H.G., Arbitration under Bilateral Investment Teaties: An often overlooked tool, 
MEALY’S International Report. May 1998. 
4 Alexander George & Timothy McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” in 2 
ADVANCES IN INFORMATION PROCESSING IN ORGANIZATIONS 21 (Robert Coulam and Richard Smith, eds. 1985). 
5 This literature is reviewed in Jean Boddewyn, “Early U.S. business-school literature (1960-1975) on international 
business-government relations: its twenty-first century relevance”, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND 
GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 23 (Grosse, ed. 2006). 
6 See Ann Capling & Kim Richard Nossal, Blowback: Investor–State Dispute Mechanisms in International Trade Agreements.  
19 GOVERNANCE 151 (2006). 
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APPENDIX 
 
 This Appendix lists all of the BITs used in the empirical analyses presented above, disaggregated 
by investor-state dispute settlement provisions.  The Appendix does not include BITs that have been 
signed but which, as of 2002, had not yet entered into force.  “No.” simply counts each capital-exporting 
state’s BITs, in chronological order by date of signature.   “Type” indicates whether the listed treaty is a 
true “BIT”, meaning that it is “bilateral” and deals exclusively with “investment”, or whether it is a 
broader trade agreement that contains BIT-like provisions (a treaty of “Friendship, Commerce, or 
Navigation,” or “FCN”, or a “free trade agreement,” or “FTA), or whether it is a BIT-equivalent treaty in 
some other form that is described, where appropriate, in an associated footnote. “Signed” and “In Force” 
list the dates of signature and entry into force.  For the most part these dates are identical to those 
reported by UNCTAD in its various lists of BITs.  However, where the UNCTAD date conflicts with 
more official sources, such as the face of the particular treaty itself, or with the date provided in a national 
government legislative “gazette” or similar authoritative source, I have made the appropriate correction.   
 
 “Pre-Consent” indicates the type of investor-state dispute settlement provision contained in the 
treaty.  The classification scheme is described in more detail in the body of this dissertation.  To briefly 
summarize, a “comprehensive” pre-consent is a consent to arbitrate a wide range of investment-related 
disputes at the investor’s initiative.  A “partial” pre-consent is a consent that only applies to a limited class 
of investment disputes, generally involving issues of expropriation.  A “promissory” pre-consent is a 
consent to investor-initiated arbitration that is incomplete in the sense that an arbitral tribunal will be 
more likely than note to require some additional manifestation of consent on behalf of the interested host 
state before the tribunal will exercise jurisdiction.  And finally, “none” indicates that the treaty does not 
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contain any of the above three types of pre-consents.  For the most part this means that the treaty does 
not so much as mention the possibility of investor-state dispute settlement.  I have also listed the 
particular arbitral facilities that the investment treaties allow the investor to access at his own initiative.  
“ICSID”  refers to arbitration under the normal rules of the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes; “ad hoc” refers to arbitration under rules that are special to the treaty or to the 
particular dispute, and not supplied by an institutionalized arbitral apparatus; “UNCITRAL” refers to 
arbitration pursuant to the ad hoc rules codified by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development;  “ICC” refers to arbitration under the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce; 
“SCC” refers to arbitration under the rules of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce; “AF” refers to 
arbitration under ICSID’s Additional Facility, which are applicable when a state party to an arbitration is 
not a member of the ICSID Convention proper; and “Other” refers to all other arbitration rules or 
facilities, including, for example, the Cairo Chamber of Commerce.   In some cases a BIT will refer to a 
particular arbitral facility or set of model rules—say, the UNICTRAL rules—but then specify a small 
number of individualized, ad hoc rules that shall apply to particular matters.  In those cases, where an 
institutionalized or model set of rules are to apply to most issues that will arise, I have coded the treaty as 
calling for institutional or model-rule arbitration rather than ad hoc arbitration.   
 
 In some cases a treaty will contain a pre-consent to ICSID arbitration, but the developing 
country party to the treaty will not have signed and ratified the ICSID Convention itself.  Under the 
terms of the ICSID Convention, only states that have joined that treaty may use its arbitral facilities.  
Where a BIT pre-consents to ICSID Arbitration, but where the developing-country Contracting Party is 
not a member of ICSID, I have noted this fact by placing [brackets] around the [X] in the ICSID column 
of the tables.  Where a treaty contains a pre-consent only to ICSID arbitration, but where the investor 
does not have access to ICSID because the developing country has not ratified the ICSID Convention, I 
have counted the treaty as not containing a pre-consent to arbitration for the purposes of the statistical 
analyses above.  I have indicated these special cases in footnotes in the tables below. 
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 The ambitious analyst may be tempted to explore whether references to particular kinds of 
arbitration render treaties measurably more or less effective at attracting additional foreign direct 
investment.  For instance, it seems clear that ICSID arbitration is inherently more investor-friendly than 
ad hoc arbitration, because ICSID awards are more secure from domestic court review.    I would caution 
modesty in this regard.  In my view it is already risks stretching credulity to assume, as I have done above, 
that investors are aware enough of the legal subtleties of various treaties to notice and to take into 
account differences in investor-state dispute settlement provisions writ large.   To argue that investors are 
aware enough at the pre-investment stage to take into account differences in the forum of arbitration 
offered to them, and to do so in a way that will manifest itself in rather base statistical analysis, crosses 
the line dividing plausibility and impossibility.  My working assumption, then, is that it is enough that an 
investment treaty provide a pre-consent to some kind of international arbitration, initiatable at the whim of 
the investor. 
 
 I have assumed throughout that Russia is legally bound by Soviet Union BITs, an assumption 
supported by arbitral practice and investor perceptions.  A more difficult issue is whether Soviet-era BITs 
bind the non-Russian members of the ex-Soviet Union.  The Alma Alta Declaration establishing the 
Commonwealth of Independent States seems to suggest that Soviet BITs might remain relevant for non-
Russian members of the CIS by suggesting a general intent to succeed to the Soviet Union’s international 
legal obligations.2  However, I am aware of no commentary or arbitral decision advocating the application 
of Soviet BITs to CIS members outside of the Russian case.  For that reason I have assumed in the tables 
below and in the statistical analyses above that non-Russian CIS members are not and have not been 
legally bound by Soviet-era BITs.   
  
                                                 
2 The Alma Ata Declaration can be found at 31 ILM 147 (1992). 
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 The disintegration of Yugoslavia poses more serious difficulties.  I have assumed throughout the 
analysis that Yugoslavia’s pre-breakup BITs continued to bind Serbia, as Serbia was clearly considered a 
successor state to Yugoslavia by most third parties.  It is more difficult to determine definitively whether 
non-Serbian constituent parts of Yugoslavia should be coded as being bound by Yugoslav BITs. In some 
cases subsequent BITs indicate that they replace an earlier Yugoslavia treaty.  We may take as an 
indication that the Yugoslavia BIT was considered to legally bind the particular country up until the entry 
into force of the new treaty.  For example, Austria’s post-breakup BITs with Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, 
and Slovenia all indicate that they replace an earlier Austria-Yugoslavia BIT as to those countries.  In 
other cases later BITs don’t mention a potentially relevant Yugoslav BIT, suggesting that the early treaty 
might not have been perceived as binding the constituent part.  Given the uncertainty I think it best to 
consider Yugoslav BITs as binding only Serbia, whether as a legal “fact” or as a perception among 
investors.  In any event, and given the lack of relevant economic data on the ex-Yugoslav countries 
across the period of study, these questions are somewhat academic, as the countries tend to drop from 
most statistical analyses. 
 
 Finally, I have not included in the tables (or in the analyses above) BITs involving Taiwan or 
Hong Kong, neither of which is, or is universally understood to be, an independent, sovereign state. 
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Australian BITs In Force, Through 2002 
 
No. Type Host Signed In Force Pre-Consent Designated Arbitral Forum/Fora 
      ICSID Ad Hoc UNCITRAL ICC SCC AF Other
1 BIT China 11-Jul-88 11-Jul-88 Partial  X      
2 BIT Papua New Guinea3 3-Sep-90 20-Oct-91 Promissory  [X]      
3 BIT Vietnam 5-Mar-91 11-Sep-91 Comprehensive  X      
4 BIT Poland 7-May-91 27-Mar-92 Partial  X      
5 BIT Hungary 15-Aug-91 10-May-92 Promissory  [X]      
6 BIT Indonesia 17-Nov-92 29-Jul-93 Promissory  [X]      
7 BIT Romania 21-Jun-93 22-Apr-94 Promissory  [X]      
8 BIT Czech Republic 30-Sep-93 29-Jun-94 Promissory  [X]      
9 BIT Laos 6-Apr-94 8-Apr-95 Comprehensive  X      
10 BIT Philippines 25-Jan-95 8-Dec-95 Promissory  [X]      
11 BIT Argentina 23-Aug-95 11-Jan-97 Comprehensive X  X     
12 BIT Peru 7-Dec-95 2-Feb-97 Promissory  [X]      
13 BIT Chile 9-Jul-96 18-Nov-99 Comprehensive X  X     
14 BIT Pakistan 7-Feb-98 14-Oct-98 Promissory  [X]      
15 BIT Lithuania 24-Nov-98 10-May-02 Promissory  [X]      
16 BIT India4 26-Feb-99 4-May-00 Comprehensive   X     
17 BIT Egypt 3-May-01 5-Sep-02 Promissory  [X]      
18 BIT Uruguay 3-Sep-01 12-Dec-02 Comprehensive  X      
 
                                                 
3 Australia’s “promissory” BITs contain apparent pre-consents to ad hoc arbitration, but only if both Contracting Parties are not members of ICSID.  Where both 
Contracting Parties are members of ICSID, the ad hoc option becomes unavailable under the terms of the treaty, and arbitrations are directed to ICSID.  But—
and here is the subtlety—these treaties require an additional manifestation of host state consent for an ICSID tribunal to exercise jurisdiction, a fact which renders 
an otherwise “comprehensive” pre-consent to ad hoc arbitration a promissory consent to ICSID arbitration. 
4 India’s pre-consent to arbitration contains more ambiguity than most, but is probably presents a valid basis for a tribunal to assume jurisdiction. 
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Austrian BITs in Force, Through 2002 
 
No. Type Host Signed In Force Pre-Consent Designated Arbitral Forum/Fora 
      ICSID Ad Hoc UNCITRAL ICC SCC AF Other 
1 BIT Romania 30-Sep-76 8-Nov-77 Partial   X     
2 BIT Malaysia 12-Apr-85 1-Jan-87 Comprehensive X       
3 BIT China 12-Sep-85 11-Oct-86 Partial  X      
4 BIT Hungary 26-May-88 1-Sep-89 Partial X       
5 BIT Turkey 16-Sep-88 1-Jan-92 Comprehensive X       
6 BIT Poland 14-Nov-88 1-Nov-89 Comprehensive [X] X      
7 BIT Yugoslavia 25-Oct-89 1-Jun-91 Comprehensive X       
8 BIT Russia 8-Feb-90 1-Sep-91 Partial   X  X   
9 BIT Czech Republic 15-Oct-90 1-Oct-91 Partial   X     
10 BIT Slovakia 15-Oct-90 1-Oct-91 Partial   X     
11 BIT Korea 14-Mar-91 1-Nov-91 Comprehensive X       
12 BIT Cape Verde 3-Sep-91 1-Apr-93 Comprehensive   X     
13 BIT Serbia5 1-Jan-92 1-Jan-92 [Comprehensive] [X]       
14 BIT Argentina 7-Aug-92 1-Jan-95 Comprehensive X  X     
15 BIT Morocco 2-Nov-92 1-Jul-95 Comprehensive X       
16 BIT Albania 18-Mar-93 1-Aug-95 Comprehensive X       
17 BIT Paraguay 13-Aug-93 1-Jan-00 Comprehensive X       
18 BIT Estonia 16-May-94 1-Oct-95 Comprehensive X  X     
19 BIT Latvia 17-Nov-94 1-May-96 Comprehensive X  X     
20 BIT Vietnam 27-Mar-95 1-Oct-96 Comprehensive   X     
21 BIT Tunisia 1-Jun-95 1-Jan-97 Comprehensive X       
22 BIT Romania 15-May-96 1-Jul-97 Comprehensive X       
23 BIT Lithuania 28-Jun-96 1-Jul-97 Comprehensive X  X     
24 BIT Ukraine 8-Nov-96 1-Dec-97 Comprehensive X  X     
25 BIT Kuwait 16-Nov-96 22-Sep-98 Comprehensive X  X     
26 BIT South Africa 28-Nov-96 1-Jan-98 Comprehensive X  X   X  
27 BIT Bulgaria 22-Jan-97 1-Nov-97 Comprehensive X  X     
28 BIT Croatia 19-Feb-97 1-Nov-99 Comprehensive X  X     
                                                 
5 Serbia has not ratified the ICSID Convention, making the pre-consent to ICSID arbitration in the Yugoslav BIT ineffective as to Serbia.  
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29 BIT Bolivia 4-Apr-97 1-Jul-02 Comprehensive X  X     
30 BIT Chile 8-Sep-97 17-Nov-00 Comprehensive X  X     
31 BIT Mexico 29-Jun-98 26-Mar-01 Comprehensive X  X X  X  
32 BIT India 8-Nov-99 1-Mar-01 Comprehensive X  X     
33 BIT Cuba 19-May-00 25-Nov-01 Comprehensive X  X X    
34 BIT Uzbekistan 2-Jun-00 18-Aug-01 Comprehensive X  X X  X  
35 BIT Azerbaijan 4-Jul-00 28-May-01 Comprehensive X  X X  X  
36 BIT Bosnia 2-Oct-00 20-Oct-02 Comprehensive X  X X  X  
37 BIT Bangladesh 21-Dec-00 1-Dec-01 Comprehensive X  X X    
38 BIT Jordan 23-Jan-01 25-Nov-01 Comprehensive X  X X    
39 BIT Slovenia 7-Mar-01 1-Feb-02 Comprehensive X  X X    
40 BIT Macedonia 28-Mar-01 14-Apr-02 Comprehensive X  X X  X  
41 BIT Egypt 12-Apr-01 29-Apr-02 Comprehensive X  X    X 
42 BIT Lebanon 1-May-01 30-Sep-02 Comprehensive X  X X  X  
43 BIT Belarus 16-May-01 1-Jun-02 Comprehensive X  X     
44 BIT Mongolia 19-May-01 1-May-02 Comprehensive X  X     
45 BIT Moldova 6-Jun-01 18-Oct-01 Comprehensive X  X     
46 BIT Belize 17-Jul-01 1-Feb-02 Comprehensive X  X X  X  
47 BIT Serbia 12-Oct-01 1-Aug-02 Comprehensive [X]  X     
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Belgian BITs in Force, Through 2002 
 
No. Type Host Signed In Force Pre-Consent Designated Arbitral Forum/For a 
      ICSID Ad Hoc UNCITRAL ICC SCC AF Other 
1 BIT Tunisia 15-Jul-64 9-Mar-66 None        
2 BIT Morocco 28-Apr-65 18-Oct-67 None        
3 BIT Indonesia 15-Jan-70 17-Jun-72 Comprehensive X       
4 BIT South Korea 20-Dec-74 3-Sep-76 Comprehensive X       
5 BIT Zaire 28-Mar-76 1-Jan-77 None        
6 BIT Egypt 28-Feb-77 20-Sep-78 Comprehensive X       
7 BIT Romania 8-May-78 1-May-80 Partial X       
8 BIT Singapore 17-Nov-78 27-Nov-80 Comprehensive X       
9 BIT Cameroon 27-Mar-80 1-Nov-81 Comprehensive X       
10 BIT Malaysia 22-Nov-79 8-Feb-82 Comprehensive X       
11 BIT Sri Lanka 5-Apr-82 26-Apr-84 Comprehensive X       
12 BIT Rwanda 2-Nov-83 1-Aug-85 Comprehensive X       
13 BIT China 4-Jun-84 5-Oct-86 Partial  X      
14 BIT Bangladesh 22-May-81 14-Sep-87 Comprehensive X       
15 BIT Hungary 14-May-86 23-Sep-88 Partial X   X X   
16 BIT Turkey 27-Aug-86 4-May-90 Comprehensive X       
17 BIT Bulgaria 25-Oct-88 29-May-91 Comprehensive   X     
18 BIT Poland 19-May-87 2-Aug-91 Partial X  X  X   
19 BIT Russia 9-Feb-89 13-Oct-91 Partial   X  X   
20 BIT Algeria 24-Apr-91 13-Feb-92 Comprehensive X     X  
21 BIT Czech Rep. 24-Apr-89 13-Feb-92 Partial   X     
22 BIT Slovakia 24-Apr-89 13-Feb-92 Partial   X     
23 BIT Malta 5-Mar-87 15-Jun-93 Comprehensive X  X X    
24 BIT Burundi 13-Apr-89 12-Sep-93 Comprehensive X       
25 BIT Mongolia 3-Mar-92 28-Oct-93 Comprehensive X       
26 BIT Argentina 28-Jun-90 20-May-94 Comprehensive X  X   X  
27 BIT Estonia 24-Jan-96 11-Dec-96 Comprehensive X   X X   
28 BIT Latvia 27-Mar-96 4-Apr-99 Comprehensive X     X  
29 BIT Uruguay 4-Nov-91 23-Apr-99 Comprehensive X  X   X  
30 BIT Cyprus 26-Feb-91 5-Jun-99 Comprehensive X   X X X  
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31 BIT Vietnam 24-Jan-91 11-Jun-99 Comprehensive X     X  
32 BIT Georgia 23-Jun-93 3-Jul-99 Comprehensive X   X X X  
33 BIT Chile 15-Jul-92 5-Aug-99 Comprehensive X       
34 BIT Lithuania 15-Oct-97 6-Sep-99 Comprehensive X  X X X   
35 BIT India 31-Oct-97 8-Jan-01 Comprehensive   X     
36 BIT Ukraine 20-May-96 27-Jan-01 Comprehensive X  X X X X  
37 BIT Kazakhstan 16-Apr-98 6-Feb-01 Comprehensive X  X   X  
38 BIT Uzbekistan 17-Apr-98 6-Feb-01 Comprehensive X  X X X X  
39 BIT Romania 4-Mar-96 9-Mar-01 Comprehensive X       
40 BIT Slovenia 1-Feb-99 14-Jan-02 Comprehensive X  X     
41 BIT Moldova 21-May-96 20-Apr-02 Comprehensive X  X X X X  
42 BIT Egypt6 28-Feb-99 24-May-02 Promissory X  X X   X 
43 BIT Morocco 13-Apr-99 29-May-02 Comprehensive X       
44 BIT Albania 1-Feb-99 18-Oct-02 Comprehensive X       
45 BIT Tunisia 8-Jan-97 18-Oct-02 Comprehensive X  X     
46 BIT Macedonia 17-Feb-99 4-Nov-02 Comprehensive X  X X X X  
47 BIT El Salvador 12-Oct-99 12-Nov-02 Comprehensive X       
 
                                                 
6 The Belgium-Egypt BIT contains a potentially ambiguous pre-consent to arbitration in the official French version.  The relevant language is that “l'investisseur sera 
autorisé à soumettre le differend à l'arbitrage”, or, in my own translation, “the investor will be authorized to submit the dispute to arbitration.”  My own position is that 
the future tense of the verb “to be” (être, or, conjugated, sera) indicates that the consent is promissory.  Egypt is certainly a sophisticated party to international 
investment law, and is capable of comprehending the formal legal implications of subtle differences in language.  Note its involvement, on the losing end of 
things, in an early and important investment arbitration that involved, inter alia, the proper interpretation of its consent to arbitration contained in its foreign 
investment law.  This is, of course, the well-known “Pyramids Case,”  Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. [SPP] v. Arab Republic of Egypt, reprinted in 22 
I.L.M. 752 (1983).  
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Canadian BITs in Force, Through 20027 
 
No. Type Host Signed In Force Pre-Consent Designated Arbitral Fora 
      ICSID Ad Hoc UNCITRAL ICC SCC AF Other
1 BIT Russia 20-Nov-89 27-Jun-91 Comprehensive   X     
2 BIT Poland 26-Oct-90 22-Nov-90 Comprehensive   X     
3 BIT Czech Republic 15-Nov-90 9-Mar-92 Comprehensive   X     
4 BIT Slovakia 15-Nov-90 9-Mar-92 Comprehensive   X     
6 BIT Hungary 3-Oct-91 21-Nov-93 Partial [X]  X     
7 BIT Argentina 5-Nov-91 29-Apr-93 Comprehensive   X     
8 FTA Mexico 17-Dec-92 1-Jan-94 Comprehensive [X]  X   X  
10 BIT Ukraine 24-Oct-94 24-Jun-95 Comprehensive [X]  X   X  
11 BIT Latvia 26-Apr-95 27-Jul-95 Comprehensive [X]  X   X  
12 BIT Trinidad-Tobago 11-Sep-95 8-Jul-96 Comprehensive [X]  X   X  
13 BIT Philippines 10-Nov-95 1-Nov-96 Comprehensive [X]  X   X  
15 BIT Romania 17-Apr-96 11-Feb-97 Comprehensive [X]  X   X  
16 BIT Ecuador 29-Apr-96 6-Jun-97 Comprehensive [X]  X   X  
17 BIT Barbados 29-May-96 17-Jan-97 Comprehensive [X]  X   X  
18 BIT Venezuela 1-Jul-96 28-Jan-98 Comprehensive [X]  X   X  
19 BIT Panama 12-Sep-96 13-Feb-98 Comprehensive [X]  X   X  
20 BIT Egypt 13-Nov-96 3-Nov-97 Comprehensive [X]  X   X  
21 FTA Chile 5-Dec-96 5-Jul-97 Comprehensive [X]  X   X  
22 BIT Thailand 17-Jan-97 24-Sep-98 Comprehensive [X]  X   X  
23 BIT Croatia 3-Feb-97 30-Jan-01 Comprehensive [X]  X   X  
24 BIT Lebanon 11-Apr-97 19-Jun-99 Comprehensive [X]  X   X  
25 BIT Armenia 8-May-97 29-Mar-99 Comprehensive [X]  X   X  
26 BIT Uruguay 29-Oct-97 2-Jun-99 Comprehensive [X]  X   X  
27 BIT Costa-Rica 18-Mar-98 29-Sep-99 Comprehensive [X]  X   X  
 
                                                 
7 Canada has not ratified the ICSID Convention, making its pre-consents to ICSID arbitration ineffective. 
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Danish BITs in Force, Through 2002 
 
No Type Host Signed In Force Pre-Consent Designated Arbitral Forum/Fora 
      ICSID Ad Hoc UNCITRAL ICC SCC AF Other
1 BIT Indonesia 30-Jan-68 2-Jul-68 None        
2 BIT Romania 12-Nov-80 9-Apr-81 Partial X       
3 BIT China 29-Apr-85 29-Apr-85 Partial  X      
4 BIT Sri Lanka 4-Jun-85 4-Jun-85 Comprehensive X       
5 BIT Hungary 2-May-88 18-Oct-88 Partial X       
6 BIT South Korea 2-Jun-88 2-Jun-88 Comprehensive X       
7 BIT Turkey 7-Feb-90 1-Aug-92 Comprehensive X       
8 BIT Poland 1-May-90 30-Oct-90 Partial X  X     
9 BIT Czech Rep. 6-Mar-91 19-Sep-92 Comprehensive X       
10 BIT Slovakia 6-Mar-91 19-Sep-92 Comprehensive X  X     
11 BIT Estonia 6-Nov-91 24-Feb-93 Comprehensive X  X     
12 BIT Malaysia 6-Jan-92 18-Sep-92 Comprehensive X       
13 BIT Ghana 13-Jan-92 6-Jan-95 Comprehensive   X     
14 BIT Latvia 30-Mar-92 18-Nov-94 Comprehensive X  X     
15 BIT Lithuania 30-Mar-92 8-Jan-93 Comprehensive X  X     
16 BIT Ukraine 23-Oct-92 29-Apr-94 Comprehensive X  X     
17 BIT Argentina 6-Nov-92 2-Feb-95 Comprehensive X  X   X  
18 BIT Bulgaria 14-Apr-93 20-May-95 Partial   X     
19 BIT Chile 28-May-93 3-Nov-95 Comprehensive X       
20 BIT Vietnam 23-Jul-93 7-Aug-94 Comprehensive X  X     
21 BIT Russia 4-Nov-93 26-Aug-96 Comprehensive   X  X   
22 BIT Romania 14-Jun-94 24-Aug-95 Comprehensive X  X     
23 BIT Peru 23-Nov-94 17-Feb-95 Comprehensive X       
24 BIT Venezuela 28-Nov-94 19-Sep-96 Comprehensive X  X   X  
25 BIT Bolivia 12-Mar-95 22-Mar-97 Comprehensive X  X     
26 BIT Mongolia 13-Mar-95 2-Apr-96 Comprehensive X  X     
27 BIT Nicaragua 13-Mar-95 26-Jan-96 Comprehensive X       
28 BIT Albania 5-Sep-95 18-Jan-96 Comprehensive X  X     
29 BIT India 6-Sep-95 28-Aug-96 Comprehensive X  X   X  
30 BIT South Africa 22-Feb-96 23-Apr-97 Comprehensive X  X   X  
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31 BIT Tunisia8 28-Jun-96 11-Apr-97 Comprehensive X  X     
32 BIT Pakistan 18-Jul-96 25-Sep-96 Comprehensive X  X     
33 BIT Korea-DRP 10-Sep-96 25-Dec-97 Comprehensive X  X     
34 BIT Zimbabwe9 25-Oct-96 2-Feb-99 Not Avail.        
35 BIT Philippines 25-Sep-97 19-Apr-98 Comprehensive X  X     
36 BIT Laos 9-Sep-98 9-May-99 Comprehensive X  X     
37 BIT Slovenia 12-May-99 30-Mar-02 Comprehensive X  X     
38 BIT Egypt 24-Jun-99 29-Jan-00 Comprehensive X  X X   X 
39 BIT Croatia 5-Jul-00 12-Jan-02 Comprehensive X  X X  X  
40 BIT Kuwait 1-Jun-01 29-Jun-02 Comprehensive X X      
41 BIT Mozambique9 12-Oct-02 30-Dec-02 Not Avail.        
 
                                                 
8 The Tunisia treaty’s pre-consent is arguably ambiguous, and might be interpreted as “promissory.”  The treaty states that “the investor shall be entitled to choose 
between of the following possibilities for international arbitration,” which may be read to mean that “the investor” is not in the here and now entitled to so choose.  
9 I was unable to obtain hard copies of the Mozambique and Zimbabwe treaties, despite numerous contacts with Danish officials.  In the statistical analysis 
presented in earlier chapters I have assume that these two treaties contain comprehensive pre-consents to arbitration.  My assumption is based on the 
contemporaneous treaty practice of both Denmark and the two developing countries, whose other BITs uniformly contain comprehensive pre-consents. 
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Finnish BITs in Force, Through 2002 
 
 
No. Type Host Signed In Force Pre-Consent Designated Arbitral Forum/Fora 
      ICSID Ad Hoc UNCITRAL ICC SCC AF Other
1 BIT Egypt 5-May-80 1-Feb-82 None        
2 BIT Bulgaria 16-Feb-84 16-Jul-85 None        
3 BIT China 4-Sep-84 26-Jan-86 Partial  X      
4 BIT Malaysia 15-Apr-85 3-Jan-88 Comprehensive X       
5 BIT Sri Lanka 27-Apr-85 25-Oct-87 Comprehensive X       
6 BIT Hungary 6-Jun-88 12-May-89 Partial X       
7 BIT Russia 8-Feb-89 15-Aug-91 Partial  X      
8 BIT Poland 5-Apr-90 29-Mar-91 Partial X  X     
9 BIT Czech Rep. 6-Nov-90 23-Oct-91 Comprehensive X  X     
10 BIT Slovakia 6-Nov-90 23-Oct-91 Comprehensive X  X     
11 BIT Estonia 13-Feb-92 2-Dec-92 Comprehensive X  X     
12 BIT Latvia 5-Mar-92 7-Dec-92 Comprehensive X  X     
13 BIT Romania 26-Mar-92 6-Jan-93 Comprehensive X       
14 BIT Ukraine 5-May-92 30-Jan-94 Comprehensive X  X     
15 BIT Lithuania 12-Jun-92 8-Jan-93 Comprehensive X  X     
16 BIT Kazakhstan 29-Sep-92 14-Feb-98 Comprehensive X  X     
17 BIT Uzbekistan 1-Oct-92 22-Oct-93 Comprehensive X  X     
18 BIT Belarus 28-Oct-92 11-Dec-94 Comprehensive X  X     
19 BIT Turkey 13-May-93 12-Apr-95 Comprehensive X       
20 BIT Chile 27-May-93 1-May-96 Comprehensive X       
21 BIT Vietnam 13-Sep-93 2-May-96 Comprehensive   X     
22 BIT South Korea 21-Oct-93 11-May-96 Comprehensive X       
23 BIT Argentina 5-Nov-93 3-May-96 Comprehensive X  X   X  
24 BIT Thailand10 18-Mar-94 18-May-96 None [X]       
25 BIT Peru 2-May-95 14-Jun-96 Comprehensive X       
                                                 
10 The Thai treaty contains a comprehensive pre-consent to ICSID arbitration, but Thailand has never ratified the ICSID Convention. The BIT is thus properly 
coded as not containing an effective pre-consent. 
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26 BIT Moldova 25-Aug-95 21-Jun-97 Comprehensive X  X     
27 BIT Kuwait 10-Mar-96 21-May-97 Comprehensive X  X     
28 BIT UAE 12-Mar-96 15-May-97 Comprehensive X  X     
29 BIT Indonesia 13-Mar-96 7-Jun-97 Comprehensive X       
30 BIT Poland 25-Nov-96 11-Mar-98 Comprehensive X  X     
31 BIT Albania 24-Jun-97 20-Feb-99 Comprehensive X  X     
32 BIT Lebanon 25-Aug-97 12-Jan-00 Comprehensive X  X     
33 BIT Oman 27-Sep-97 20-Feb-99 Comprehensive X  X     
34 BIT Bulgaria 3-Oct-97 16-Apr-99 Comprehensive X  X     
35 BIT Philippines 25-Mar-98 16-Apr-99 Comprehensive X  X     
36 BIT Slovenia 1-Jun-98 3-Jun-00 Comprehensive X  X     
37 BIT South Africa 14-Sep-98 3-Oct-99 Comprehensive X  X   X  
38 BIT Mexico 22-Feb-99 30-Aug-00 Comprehensive [X]  X   X  
39 BIT Croatia 1-Jun-99 1-Nov-02 Comprehensive X  X     
40 BIT Bosnia 1-Nov-00 8-Dec-01 Comprehensive X  X     
41 BIT Macedonia 25-Jan-01 22-Mar-02 Comprehensive X  X   X  
42 BIT Ecuador 18-Apr-01 16-Dec-01 Comprehensive X  X     
43 BIT Tanzania 19-Jun-01 30-Oct-02 Comprehensive X  X   X  
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French BITs in Force, Through 200211 
 
 
No. Type Host Signed In Force Pre-Consent Designated Arbitral Fora 
      ICSID Ad Hoc UNCITRAL ICC SCC AF Other
1 BIT Tunisia 9-Aug-63 1-Aug-65 None        
2 BIT Zaire 5-Oct-72 1-Mar-75 None        
3 BIT Mauritius 22-Mar-73 1-Mar-74 None        
4 BIT Egypt 22-Dec-74 1-Oct-75 Comprehensive X       
5 BIT Malaysia 24-Apr-75 1-Sep-76 None        
5 BIT Morocco 15-Jul-75 13-Dec-76 None        
6 BIT Singapore 8-Sep-75 18-Oct-76 Comprehensive X       
7 BIT Malta 11-Aug-76 1-Jan-78 None        
8 BIT Romania 16-Dec-76 1-Aug-78 Partial X           
9 BIT Syria 28-Nov-77 1-Mar-79 Comprehensive X   X    
10 BIT South Korea 28-Dec-77 1-Mar-79 None        
11 BIT Jordan 23-Feb-78 18-Oct-79 Comprehensive X       
12 BIT Sudan 31-Jul-78 5-Jul-80 Comprehensive X       
13 BIT El Salvador 20-Sep-78 12-Dec-92 Comprehensive X   X    
14 BIT Paraguay12 30-Nov-78 11-Dec-80 Comprehensive [X]       
15 BIT Liberia 23-Mar-79 22-Jan-82 Comprehensive X       
16 BIT Sri Lanka 10-Apr-80 19-Apr-82 Comprehensive X       
17 BIT Equa. Guinea 3-Mar-82 23-Sep-83 Comprehensive X   X    
18 BIT Panama 5-Nov-82 9-Oct-85 Comprehensive   X     
19 BIT Nepal 2-May-83 13-Jun-85 Comprehensive X       
20 BIT Pakistan 1-Jun-83 14-Dec-84 Comprehensive X       
21 BIT Israel 9-Jun-83 11-Jan-85 Comprehensive X       
22 BIT Costa Rica 8-Mar-84 18-Jun-99 Comprehensive X       
                                                 
11 The list of French BITs does not include a number of early “establishment” treaties between France and Franc-zone ex-colonies, nor any of a number of 
“investment guarantee treaties” (IGT) that primarily concern access to France’s investment insurance program.  These other types of treaties are certainly 
investment-related, but are sufficiently distinct in their substantive and procedural content from BITs that they should not be included in the present analysis.  The 
excluded establishment treaties include treaties with the following countries (with years of signature in [brackets]): Central African Republic [1960]; Chad {1960]; 
Congo [1960]; Gabon [1974]; Senegal [1974]; Madagascar [1965].  The excluded IGT treaties include treaties with Tunisia [1972]; Haiti [1973]; South Korea [1975]; 
Yugoslavia [1974]; Indonesia [1973]; Philippines [1976]. 
12 Paraguay did not ratify the ICSID Convention until 1983, which means that its comprehensive pre-consent should not be recorded as effective until that year. 
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23 BIT Yemen 27-Apr-84 19-Jul-91 Comprehensive X  X     
24 BIT Haiti 23-May-84 25-Mar-85 Comprehensive    X    
25 BIT China 30-May-84 19-Mar-85 Partial   X         
26 BIT Bangladesh 10-Sep-85 3-Oct-86 Comprehensive X       
27 BIT Hungary 6-Nov-86 30-Sep-87 Partial X  X         
28 BIT Poland 14-Feb-89 10-Feb-90 Partial X  X         
29 BIT Bulgaria 5-Apr-89 1-May-90 Partial   X         
30 BIT Russia 4-Jul-89 18-Jul-91 Partial   X         
31 BIT Kuwait 27-Sep-89 16-May-91 Comprehensive X X      
32 BIT Bolivia 25-Oct-89 12-Oct-96 Comprehensive X  X     
33 BIT Laos13 12-Dec-89 8-Mar-91 [None] [X]             
34 BIT Nigeria 27-Feb-90 19-Aug-91 Comprehensive X       
35 BIT Czech Rep. 13-Sep-90 27-Sep-91 Comprehensive X  X     
36 BIT Slovakia 13-Sep-90 27-Sep-91 Comprehensive X  X     
37 BIT Argentina 3-Jul-91 3-Mar-93 Comprehensive X  X   X  
38 BIT UAE 9-Sep-91 10-Jan-95 Comprehensive X X      
39 BIT Mongolia 8-Nov-91 22-Dec-93 Comprehensive X       
40 BIT Lithuania 23-Apr-92 27-Mar-95 Comprehensive X  X     
41 BIT Estonia 14-May-92 25-Sep-95 Comprehensive X  X     
42 BIT Latvia 15-May-92 1-Oct-94 Comprehensive X  X     
43 BIT Vietnam 26-May-92 10-Aug-94 Comprehensive X  X     
44 BIT Chile 14-Jul-92 13-Jun-94 Comprehensive X       
45 BIT Jamaica 25-Jan-93 15-Sep-94 Comprehensive X       
46 BIT Algeria 13-Feb-93 27-Jun-00 Comprehensive X  X     
47 BIT Peru 6-Oct-93 4-Jul-96 Comprehensive X       
48 BIT Uruguay 14-Oct-93 4-Jul-97 Comprehensive X  X     
49 BIT Uzbekistan 27-Oct-93 15-Jun-96 Comprehensive X       
50 BIT Trin.-Tobago 28-Oct-93 16-May-96 Comprehensive X  X X    
51 BIT Turkmenistan 28-Apr-94 2-May-96 Comprehensive X       
52 BIT Ukraine14 3-May-94 26-Jan-96 Comprehensive [X]       
53 BIT Kyrgyzstan 2-Jun-94 10-Aug-97 [None] [X]             
54 BIT Ecuador 7-Sep-94 17-Jun-96 Comprehensive X       
                                                 
13 The Laos, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova BITs contain comprehensive pre-consents to ICSID arbitration, but none of these three countries have ratified the 
Convention.  This renders their pre-consents ineffective, and I have accordingly coded the treaties as not having a pre-consent. 
14 Ukraine did not ratify the ICSID Convention until 2000, which means that its comprehensive pre-consent should not be recorded as effective until that year.  
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55 BIT Philippines15 13-Sep-94 13-Jun-96 Comprehensive X       
56 BIT Oman 17-Oct-94 4-Jul-96 Comprehensive X       
57 BIT Romania 21-Mar-95 21-Jun-96 Comprehensive X       
58 BIT Albania 13-Jun-95 16-Jun-96 Comprehensive X       
59 BIT South Africa 11-Oct-95 22-Jun-97 Comprehensive X X      
60 BIT Armenia 4-Nov-95 21-Jun-97 Comprehensive X       
61 BIT Morocco 13-Jan-96 30-May-99 Comprehensive X       
62 BIT Croatia 3-Jun-96 5-Mar-98 Comprehensive X  X     
63 BIT Qatar 8-Sep-96 27-Jul-00 Comprehensive X  X     
64 BIT Lebanon 28-Nov-96 29-Oct-99 Comprehensive X  X     
65 BIT Georgia 3-Feb-97 13-Apr-00 Comprehensive X       
66 BIT Cuba 25-Apr-97 6-Nov-99 Comprehensive   X     
67 BIT India 2-Sep-97 17-May-00 Comprehensive X  X     
68 BIT Moldova 8-Sep-97 3-Nov-99 [None] [X]             
69 BIT Tunisia 20-Oct-97 18-Jan-99 Comprehensive X       
70 BIT Macedonia 28-Jan-98 31-Mar-00 Comprehensive X       
71 BIT Kazakhstan 3-Feb-98 21-Aug-00 Comprehensive X  X     
72 BIT Slovenia 11-Feb-98 5-Aug-00 Comprehensive X       
73 BIT Nicaragua 13-Feb-98 31-Mar-00 Comprehensive X       
74 BIT Honduras 27-Apr-98 8-Mar-01 Comprehensive X  X     
75 BIT Guatemala 27-May-98 28-Oct-01 Comprehensive X       
76 BIT Azerbaijan 1-Sep-98 24-Aug-00 Comprehensive X       
77 BIT Mexico 12-Nov-98 12-Oct-00 Comprehensive X  X X  X  
78 BIT Cambodia 13-Jul-00 24-Jul-02 Comprehensive X       
 
                                                 
15 The Philippines’ pre-consent is promissory in its official English version, which states that the Contracting Parties “shall assent” to investor-initiated arbitration.  
But in the equally official French version, the pre-consent is clearly effective immediately: each Contracting Party “consent” to investor-initiated arbitration (present 
tense)  I have coded the treaty according to the French version. 
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German BITs in Force, Through 2002 
 
No. Type Host Signed In Force Pre-Consent Designated Arbitral Fora 
      ICSID Ad Hoc UNCITRAL ICC SCC AF Other
1 BIT Pakistan 25-Nov-59 28-Apr-62 None               
2 FCN Dominican Republic16 16-Dec-59 3-Jun-60 None               
3 BIT Malaysia 22-Dec-60 6-Jul-63 None               
4 BIT Greece 27-Mar-61 15-Jul-63 None               
5 BIT Togo 16-May-61 21-Dec-64 None               
6 BIT Morocco 31-Aug-61 21-Jan-68 None               
7 BIT Liberia 12-Dec-61 22-Oct-67 None               
8 BIT Thailand 13-Dec-61 10-Apr-65 None               
9 BIT Guinea 19-Apr-62 13-Mar-65 None               
10 BIT Turkey 20-Jun-62 16-Dec-65 None               
11 BIT Cameroon 29-Jun-62 21-Nov-63 None               
12 BIT Madagascar 21-Sep-62 21-Mar-66 None               
13 BIT Sudan 7-Feb-63 24-Nov-67 None               
14 BIT Sri Lanka 8-Nov-63 7-Dec-66 None               
15 BIT Tunisia 20-Dec-63 6-Feb-66 None               
16 BIT Senegal 24-Jan-64 16-Jan-66 None               
17 BIT South Korea 4-Feb-64 15-Jan-67 None               
18 EOL India17 15-Oct-64 15-Oct-64 None               
19 BIT Niger 29-Oct-64 10-Jan-66 None               
20 BIT Tanzania 30-Jan-65 12-Jul-68 None               
21 BIT Sierra Leone 8-Apr-65 10-Dec-66 None               
22 BIT Ecuador 28-Jun-65 30-Nov-66 None               
23 BIT Cen’l African Rep. 23-Aug-65 21-Jan-68 None               
24 BIT Congo 13-Sep-65 14-Oct-67 None               
25 BIT Iran 11-Nov-65 6-Apr-68 None               
26 BIT Côte d’Ivoire 27-Oct-66 10-Jun-68 None               
27 BIT Uganda 29-Nov-66 19-Aug-68 None               
                                                 
16 The various sources disagree on whether the Germany-Dominican Republic FCN entered into force in 1959 or 1960.  I have been unable to directly confirm 
the correct date. 
17 The Indian “treaty” is actually an “exchange of letters” rather than an actual treaty. 
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28 BIT Zambia 10-Dec-66 25-Aug-72 None               
29 BIT Chad 11-Apr-67 23-Nov-68 None               
30 BIT Rwanda 18-May-67 28-Feb-69 None               
31 BIT Indonesia 8-Nov-68 19-Apr-71 None               
32 BIT Zaire 18-Mar-69 22-Jul-71 None               
33 BIT Gabon 16-May-69 29-Mar-71 None               
34 BIT Mauritius 25-May-71 27-Aug-73 None               
35 BIT Haiti 14-Aug-73 1-Dec-75 None               
36 BIT Singapore 3-Oct-73 1-Oct-75 None               
37 BIT Yemen 21-Jun-74 19-Dec-78 None               
38 BIT Egypt 5-Jul-74 22-Jul-78 None               
39 BIT Jordan 15-Jul-74 10-Oct-77 None               
40 BIT Malta 17-Sep-74 14-Dec-75 None               
41 BIT Mali 28-Jun-77 16-May-80 None               
42 BIT Syria 2-Aug-77 20-Apr-80 None               
43 BIT Benin 29-Jun-78 18-Jul-85 None               
44 BIT Oman 25-Jun-79 4-Feb-86 None               
45 BIT Romania 12-Oct-79 1-Oct-81 Partial 1             
46 BIT Portugal 16-Sep-80 23-Apr-82 None               
47 BIT Papua New Guinea 12-Nov-80 3-Nov-83 None               
48 BIT Bangladesh 6-May-81 14-Sep-86 None               
49 BIT Somalia 27-Nov-81 15-Feb-85 None               
50 BIT Lesotho 11-Nov-82 17-Aug-85 None               
51 BIT Mauritania 8-Dec-82 26-Apr-86 None               
52 BIT China 7-Oct-83 18-Mar-85 Partial   1           
53 BIT Panama 2-Nov-83 10-Mar-89 Comprehensive     1         
54 BIT Burundi 10-Sep-84 9-Dec-87 None               
55 BIT Dominica 1-Oct-84 11-May-86 None               
56 BIT Saint Lucia18 16-Mar-85 22-Jul-87 [Comprehensive] [1]             
57 BIT Saint Vincent-Gren. 25-Mar-86 8-Jan-89 None               
58 BIT Bulgaria 12-Apr-86 10-Mar-88 Partial     1         
59 BIT Hungary 30-Apr-86 7-Nov-87 Partial 1 1           
60 BIT Nepal 20-Oct-86 7-Jul-88 Comprehensive 1             
                                                 
18 Saint Lucia has never ratified the ICSID Convention, making its comprehensive pre-consent ineffective. 
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61 BIT Bolivia 23-Mar-87 9-Nov-90 Comprehensive 1 1           
62 BIT Uruguay 4-May-87 29-Jun-90 Comprehensive 1 1           
63 BIT Russia 13-Jun-89 5-Aug-91 Partial   1           
64 BIT Yugoslavia 10-Jul-89 26-Oct-90 [Comprehensive] [1]             
65 BIT Poland 10-Nov-89 24-Feb-91 Partial   1           
66 BIT Guyana 6-Dec-89 8-Mar-94 Comprehensive 1             
67 BIT Cape Verde 18-Jan-90 15-Dec-93 Comprehensive 1 1           
68 BIT Swaziland 5-Apr-90 7-Aug-95 Comprehensive 1             
69 BIT Czech Republic 2-Oct-90 2-Aug-92 Comprehensive   1           
70 BIT Slovakia 2-Oct-90 2-Aug-92 Comprehensive   1           
71 BIT Argentina 9-Apr-91 8-Nov-93 Comprehensive 1 1           
72 BIT Mongolia 26-Jun-91 23-Jun-96 Comprehensive 1 1           
73 BIT Chile 21-Oct-91 18-Jul-99 Comprehensive 1             
74 BIT Albania 31-Oct-91 18-Aug-95 Comprehensive 1 1           
75 BIT Serbia19 1-Jan-92 1-Jan-92 [Comprehensive] [1]             
76 BIT Lithuania 28-Feb-92 27-Jun-97 Comprehensive 1 1           
77 BIT Kazakhstan20 22-Sep-92 10-May-95 [Comprehensive] [1]             
78 BIT Jamaica 24-Sep-92 29-May-96 Comprehensive 1             
79 BIT Estonia 12-Nov-92 12-Jan-97 Comprehensive 1 1           
80 BIT Ukraine 15-Feb-93 29-Jun-96 Comprehensive 1 1           
81 BIT Belarus 2-Apr-93 23-Sep-96 Comprehensive 1             
82 BIT Vietnam 3-Apr-93 19-Sep-98 Comprehensive 1 1           
83 BIT Latvia 20-Apr-93 9-Jun-96 Comprehensive 1 1           
84 BIT Uzbekistan 28-Apr-93 23-May-98 Comprehensive 1 1           
85 BIT Georgia 25-Jun-93 27-Sep-98 Comprehensive 1 1           
86 BIT Paraguay 11-Aug-93 3-Jul-98 Comprehensive 1             
87 BIT Slovenia 28-Oct-93 18-Jul-98 Comprehensive 1             
88 BIT Namibia21 21-Jan-94 21-Dec-97 [Comprehensive] [1]             
89 BIT Kuwait 30-Mar-94 15-Nov-97 Comprehensive 1 1           
90 BIT Costa Rica 13-Sep-94 24-Mar-98 Comprehensive 1             
91 BIT Barbados 2-Dec-94 11-May-02 Comprehensive 1 1           
                                                 
19 Serbia has not ratified the ICSID Convention, making its 1989 pre-consent in the Yugoslavia BIT ineffective as to Serbia. 
20 Kazakhstan did not ratify the ICSID Convention until 2000, makings its pre-consent ineffective until that year. 
21 Namibia has not ratified the ICSID Convention, makings its pre-consent ineffective across the period of the present study. 
 257
92 BIT Peru 30-Jan-95 1-May-97 Comprehensive 1   1         
93 BIT Ghana 24-Feb-95 23-Nov-98 Comprehensive 1 1 1         
94 BIT Honduras 21-Mar-95 27-May-98 Comprehensive 1             
95 BIT India 10-Jul-95 13-Jul-98 Comprehensive 1   1         
96 BIT South Africa 11-Sep-95 10-Apr-98 Comprehensive 1         1   
97 BIT Zimbabwe 29-Sep-95 14-Apr-00 Comprehensive 1             
98 BIT Armenia 21-Dec-95 23-Jun-97 Comprehensive 1             
99 BIT Azerbaijan 22-Dec-95 29-Jul-98 Comprehensive 1 1           
100 BIT Algeria 11-Mar-96 30-May-02 Comprehensive 1             
101 BIT Ecuador 21-Mar-96 12-Feb-99 Comprehensive 1             
102 BIT Cuba 30-Apr-96 22-Nov-98 Comprehensive 1 1           
103 BIT Kenya 3-May-96 7-Dec-00 Comprehensive 1             
104 BIT Nicaragua 6-May-96 19-Jan-01 Comprehensive 1             
105 BIT Venezuela 14-May-96 16-Oct-98 Comprehensive 1   1     1   
106 BIT Qatar 14-Jun-96 19-Jan-99 Comprehensive 1   1         
107 BIT Romania 25-Jun-96 12-Dec-98 Comprehensive 1             
108 BIT Laos 9-Aug-96 24-Mar-99 Comprehensive 1 1           
109 BIT Macedonia 10-Sep-96 17-Sep-00 Comprehensive 1             
110 BIT Saudi Arabia 29-Oct-96 9-Jan-99 Comprehensive 1             
111 BIT Lebanon 18-Mar-97 25-Mar-99 Comprehensive 1   1     1   
112 BIT Croatia22 21-Mar-97 28-Sep-00 Comprehensive 1             
113 BIT Philippines 18-Apr-97 1-Feb-00 Comprehensive 1             
114 BIT UAE 21-Jun-97 2-Jul-99 Comprehensive 1             
115 BIT Kyrgyzstan23 28-Aug-97 6-Sep-98 [Comprehensive]               
116 BIT Turkmenistan 28-Aug-97 19-Feb-01 Comprehensive 1             
117 BIT El Salvador 11-Dec-97 15-Apr-01 Comprehensive 1             
118 BIT Mexico 25-Aug-98 23-Feb-01 Comprehensive 1 1   1   1   
119 BIT Gabon 15-Sep-98 23-Feb-01 Comprehensive 1             
120 BIT Antigua-Barbuda 5-Nov-98 28-Feb-01 Comprehensive 1 1           
121 BIT Cambodia 15-Feb-99 14-Apr-02 Comprehensive 1 1           
                                                 
22 The 1997 Croatian BIT does not indicate that Croatia considered itself bound by the 1989 Yugoslavia BIT.  I have assumed here that it was not.  In any event 
Bosnia did not ratify the ICSID Convention until 1997, meaning that the 1989 pre-consent would have been ineffective. 
23 I was unable to obtain a copy of the text of the Kyrgyzstan BIT.  In the statistical analyses in previous chapters I assumed that the treaty contained an effective 
pre-consent, in line with contemporaneous Germany and Kyrgyzstan BIT practice. 
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Italian BITs in Force, Through 2002 
 
No. Type Host Signed In Force Pre-Consent Designated Arbitral Fora 
      ICSID Ad Hoc UNCITRAL ICC SCC AF Other 
1 BIT Guinea 20-Feb-64 20-Feb-64 None        
2 BIT Malta 28-Jul-67 15-Oct-73 None        
3 BIT Chad 11-Jun-69 11-Jun-69 Comprehensive X       
4 BIT Romania 14-Jan-77 6-Mar-79 Partial X       
5 BIT China 28-Jan-85 28-Aug-87 Partial  X      
6 BIT Tunisia 17-Oct-85 24-Jun-89 Comprehensive X X      
7 BIT Hungary 17-Feb-87 23-Feb-90 Partial X  X     
8 BIT Sri Lanka24 25-Mar-87 20-Mar-90 Partial X X      
9 BIT Kuwait 17-Dec-87 21-May-90 Comprehensive X  X   X  
10 BIT Malaysia 4-Jan-88 25-Oct-90 Comprehensive X       
11 BIT Philippines 17-Jun-88 4-Nov-93 Comprehensive X       
12 BIT Bulgaria 5-Dec-88 27-Dec-90 Partial   X     
13 BIT South Korea 10-Jan-89 26-Jun-92 Comprehensive X       
14 BIT Egypt 2-Mar-89 1-May-94 Comprehensive X  X     
15 BIT Poland 10-May-89 10-Jan-93 Partial X  X     
16 BIT Russia 30-Nov-89 8-Jul-91 Partial   X     
17 BIT Uruguay 21-Feb-90 2-Mar-98 Comprehensive X X      
18 BIT Bangladesh 20-Mar-90 20-Sep-94 Partial X  X     
19 BIT Bolivia 30-Apr-90 22-Feb-92 Comprehensive X  X     
20 BIT Vietnam 18-May-90 6-May-94 Comprehensive [X]  X     
21 BIT Argentina 22-May-90 14-Oct-93 Comprehensive X  X   X  
22 BIT Morocco 18-Jul-90 7-Apr-00 Comprehensive X       
23 BIT Romania 6-Dec-90 14-Mar-95 Comprehensive X  X     
24 BIT Indonesia 25-Apr-91 25-Jun-95 Comprehensive X  X     
25 BIT Algeria 18-May-91 26-Nov-93 Comprehensive X X      
26 BIT Albania 12-Sep-91 29-Jan-96 Comprehensive X  X   X  
27 BIT Mongolia 15-Jan-93 1-Sep-95 Comprehensive X  X     
                                                 
24 The Sri Lanka treaty’s pre-consent is ambiguous as to whether the investor or the Contracting Party gets to choose the dispute settlement forum. 
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28 BIT Chile 8-Mar-93 8-Feb-95 Comprehensive X  X     
29 BIT Cuba 7-May-93 23-Aug-95 Comprehensive  X      
30 BIT Oman 23-Jun-93 23-Jan-97 Comprehensive   X     
31 BIT Jamaica 29-Sep-93 9-Nov-95 Promissory X  X     
32 BIT Peru 5-May-94 18-Oct-95 Comprehensive X  X     
33 BIT Kazakhstan 22-Sep-94 12-Jul-96 Comprehensive X  X     
34 BIT Lithuania 1-Dec-94 15-Apr-97 Comprehensive X  X     
35 BIT Ethiopia 23-Dec-94 8-May-97 Comprehensive X  X     
36 BIT UAE 22-Jan-95 29-Apr-97 Comprehensive X  X     
37 BIT Ukraine 2-May-95 12-Sep-97 Comprehensive X  X     
38 BIT Belarus 25-Jul-95 12-Aug-97 Comprehensive X  X     
39 BIT Barbados25 25-Oct-95 21-Jul-97 Partial X       
40 BIT India 23-Nov-95 26-Mar-98 Comprehensive X  X   X  
41 BIT Czech Rep. 22-Jan-96 1-Nov-97 Comprehensive X  X     
42 BIT Russia 9-Apr-96 7-Jul-97 Comprehensive   X     
43 BIT Jordan 21-Jul-96 17-Jan-01 Comprehensive X       
44 BIT Saudi Arabia 10-Sep-96 22-May-98 Comprehensive X       
45 BIT Kenya 16-Sep-96 4-Aug-99 Comprehensive X  X     
46 BIT Croatia 5-Nov-96 12-Jun-98 Comprehensive X  X     
47 BIT Macedonia 26-Feb-97 28-May-99 Comprehensive X  X     
48 BIT Estonia 20-Mar-97 9-May-00 Comprehensive X  X     
49 BIT Georgia 15-May-97 26-Jul-99 Comprehensive X  X     
50 BIT Latvia 21-May-97 2-Mar-99 Comprehensive X  X     
51 BIT South Africa 9-Jun-97 16-Mar-99 Comprehensive X  X   X  
52 BIT Pakistan 19-Jul-97 22-Jun-01 Comprehensive X  X     
53 BIT Uzbekistan 17-Sep-97 14-Oct-99 Comprehensive X  X     
54 BIT Azerbaijan 25-Sep-97 4-Feb-00 Comprehensive X  X     
55 BIT Lebanon 7-Nov-97 9-Feb-00 Comprehensive X  X     
56 BIT Uganda 12-Dec-97 24-Sep-99 Comprehensive X  X     
57 BIT Slovakia 30-Jul-98 22-Nov-00 Comprehensive X  X     
                                                 
25 Barbados’ consent is very ambiguous, and a tribunal might view it as promissory. 
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58 BIT Mexico 24-Nov-99 5-Dec-02 Comprehensive [X]  X   X  
 
 261
Japanese BITs in Force, Through 2002 
 
 
No. Type Host Signed In Force Pre-Consent Designated Arbitral Fora 
      ICSID Ad Hoc UNCITRAL ICC SCC AF Other 
1 FCN India26 4-Feb-58 8-Apr-58 None               
2 FCN Cuba 22-Apr-60 20-Jul-60 None               
3 FCN Malaysia 10-May-60 16-Aug-60 None               
4 FCN Singapore 10-May-60 16-Aug-60 None               
5 FCN Peru 15-May-61 18-Dec-61 None               
6 FCN Indonesia 1-Jul-61 8-Mar-63 None               
7 FCN Argentina 20-Dec-61 25-Sep-67 None               
8 FCN El Salvador 19-Jul-63 1-Jul-64 None               
9 FCN Pakistan 8-Dec-69 20-Aug-61 None               
10 BIT Egypt27 28-Jan-77 14-Jan-78 Promissory X             
11 BIT Philippines 10-May-79 20-Jul-80 None               
12 BIT Sri Lanka 1-Mar-82 7-Aug-82 Promissory X             
13 BIT  China 27-Aug-88 14-May-89 Partial   X           
14 BIT Turkey 12-Feb-92 12-Mar-93 Promissory X             
15 BIT Pakistan 10-Mar-98 29-May-02 Promissory X             
16 BIT Bangladesh 10-Nov-98 25-Aug-99 Promissory X             
17 BIT Russia 13-Nov-98 27-May-00 Comprehensive     X     X   
18 BIT Mongolia 15-Feb-01 24-Mar-02 Promissory X   X     X   
19 FCN Singapore 13-Jan-02 1-Nov-02 Comprehensive X X X     X   
                                                 
26The Japan-India FCN contains substantive provisions dealing with MFN and national treatment for protection of property and business interests, but does not 
explicitly address issues of expropriation. It is at least debatable whether the treaty should be considered a rough BIT equivalent. 
 
27 The Japan-Egypt BIT, like Japan’s other “promissory” BITs, provides that the Contracting Parties “shall consent” to the investor’s request for arbitration. It is 
possible that the implicit futurity of the consent, as indicated by “shall”, is an artifact of the English translations of the treaties. I have not been able to obtain the 
original Japanese texts to verify whether they also indicate promissory rather than actual consent. 
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Netherlands BITs in Force, Through 2002 
 
No. Type Host Signed In Force Pre-Consent  
      ICSID Ad Hoc UNCITRAL ICC SCC AF Other
1 BIT Tunisia28 23-May-63 19-Dec-64 None               
2 BIT Côte d’Ivoire 26-Apr-65 8-Sep-66 None               
3 BIT Senegal 12-Jun-65 23-May-67 None               
4 BIT Cameroon 6-Jul-65 7-May-66 None               
5 FCN Indonesia 7-Jul-68 17-Jul-71 Promissory X             
6 BIT Tanzania 14-Apr-70 28-Jul-72 None               
7 BIT Sudan 22-Aug-70 27-Mar-72 None               
8 BIT Kenya 11-Sep-70 11-Jun-79 Promissory X             
9 BIT Malaysia 15-Jun-71 13-Sep-72 Promissory X             
10 BIT Morocco 23-Dec-71 27-Jul-78 Promissory X             
11 BIT Singapore 16-May-72 7-Sep-73 Promissory X             
12 BIT Thailand 6-Jun-72 3-Mar-73 None               
13 BIT South Korea 16-Oct-74 1-Jun-75 Promissory X             
14 BIT Yugoslavia 16-Feb-76 1-Apr-77 None               
15 BIT Egypt 30-Oct-76 1-Jan-78 Promissory X             
16 BIT Senegal 3-Aug-79 5-May-81 Promissory X             
17 BIT Romania 27-Oct-83 1-Oct-84 Partial X             
18 BIT Sri-Lanka 26-Apr-84 1-May-85 Comprehensive X             
19 BIT Malta 10-Sep-84 1-Jul-85 None               
20 BIT Philippines 27-Feb-85 1-Oct-87 Promissory X             
21 BIT Yemen29 18-Mar-85 1-Sep-86 [Comprehensive] [X]             
22 BIT China 17-Jun-85 1-Feb-87 Partial   X           
23 BIT Turkey30 27-Mar-86 1-Nov-86 [Comprehensive] [X]             
24 BIT Hungary 2-Sep-87 1-Jun-88 Partial X X           
                                                 
28 The Tunisian BIT, like many other early Dutch BIT-like treaties, is actually titled an “economic and technical cooperation agreement”.  However, its scope of 
content is much more limited than a typical United States, Japanese, or German FCN treaty.  For that reason it is not unduly misleading to call these treaties 
“BITs.”  
29 Yemen did not ratify the ICSID Convention until 2004, making its pre-consent ineffective across the period of this study. 
30 Turkey did not ratify the ICSID Convention until 1989, making its pre-consent ineffective until that date. 
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25 BIT Oman 19-Sep-87 1-Feb-89 Comprehensive   X           
26 BIT Bulgaria 8-Mar-88 24-May-90 Partial     X         
27 BIT Uruguay 22-Sep-88 1-Aug-91 Comprehensive [X] X           
28 BIT Pakistan 4-Oct-88 1-Oct-89 Promissory X             
29 BIT Ghana 31-Mar-89 1-Jul-91 Comprehensive X   X         
30 BIT Russia 5-Oct-89 20-Jul-91 Partial   X           
31 BIT Jamaica 18-Apr-91 1-Aug-92 Comprehensive X             
32 BIT Czech Rep. 29-Apr-91 1-Oct-92 Comprehensive     X         
33 BIT Slovakia 29-Apr-91 1-Oct-92 Comprehensive     X         
34 BIT Venezuela 22-Oct-91 1-Nov-93 Comprehensive X         X   
35 BIT Cape Verde 11-Nov-91 25-Nov-92 Comprehensive X X           
36 BIT Bolivia 10-Mar-92 1-Nov-94 Comprehensive X X           
37 BIT Poland31 7-Sep-92 1-Feb-94 Partial [X]  X           
38 BIT Argentina 20-Oct-92 1-Oct-94 Comprehensive X   X     X   
39 BIT Estonia 27-Oct-92 1-Sep-93 Comprehensive X   X         
40 BIT Paraguay32 29-Oct-92 1-Aug-94 Comprehensive X             
41 BIT Nigeria 2-Nov-92 1-Feb-94 Comprehensive X             
42 BIT Lithuania 26-Jan-94 1-Apr-95 Comprehensive X             
43 BIT Vietnam 10-Mar-94 1-Feb-95 Comprehensive X   X         
44 BIT Latvia33 14-Mar-94 1-Apr-95 [Comprehensive] [X]             
45 BIT Indonesia 6-Apr-94 1-Jul-95 Comprehensive X             
46 BIT Albania 15-Apr-94 1-Sep-95 Comprehensive X   X         
47 BIT Romania 19-Apr-94 1-Feb-95 Comprehensive X   X         
48 BIT Ukraine 14-Jul-94 1-Jun-97 Comprehensive X         X   
49 BIT Bangladesh 1-Nov-94 1-Jun-96 Comprehensive X             
50 BIT Peru 27-Dec-94 1-Feb-96 Comprehensive X             
51 BIT Mongolia 9-Mar-95 1-Jun-96 Comprehensive X             
                                                 
31 The Polish BIT limits its pre-consent to disputes involving “the essential aspects pertaining to the conduct of business”.  It is quite unclear how broadly (or how 
narrowly) a tribunal would be likely to interpret this limitation.  I have assumed that the pre-consent is approximately as narrow as those which explicitly limit 
themselves to expropriation-type disputes. 
32 Paraguay limits its pre-consent to arbitral review of domestic court judgments for violations of “international law” or for “obvious unfairness”.  It is not clear 
how limiting this restriction is in practice.  
33 Latvia did not ratify the ICSID Convention until 1997, which means that its pre-consent was ineffective until that date. 
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52 BIT Belarus 11-Apr-95 1-Aug-96 Comprehensive X             
53 BIT South Africa 9-May-95 1-May-99 Comprehensive X   X X   X   
54 BIT Moldova34 26-Sep-95 1-May-97 [Comprehensive] [X]             
55 BIT India 6-Nov-95 1-Dec-96 Comprehensive     X         
56 BIT Egypt 17-Jan-96 1-Mar-98 Comprehensive X   X X     X 
57 BIT Uzbekistan 14-Mar-96 1-Jul-97 Comprehensive X             
58 BIT Slovenia 24-Sep-96 1-Aug-98 Comprehensive X             
59 BIT Zimbabwe 11-Dec-96 1-May-98 Comprehensive X             
60 BIT Jordan 17-Nov-97 1-Aug-98 Comprehensive X             
61 BIT Georgia 3-Feb-98 1-Mar-99 Comprehensive X             
62 BIT Croatia 28-Apr-98 1-Jun-99 Comprehensive X         X   
63 BIT Tunisia 11-May-98 1-Aug-99 Comprehensive X             
64 BIT Mexico 13-May-98 1-Oct-99 Comprehensive X   X     X   
65 BIT Bosnia 13-May-98 1-Jan-02 Comprehensive X             
66 BIT Macedonia 7-Jul-98 1-Jun-99 Comprehensive X             
67 BIT Costa Rica 21-May-99 1-Jul-01 Comprehensive X   X     X   
68 BIT Ecuador 27-Jun-99 1-Jul-01 Comprehensive X   X         
69 BIT Bulgaria 6-Oct-99 1-Mar-01 Comprehensive X   X     X   
70 BIT El Salvador 12-Oct-99 1-Mar-01 Comprehensive X   X         
71 BIT Cuba 2-Nov-99 1-Nov-01 Comprehensive X   X X       
72 BIT Panama 28-Aug-00 1-Sep-01 Comprehensive X             
73 BIT Nicaragua 28-Aug-00 11-Oct-02 Comprehensive X             
74 BIT Honduras 15-Jan-01 1-Sep-02 Comprehensive X   X         
75 BIT Guatemala 18-May-01 1-Sep-02 Comprehensive X   X     X   
76 BIT Kuwait 29-May-01 31-May-02 Comprehensive X             
77 BIT Mozambique 18-Dec-01 26-Feb-02 Comprehensive X             
 
                                                 
34 Moldova has not ratified the ICSID Convention, meaning that its pre-consent is not effective. 
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Norwegian BITs in Force, Through 2002 
 
No. Type Host Signed In Force Pre-Consent Designated Arbitral Fora 
      ICSID Ad Hoc UNCITRAL ICC SCC AF Other
1 FCN Madagascar 13-May-66 28-Sep-67 None               
2 BIT Indonesia 24-Nov-69 25-Aug-70 None               
3 BIT Malaysia 6-Nov-84 7-Jan-86 Comprehensive X             
4 BIT China35 21-Nov-84 10-Jul-85 None               
5 BIT Sri Lanka 13-Jun-85 13-Jun-85 Comprehensive X             
6 BIT Poland 5-Jun-90 24-Oct-90 Partial   X           
7 BIT Hungary 8-Apr-91 4-Dec-92 Partial X             
8 BIT Czech Rep. 21-May-91 6-Aug-92 Comprehensive X   X         
9 BIT Slovakia 21-May-91 6-Aug-92 Comprehensive X   X         
10 BIT Romania 11-Jun-91 23-Mar-92 Comprehensive X             
11 BIT Indonesia 26-Nov-91 1-Oct-94 Comprehensive X             
12 BIT Estonia 15-Jun-92 15-Jun-92 Comprehensive X   X         
13 BIT Latvia 16-Jun-92 1-Dec-92 Comprehensive X   X         
14 BIT Lithuania 16-Jun-92 20-Dec-92 Comprehensive X   X         
15 BIT Chile 1-Jun-93 7-Sep-94 Comprehensive X             
16 BIT Peru 10-Mar-95 9-May-95 Comprehensive X   X         
17 BIT Russia 4-Oct-95 21-May-98 Comprehensive     X   X     
 
 
                                                 
35 China’s BIT with Norway contains ostensible investor-state dispute settlement provisions for expropriation-compensation disputes, but requires the Contracting 
Parties, not the investor, to appoint the arbitrators, bear the costs of the arbitration, and so on.  I view these provisions as more akin to a state-state dispute 
settlement mechanism, and accordingly code the treaty as not incorporating a meaningfully, partial pre-consent to investor-initiated and investor-controlled arbitration. 
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Singapore BITs in Force, Through 200236 
 
No. Type Host Signed In Force Pre-Consent Designated Arbitral Fora 
      ICSID Ad Hoc UNCITRAL ICC SCC AF Other
1 BIT Sri Lanka 9-May-80 30-Sep-80 Comprehensive X       
2 BIT China 21-Nov-85 7-Feb-86 Partial  X      
3 FTA Brunei 15-Dec-87 2-Aug-88 Comprehensive  X      
4 FTA Indonesia 15-Dec-87 2-Aug-88 Comprehensive  X      
5 FTA Malaysia 15-Dec-87 2-Aug-88 Comprehensive  X      
6 FTA Philippines 15-Dec-87 2-Aug-88 Comprehensive  X      
7 FTA Thailand 15-Dec-87 2-Aug-88 Comprehensive  X      
8 BIT Vietnam 29-Oct-92 25-Dec-92 Promissory   X     
9 BIT Poland 3-Jun-93 29-Dec-93 Promissory   X     
10 BIT Pakistan 8-Mar-95 4-May-95 Comprehensive X  X     
11 BIT Czech Rep. 8-Apr-95 8-Oct-95 Comprehensive X  X     
12 BIT Mongolia 24-Jul-95 14-Jan-96 Comprehensive X       
13 FTA Vietnam 16-Aug-96 16-Aug-96 Comprehensive  X      
14 BIT Laos37 24-Mar-97 26-Mar-98 [Comprehensive] [X]       
15 BIT Egypt 15-Apr-97 1-Mar-98 Comprehensive X       
16 BIT Hungary 17-Apr-97 1-Jan-99 Comprehensive X       
17 FTA Laos 23-Jul-97 23-Jul-97 Comprehensive  X      
18 BIT Latvia 7-Jul-98 18-Mar-99 Comprehensive X       
19 FTA Cambodia 30-Apr-99 30-Apr-99 Comprehensive  X      
20 BIT Mauritius 4-Mar-00 20-Mar-00 Comprehensive X       
21 BIT Belarus 13-May-00 13-Jan-00 Comprehensive X       
                                                 
36 I have not listed BITjfs between Singapore and the “capital-exporting countries” as defined in previous chapters.  Those BITs include treaties with the 
following countries (with year of signing in [brackets]): the Netherlands [1972]; Germany [1973]; the UK [1975]; France [1975]; Switzerland [1978]; 
Belgium [1978].  The various BIT-like FTA agreements listed in the table refer to ASEAN’s Investment Protocol.  
37 Laos has never ratified the ICSID Convention, which makes its pre-consent in this BIT ineffective across the period of study.  However, Laos has an 
effective pre-consent through an FTA with Singapore, as indicated in the table. 
 267
Spanish BITs in Force, Through 2002 
 
No. Type Host Signed In Force Pre-Consent Designated Arbitral Fora 
      ICSID Ad Hoc UNCITRAL ICC SCC AF Other
1 BIT Morocco 27-Sep-89 15-Jan-92 None        
2 BIT Hungary 9-Nov-89 1-Aug-92 Partial    X X   
3 BIT Bolivia 24-Apr-90 12-May-92 None        
4 BIT Russia 26-Oct-90 28-Nov-91 Partial   X  X   
5 BIT Czech Rep. 12-Dec-90 28-Nov-91 Comprehensive X  X X X   
6 BIT Slovakia 12-Dec-90 28-Nov-91 Comprehensive X  X X X   
7 BIT Tunisia 28-May-91 20-Jun-94 Comprehensive X  X     
8 BIT Chile 2-Oct-91 28-Mar-94 Comprehensive X  X   X  
9 BIT Argentina 3-Oct-91 28-Sep-92 Comprehensive [X]  X     
10 BIT China 6-Feb-92 1-May-93 Partial   X     
11 BIT Uruguay 7-Apr-92 6-May-94 Comprehensive [X]  X     
12 BIT Poland 30-Jul-92 1-May-93 Comprehensive X  X X X   
13 BIT Egypt 3-Nov-92 26-Apr-94 Comprehensive X  X X X  X 
14 BIT Paraguay 11-Oct-93 22-Nov-96 Comprehensive X  X X    
15 BIT Philippines 19-Oct-93 21-Sep-94 Comprehensive X       
16 BIT South Korea 17-Jan-94 19-Jul-94 Comprehensive X  X     
17 BIT Nicaragua 16-Mar-94 28-Mar-95 Comprehensive X  X X    
18 BIT Honduras 18-Mar-94 23-May-96 Comprehensive X  X X    
19 BIT Kazakhstan 23-Mar-94 22-Jun-95 Comprehensive X  X X    
20 BIT Cuba 27-May-94 9-Jun-95 Comprehensive   X X    
21 BIT Lithuania 6-Jul-94 22-Dec-95 Comprehensive X  X X    
22 BIT Pakistan 15-Sep-94 26-Apr-96 Comprehensive X  X X    
23 BIT Peru 17-Nov-94 17-Feb-96 Comprehensive X  X     
24 BIT Algeria 23-Dec-94 17-Jan-96 Comprehensive X  X X X   
25 BIT Romania 25-Jan-95 7-Dec-95 Comprehensive X  X     
26 BIT El Salvador 14-Feb-95 20-Feb-96 Comprehensive X  X     
27 BIT Turkey 15-Feb-95 3-Mar-98 Comprehensive X  X X    
28 BIT Gabon 2-Mar-95 12-Dec-01 Comprehensive X  X     
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29 BIT Dominican Rep. 16-Mar-95 7-Oct-96 Comprehensive   X     
30 BIT Malaysia 4-Apr-95 16-Feb-96 Comprehensive X  X     
31 BIT Indonesia38 30-May-95 12-Feb-97 Comprehensive X  X     
32 BIT Mexico 23-Jun-95 18-Dec-96 Comprehensive X X X   X  
33 BIT Bulgaria 5-Sep-95 22-Apr-98 Partial [X]  X     
34 BIT Latvia 26-Oct-95 14-Mar-97 Comprehensive X  X X    
35 BIT Venezuela 2-Nov-95 10-Sep-97 Comprehensive X  X   X  
36 BIT Lebanon 22-Feb-96 29-Apr-97 Comprehensive X  X   X  
37 BIT Ecuador 26-Jun-96 18-Jun-97 Comprehensive X  X     
38 BIT Costa Rica 8-Jul-97 17-Jul-99 Comprehensive X  X   X  
39 BIT Croatia 21-Jul-97 17-Sep-98 Comprehensive X  X   X  
40 BIT India 30-Sep-97 15-Dec-98 Comprehensive X  X   X  
41 BIT Panama 10-Nov-97 31-Jul-98 Comprehensive X  X     
42 BIT Estonia 11-Nov-97 1-Jul-98 Comprehensive X  X X    
43 BIT Ukraine 26-Feb-98 13-Mar-00 Comprehensive X  X   X  
44 BIT Slovenia 15-Jul-98 3-Apr-00 Comprehensive X  X     
45 BIT South Africa 30-Sep-98 23-Dec-99 Comprehensive X  X   X  
46 BIT Jordan 20-Oct-99 13-Dec-00 Comprehensive X  X     
47 BIT Bolivia 24-Oct-01 9-Jul-02 Comprehensive X  X   X  
48 BIT Jamaica 13-Mar-02 25-Nov-02 Comprehensive X  X    X 
 
                                                 
38 Indonesia’s pre-consent contains important ambiguities. 
 269
Swedish BITs in Force, Through 2002 
 
No. Type Host Signed In Force Pre-Consent Designated Arbitral Fora 
      ICSID Ad Hoc UNCITRAL ICC SCC AF Other 
1 FCN Côte d’Ivoire 27-Aug-65 3-Nov-66 None  
2 FCN Madagascar 2-Apr-66 23-Jun-67 None  
3 FCN Senegal 24-Feb-67 23-Feb-68 None  
4 BIT Egypt 15-Jul-78 29-Jan-79 None  
5 BIT Yugoslavia39 10-Nov-78 21-Nov-79 None  
6 BIT Malaysia 3-Mar-79 6-Jul-79 None  
7 BIT Pakistan 12-Mar-81 14-Jun-81 Comprehensive X  
8 BIT China 29-Mar-82 29-Mar-82 None  
9 BIT Sri Lanka 30-Apr-82 30-Apr-82 Comprehensive X  
10 BIT Yemen40 29-Oct-83 23-Feb-84 [Comprehensive] [X]  
11 BIT Tunisia 15-Sep-84 13-May-85 Comprehensive X  
12 BIT Hungary 21-Apr-87 21-Apr-87 Partial X  
13 BIT Poland 13-Oct-89 4-Jan-90 Partial  X 
14 BIT Bolivia 20-Sep-90 3-Jul-92 Comprehensive  X 
15 BIT Morocco41 26-Sep-90 NIF Comprehensive X  
16 BIT Czech Rep. 13-Nov-90 23-Sep-91 Comprehensive X  X 
17 BIT Slovakia 13-Nov-90 23-Sep-91 Comprehensive X  X 
18 BIT Argentina 22-Nov-91 28-Sep-92 Comprehensive X  X 
19 BIT Latvia 10-Mar-92 6-Nov-92 Comprehensive X  X 
20 BIT Lithuania 17-Mar-92 2-Sep-92 Comprehensive X  X 
21 BIT Estonia 31-Mar-92 20-May-92 Comprehensive X  X 
22 BIT Indonesia 17-Sep-92 18-Feb-93 Comprehensive X  
23 BIT Chile 24-May-93 30-Dec-95 Comprehensive X  
24 BIT Vietnam 8-Sep-93 2-Aug-94 Comprehensive X  X 
25 BIT Bulgaria 19-Apr-94 1-Apr-95 Partial X  X 
26 BIT Peru 3-May-94 1-Aug-94 Comprehensive X  
27 BIT Belarus 20-Dec-94 1-Nov-96 Comprehensive X  
                                                 
39 In the empirical analyses above I have assumed that the 1978 Yugoslav treaty binds Serbia. 
40 Yemen didn't join ICSID until 2004, making its pre-consent ineffective for the study period 
41 The Moroccan BIT provisionally entered into force upon signature, but has never fully entered into force. 
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28 BIT Albania 31-Mar-95 1-Apr-96 Comprehensive X  
29 BIT Russia 19-Apr-95 7-Jun-96 Comprehensive  X 
30 BIT Oman 13-Jul-95 6-Jun-96 Comprehensive X  
31 BIT Ukraine 15-Aug-95 1-Mar-97 Comprehensive X  X X 
32 BIT South Korea 30-Aug-95 18-Jun-97 Comprehensive X  
33 BIT Laos 29-Aug-96 1-Jan-97 Comprehensive X  X 
34 BIT Venezuela 25-Nov-96 5-Jan-98 Comprehensive X  X 
35 BIT Turkey 11-Apr-97 8-Oct-98 Comprehensive X  
36 BIT Uruguay 17-Jun-97 1-Dec-99 Comprehensive X  X X 
37 BIT Macedonia 7-May-98 1-Oct-98 Comprehensive X  X X 
38 BIT South Africa 25-May-98 1-Jan-99 Comprehensive X  X 
39 BIT Malta 24-Aug-99 1-Jan-00 Comprehensive X  X X 
40 BIT Tanzania 1-Sep-99 1-Mar-02 Comprehensive X  X 
41 BIT Slovenia 5-Oct-99 12-May-01 Comprehensive X  
42 BIT Kuwait 7-Nov-99 10-May-02 Comprehensive X  X 
43 BIT UAE 10-Nov-99 15-Mar-00 Comprehensive X  
44 BIT Thailand 18-Feb-00 23-Nov-00 Comprehensive X  X X 
45 BIT India 4-Jul-00 1-Apr-01 Comprehensive X  X 
46 BIT Mexico 3-Oct-00 1-Jul-01 Comprehensive  X X X 
47 BIT Bosnia42 31-Oct-00 1-Jan-02 Comprehensive X  X X 
48 BIT Croatia 23-Nov-00 1-Aug-02 Comprehensive X  X X X 
49 BIT Uzbekistan 29-May-01 1-Oct-01 Comprehensive X  X 
50 BIT Ecuador 30-May-01 1-Mar-02 Comprehensive X  X 
51 BIT Lebanon 15-Jun-01 2-Nov-01 Comprehensive X  X X 
 
                                                 
42 Bosnia’s BIT indicates that it was bound by Yugoslavia’s 1978 BIT. 
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Swiss BITs in Force, Through 2002 
 
No. Type Host Signed In Force Pre-Consent Designated Arbitral Fora 
      ICSID Ad Hoc UNCITRAL ICC SCC AF Other
1 BIT Tunisia 2-Dec-61 19-Jan-64 None        
2 FCN Niger 28-Mar-62 17-Nov-62 None        
3 FCN Guinea 26-Apr-62 29-Jul-63 None        
4 FCN Côte d’Ivoire 26-Jun-62 18-Nov-62 None        
5 FCN Senegal 16-Aug-62 13-Aug-64 None        
6 FCN Congo 18-Oct-62 11-Jul-64 None        
7 FCN Cameroon 28-Jan-63 6-Apr-64 None        
8 FCN Liberia 23-Jul-63 22-Sep-64 None        
9 FCN Rwanda 15-Oct-63 15-Oct-63 None        
10 FCN Togo 17-Jan-64 9-Aug-66 None        
11 FCN Madagascar 17-Mar-64 31-Mar-66 None        
12 FCN Malta 20-Jan-65 23-Feb-65 None        
13 BIT Tanzania 3-May-65 16-Sep-65 None        
14 BIT Costa Rica 1-Sep-65 18-Aug-66 None        
15 FCN Benin 20-Apr-66 6-Oct-73 None        
16 FCN Chad 21-Feb-67 31-Oct-67 None        
17 BIT Ecuador 2-May-68 9-Nov-69 None        
18 FCN Burkina Faso 6-May-69 15-Sep-69 None        
19 BIT South Korea 7-Apr-71 7-Apr-71 None        
20 BIT Uganda 23-Aug-71 8-May-72 None        
21 FCN Gabon 28-Jan-72 18-Oct-72 None        
22 BIT Zaire 10-Mar-72 10-May-73 None        
23 FCN Cent. African Rep. 28-Feb-73 4-Jul-73 None        
24 BIT Egypt 25-Jul-73 4-Jun-74 None        
25 BIT Indonesia 6-Feb-74 2-Mar-77 None        
26 BIT Sudan 17-Feb-74 14-Dec-74 None        
27 FCN Mauritania 9-Sep-76 30-May-78 None        
28 BIT Jordan 11-Nov-76 2-Mar-77 None        
29 BIT Syria 22-Jun-77 10-Aug-78 None        
30 BIT Malaysia 1-Mar-78 9-Jun-78 None        
31 BIT Singapore 6-Mar-78 3-May-78 None        
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32 BIT Mali 8-Mar-78 8-Dec-78 None        
33 BIT Sri Lanka43 23-Sep-81 12-Feb-82 Comprehensive X       
34 BIT Panama 19-Oct-83 22-Aug-85 Comprehensive   X     
35 BIT Morocco 17-Dec-85 12-Apr-91 None        
36 BIT China 12-Nov-86 18-Mar-87 Partial  X      
37 BIT Bolivia 6-Nov-87 13-May-91 Comprehensive X X      
38 BIT Turkey 3-Mar-88 21-Feb-90 Comprehensive X       
39 BIT Hungary 5-Oct-88 16-May-89 Partial X       
40 BIT Uruguay 7-Oct-88 22-Apr-91 Comprehensive X X      
41 BIT Poland 8-Nov-89 17-Apr-90 Partial X X      
42 BIT Czech Rep. 5-Oct-90 7-Aug-91 Comprehensive X X      
43 BIT Slovakia 5-Oct-90 7-Aug-91 Comprehensive X X      
44 BIT Russia 1-Dec-90 26-Aug-91 Partial  X      
45 BIT Jamaica 11-Dec-90 21-Nov-91 Comprehensive X       
46 BIT Argentina 12-Apr-91 6-Nov-92 Comprehensive X  X     
47 BIT Ghana 8-Oct-91 16-Jun-93 Comprehensive X  X   X  
48 BIT Bulgaria44 28-Oct-91 26-Oct-93 Partial/Comp. [X]  X     
49 BIT Cape Verde 28-Oct-91 6-May-92 Comprehensive X X      
50 BIT Peru 22-Nov-91 23-Nov-93 Comprehensive X  X     
51 BIT Paraguay 31-Jan-92 28-Sep-92 Comprehensive X  X     
52 BIT Vietnam 3-Jul-92 3-Dec-92 Comprehensive X  X     
53 BIT Albania 22-Sep-92 30-Apr-93 Comprehensive X X      
54 BIT Estonia 21-Dec-92 18-Aug-93 Comprehensive X X      
55 BIT Latvia 22-Dec-92 16-Apr-93 Comprehensive X X      
56 BIT Lithuania 23-Dec-92 13-May-93 Comprehensive X X      
57 BIT Uzbekistan 16-Apr-93 5-Nov-93 Comprehensive X X      
58 BIT Belarus 28-May-93 13-Jul-94 Comprehensive X  X     
                                                 
43 The Sri Lankan BIT’s comprehensive pre-consent contains important potential ambiguities that may lead a tribunal to refuse to exercise jurisdiction.  
Schaufelberger, for instance, reads the provision as requiring the further assent of the host state.  Peter Schaufelberger, La protection juridique des investissements 
internationaux dans les pays en développement: Etude de la garantie contre les risques de l’investissement et an particularier de l’Agence multilatérale de garantie des investissements (AMGI), 
83 ETUDES SUISSES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 92 (1993).  My own evaluation suggests that the second paragraph of the investor-state dispute settlement 
provision allows the investor to unilaterally initiate arbitration after a waiting period of twelve months. 
44 The Bulgarian BIT contains a partial pre-consent to ad hoc arbitration for expropriation-type disputes, but also indicates that once Bulgaria joins ICSID 
investors shall have the right to initiate ICSID arbitration as to all types of investment disputes.  Because Bulgaria ratified the ICSID Convention in 2000, since 
that time its BIT is best considered to incorporate a comprehensive pre-consent. 
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59 BIT Honduras 14-Oct-93 31-Aug-98 Comprehensive X  X X    
60 BIT Romania 25-Oct-93 30-Jul-94 Comprehensive X  X     
61 BIT Venezuela 18-Nov-93 30-Nov-94 Comprehensive X  X     
62 BIT Gambia 22-Nov-93 30-Mar-94 Comprehensive X       
63 BIT Kazakhstan45 12-May-94 13-May-98 [Comprehensive] [X]       
64 BIT Namibia 1-Aug-94 26-Apr-00 Comprehensive X       
65 BIT Zambia 3-Aug-94 7-Mar-95 Comprehensive X       
66 BIT El Salvador 8-Dec-94 16-Sep-96 Comprehensive X  X     
67 BIT Barbados 29-Mar-95 22-Dec-95 Comprehensive X       
68 BIT Ukraine 20-Apr-95 21-Jan-97 Comprehensive X  X     
69 BIT South Africa 27-Jun-95 29-Nov-97 Comprehensive X  X     
70 BIT Mexico 10-Jul-95 14-Mar-96 Comprehensive X  X   X  
71 BIT Pakistan 11-Jul-95 6-May-96 Comprehensive X       
72 BIT Slovenia 9-Nov-95 20-Mar-97 Comprehensive X  X     
73 BIT Moldova46 30-Nov-95 29-Nov-96 [Comprehensive] [X]       
74 BIT Cuba 28-Jun-96 7-Nov-97 Comprehensive X  X     
75 BIT Zimbabwe 15-Aug-96 9-Feb-01 Comprehensive X       
76 BIT Macedonia 26-Sep-96 6-May-97 Comprehensive X  X     
77 BIT Cambodia 12-Oct-96 28-Mar-00 Comprehensive X  X     
78 BIT Croatia 30-Oct-96 17-Jun-97 Comprehensive X       
79 BIT Laos 4-Dec-96 4-Dec-96 Comprehensive X  X     
80 BIT Mongolia 29-Jan-97 9-Sep-99 Comprehensive X  X     
81 BIT Philippines 31-Mar-97 23-Apr-99 Comprehensive X  X     
82 BIT India 4-Apr-97 16-Feb-00 Comprehensive X  X     
83 BIT Thailand47 17-Nov-97 21-Jul-99 None/Prom’y [X]       
84 BIT Iran 8-Mar-98 1-Nov-01 Comprehensive   X     
85 BIT Botswana 26-Jun-98 13-Apr-00 Comprehensive X       
86 BIT Ethiopia 26-Jun-98 7-Dec-98 Comprehensive X  X     
87 BIT Kuwait 31-Oct-98 17-Dec-00 Comprehensive X  X   X  
88 BIT UAE 3-Nov-98 16-Aug-99 Comprehensive X  X     
89 BIT Armenia 19-Nov-98 4-Nov-02 Comprehensive X  X     
                                                 
45 Kazakhstan did not ratify the ICSID Convention until 2000, makings its pre-consent ineffective until that time. 
46 Moldova has not ratified the ICSID Convention, making its pre-consent ineffective across the entire period of study. 
47 The Thai BIT indicates that Thailand “shall consent” to investor-initiated arbitration if it has ratified the ICSID Convention, which Thailand has not done. 
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90 BIT Mauritius 26-Nov-98 21-Apr-00 Comprehensive X  X     
91 BIT Nicaragua 30-Nov-98 2-May-00 Comprehensive X       
92 BIT North Korea48 14-Dec-98 15-Nov-00 Not Available        
93 BIT Chile 24-Sep-99 2-May-02 Comprehensive X  X     
94 BIT Lebanon 3-Mar-00 20-Apr-01 Comprehensive X  X     
95 BIT Costa Rica 1-Aug-00 19-Nov-02 Comprehensive X  X     
96 BIT Bangladesh 14-Oct-00 3-Sep-01 Comprehensive X       
97 BIT Djibouti 4-Feb-01 10-Jun-01 Comprehensive X  X     
98 BIT Jordan49 25-Feb-01 11-Dec-01 Not Available        
 
                                                 
48 I was unable to obtain a hard copy of the North Korea BIT.  North Korea was not included in the statistical analyses presented in previous chapters due to lack 
of data for other variables. 
49 I was unable to obtain a hard copy of the Jordanian BIT.  In the analyses above I have assumed that the treaty contains a comprehensive pre-consent. 
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United Kingdom BITs in Force, Through 2002 
 
No. Type Host Signed In Force Pre-Consent Designated Arbitral Fora 
      ICSID Ad Hoc UNCITRAL ICC SCC AF Other
1 FCN Cameroon50 29-Jul-63 29-Jul-63 None        
2 BIT Egypt 11-Jun-75 24-Feb-76 Comprehensive X       
3 BIT Singapore 22-Jul-75 22-Jul-75 Comprehensive X       
4 BIT South Korea 4-Mar-76 4-Mar-76 Comprehensive X       
5 BIT Romania 19-Mar-76 22-Nov-76 None        
6 BIT Indonesia 27-Apr-76 24-Mar-77 Promissory        
7 BIT Thailand 28-Nov-78 11-Aug-79 None        
8 BIT Jordan 10-Oct-79 24-Apr-80 Comprehensive X       
9 BIT Sri Lanka 13-Feb-80 18-Dec-80 Comprehensive X       
10 BIT Senegal 7-May-80 9-Feb-84 Comprehensive X       
11 BIT Bangladesh 19-Jun-80 19-Jun-80 Comprehensive X       
12 BIT Philippines 3-Dec-80 2-Jan-81 Promissory X       
13 BIT Lesotho 18-Feb-81 18-Feb-81 Comprehensive X       
14 BIT Papua New Guinea 14-May-81 22-Dec-81 Comprehensive X       
15 BIT Malaysia 21-May-81 21-Oct-88 Comprehensive X       
16 BIT Paraguay 4-Jun-81 23-Apr-92 Comprehensive X       
17 BIT Yemen 25-Feb-82 11-Nov-83 Comprehensive X       
18 BIT Belize 30-Apr-82 30-Apr-82 Comprehensive   X     
19 BIT Cameroon 4-Jun-82 7-Jun-85 Comprehensive X       
20 BIT Saint Lucia 18-Jan-83 18-Jan-83 Comprehensive   X     
21 BIT Panama 7-Oct-83 7-Nov-85 Comprehensive   X     
22 BIT Haiti 18-Mar-85 27-Mar-95 Comprehensive   X     
23 BIT China51 15-May-86 15-May-86 Partial   X     
24 BIT Mauritius 20-May-86 13-Oct-86 Comprehensive X       
                                                 
50 The UK-Cameroon FCN treaty (actually an “Agreement on Commercial and Economic Cooperation”) is very BIT-like in its investment-related provisions.  
The UK also entered into FCN-type treaties with Nepal, Oman, Iran (1959), and Japan.  The Nepal and Oman treaties contain very few investment-related 
provisions and should not be considered BIT-equivalent treaties.  The Iranian treaty is potentially BIT-like, but it never appears to have entered into force. 
51 The UK-China BIT limits its pre-consent to disputes concerning the appropriate level of “compensation.”  But unlike other Chinese BITs, the UK version does 
not specify that jurisdiction is limited to disputes over compensation for expropriation.  This opens up the possibility that China has pre-consented to arbitration 
involving issues of compensation for breaches of a much wider variety of international legal issues. 
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25 BIT Malta 4-Oct-86 4-Oct-86 Comprehensive   X     
26 BIT Jamaica 20-Jan-87 14-May-87 Comprehensive X       
27 BIT Dominica 23-Jan-87 23-Jan-87 Comprehensive   X     
28 BIT Hungary 9-Mar-87 28-Aug-87 Partial X       
29 BIT Antigua-Barbuda 12-Jun-87 12-Jun-87 Comprehensive   X     
30 BIT Benin 27-Nov-87 27-Nov-87 Comprehensive X       
31 BIT Poland 8-Dec-87 14-Apr-88 Comprehensive   X     
32 BIT Grenada 25-Feb-88 25-Feb-88 Comprehensive   X     
33 BIT Bolivia 24-May-88 16-Feb-90 Comprehensive   X     
34 BIT Tunisia 14-Mar-89 4-Jan-90 Comprehensive X       
35 BIT Ghana 22-Mar-89 25-Oct-91 Comprehensive   X     
36 BIT Russia 6-Apr-89 3-Jul-91 Partial   X  X   
37 BIT Congo 25-May-89 9-Nov-90 Comprehensive X       
38 BIT Guyana 27-Oct-89 11-Apr-90 Comprehensive X       
39 BIT Czech Rep. 10-Jul-90 26-Oct-92 Partial   X  X  X 
40 BIT Slovakia 10-Jul-90 26-Oct-92 Partial   X  X  X 
41 BIT Burundi 13-Sep-90 13-Sep-90 Comprehensive X       
42 BIT Morocco52 30-Oct-90 14-Feb-02 Comprehensive X       
43 BIT Argentina 11-Dec-90 19-Feb-93 Comprehensive X  X     
44 BIT Nigeria 11-Dec-90 11-Dec-90 Comprehensive X       
45 BIT Turkey 15-Mar-91 22-Oct-96 Comprehensive X       
46 BIT Mongolia 4-Oct-91 4-Oct-91 Comprehensive   X     
47 BIT Uruguay53 21-Oct-91 1-Aug-97 Comprehensive   X     
48 BIT Bahrain 30-Oct-91 30-Oct-91 Comprehensive   X     
49 BIT UAE 8-Dec-92 15-Dec-93 Comprehensive X       
50 BIT Ukraine 10-Feb-93 10-Feb-93 Comprehensive   X     
51 BIT Nepal 2-Mar-93 2-Mar-93 Comprehensive X       
52 BIT Barbados 7-Apr-93 7-Apr-93 Comprehensive X       
53 BIT Lithuania 17-May-93 21-Sep-93 Comprehensive   X     
54 BIT Armenia 27-May-93 11-Jul-96 Comprehensive X       
                                                 
52 The UK-Morocco BIT entered into force provisionally upon signature.  In the statistical analyses above I have used the date of actual entry into force. 
53 The pre-consent in the Uruguayan BIT is limited to arbitral review of domestic court judgments for “manifest injustice” or for “violation” of the BIT.  It 
remains unclear how meaningful this jurisdictional limitation will prove in practice, though it is arguable that it renders the Uruguayan BIT’s pre-consent less than 
“comprehensive”. 
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55 BIT Trinidad-Tobago 23-Jul-93 8-Oct-93 Comprehensive   X     
56 BIT Peru 4-Oct-93 21-Apr-94 Comprehensive X       
57 BIT Uzbekistan 24-Nov-93 24-Nov-93 Comprehensive   X     
58 BIT Honduras 7-Dec-93 8-Mar-95 Comprehensive   X     
59 BIT Tanzania 7-Jan-94 2-Aug-96 Comprehensive X       
60 BIT Latvia 24-Jan-94 16-Feb-95 Comprehensive X       
61 BIT Belarus 1-Mar-94 28-Dec-94 Comprehensive X       
62 BIT India 14-Mar-94 6-Jan-95 Comprehensive X  X     
63 BIT Albania 30-Mar-94 30-Aug-95 Comprehensive X       
64 BIT Ecuador 10-May-94 24-Aug-95 Comprehensive X       
65 BIT Estonia 12-May-94 16-Dec-94 Comprehensive X       
66 BIT South Africa 20-Sep-94 27-May-98 Comprehensive   X     
67 BIT Pakistan 30-Nov-94 30-Nov-94 Comprehensive   X     
68 BIT Kyrgyzstan 8-Dec-94 18-Jun-98 Comprehensive   X     
69 BIT Cuba 30-Jan-95 11-May-95 Comprehensive   X X    
70 BIT Turkmenistan 9-Feb-95 9-Feb-95 Comprehensive   X     
71 BIT Georgia 15-Feb-95 15-Feb-95 Comprehensive X       
72 BIT Venezuela 15-Mar-95 1-Aug-96 Comprehensive X       
73 BIT Swaziland 5-May-95 5-May-95 Comprehensive   X     
74 BIT Laos 1-Jun-95 1-Jun-95 Comprehensive   X     
75 BIT Côte d’Ivoire 8-Jun-95 9-Oct-97 Comprehensive X       
76 BIT Romania 13-Jul-95 10-Jan-96 Comprehensive X  X   X  
77 BIT Kazakhstan 23-Nov-95 23-Nov-95 Comprehensive   X     
78 BIT Oman 25-Nov-95 21-May-96 Comprehensive   X     
79 BIT Bulgaria 11-Dec-95 24-Jun-97 Partial   X     
80 BIT Azerbaijan 4-Jan-96 11-Dec-96 Comprehensive X       
81 BIT Chile 8-Jan-96 21-Apr-97 Comprehensive X       
82 BIT Moldova 19-Mar-96 30-Jul-98 Comprehensive X       
83 BIT Slovenia 3-Jul-96 27-Mar-99 Comprehensive   X     
84 BIT Nicaragua 4-Dec-96 21-Dec-01 Comprehensive X       
85 BIT Croatia 11-Mar-97 16-Apr-98 Comprehensive   X     
86 BIT Tonga 22-Oct-97 22-Oct-97 Comprehensive   X     
87 BIT Uganda 24-Apr-98 24-Apr-98 Comprehensive X       
88 BIT Lebanon 16-Feb-99 16-Sep-01 Comprehensive   X     
89 BIT Kenya 13-Sep-99 13-Sep-99 Comprehensive X       
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90 BIT El Salvador 14-Oct-99 1-Dec-00 Comprehensive X       
91 BIT Sierra Leone 13-Jan-00 20-Nov-01 Comprehensive X       
92 BIT Vietnam 1-Aug-02 1-Aug-02 Comprehensive   X     
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United States BITs in Force, Through 200254 
 
No. Type Host Signed In Force Pre-Consent Designated Arbitral Fora 
      ICSID Ad Hoc UNCITRAL ICC SCC AF Other
1 FCN Ireland 21-Jan-50 14-Sep-50 None        
2 FCN Greece 3-Aug-51 13-Oct-54 None        
3 FCN Israel 23-Aug-51 3-Apr-54 None        
4 FCN Ethiopia 7-Sep-51 8-Oct-53 None        
5 FCN Iran55 15-Aug-55 16-Jun-57 None        
6 FCN Nicaragua56 21-Jan-56 24-May-58 None        
7 FCN South Korea 28-Nov-56 7-Nov-57 None        
8 FCN Oman 20-Dec-58 11-Jun-60 None        
9 FCN Pakistan 12-Nov-59 12-Feb-61 None        
10 FCN Belgium 21-Feb-61 3-Oct-63 None        
11 FCN Vietnam57 3-Apr-61 30-Nov-61 None        
12 FCN Togo 8-Feb-66 5-Feb-67 None        
13 FCN Thailand 29-May-66 8-Jun-68 None        
14 BIT Panama 27-Oct-82 30-May-91 Comprehensive      X  
15 BIT Senegal 6-Dec-83 25-Oct-90 Comprehensive X     X  
16 BIT Zaire 3-Aug-84 28-Jul-89 Comprehensive X     X  
17 BIT Morocco 22-Jul-85 29-May-91 Comprehensive X       
18 BIT Turkey 3-Dec-85 18-May-90 Comprehensive X       
19 BIT Cameroon 26-Feb-86 6-Apr-89 Comprehensive X       
20 BIT Egypt58 11-Mar-86 27-Jun-92 Comprehensive X       
21 BIT Bangladesh 12-Mar-86 25-Jul-89 Comprehensive X       
                                                 
54 The United States table does not include a number of BIT-like FCN treaties between the United States and other “capital-exporting countries” as defined in the 
study above.  These excluded treaties include the following (with year of signature in [brackets]): Italy [1948]; Denmark [1951]; Japan [1953]; Germany [1954]; 
Netherlands [1956]; France [1959] Belgium-Luxembourg [1961/1962]. 
55 The Iranian FCN surprisingly appears to remain in force. 
56 The United States Government denounced the Nicaragua FCN in 1985.  See Paul Peters & Nico Schrijver, Latin America and International Regulation of Foreign 
Investment: Changing Perspectives, 34 NETHERLANDS INT’L L. REV. 355 (1992). 
57 The Vietnam FCN was concluded with South Vietnam; the United States Department of State says that the FCN’s current status—e.g. whether it applies to the 
modern Democratic Republic of Vietnam—is “under review”. 
58 Egypt originally signed a BIT with the United States on 29-sep-1982.  This BIT never entered into force, but formed the core of the new US-Egypt BIT signed 
in 1986. 
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22 BIT Grenada 2-May-86 3-Mar-89 Comprehensive X X      
23 BIT Congo 12-Feb-90 13-Aug-94 Comprehensive X X      
24 BIT Poland 21-Mar-90 6-Aug-94 Comprehensive X  X   X  
25 BIT Tunisia 15-May-90 7-Feb-93 Comprehensive X       
26 BIT Sri Lanka 20-Sep-91 1-May-93 Comprehensive X X      
27 BIT Czech Rep. 22-Oct-91 19-Dec-92 Comprehensive X  X   X  
28 BIT Slovakia 22-Oct-91 19-Dec-92 Comprehensive X  X   X  
29 BIT Argentina 31-Mar-92 27-Jan-94 Comprehensive X  X   X  
30 BIT Kazakhstan 19-May-92 12-Jan-94 Comprehensive X  X   X  
31 BIT Romania 28-May-92 15-Jan-94 Comprehensive X  X   X  
32 BIT Armenia 23-Sep-92 29-Mar-96 Comprehensive X  X   X  
33 BIT Bulgaria 23-Sep-92 2-Jun-94 Comprehensive X  X   X  
34 FTA Mexico 17-Dec-92 1-Jan-94 Comprehensive X  X   X  
35 BIT Kyrgyzstan 19-Jan-93 12-Jan-94 Comprehensive X  X   X  
36 BIT Moldova 21-Apr-93 25-Nov-94 Comprehensive X  X   X  
37 BIT Ecuador 27-Aug-93 11-May-97 Comprehensive X  X   X  
38 BIT Jamaica 4-Feb-94 7-Mar-97 Comprehensive X  X     
39 BIT Ukraine 4-Mar-94 16-Nov-96 Comprehensive X  X   X  
40 BIT Georgia 7-Mar-94 10-Aug-97 Comprehensive X  X   X  
41 BIT Estonia 19-Apr-94 16-Feb-97 Comprehensive X  X   X  
42 BIT Trinidad-Tob. 26-Sep-94 26-Dec-96 Comprehensive X  X   X  
43 BIT Mongolia 6-Oct-94 4-Jan-97 Comprehensive X  X   X  
44 BIT Albania 11-Jan-95 4-Jan-98 Comprehensive X  X   X  
45 BIT Latvia 13-Jan-95 26-Dec-96 Comprehensive X  X   X  
46 BIT Honduras 1-Jul-95 11-Jul-01 Comprehensive X  X   X  
47 BIT Croatia 13-Jul-96 20-Jun-01 Comprehensive X  X   X  
48 BIT Azerbaijan 1-Aug-97 2-Aug-01 Comprehensive X  X   X  
49 BIT Bolivia 17-Apr-98 6-Jun-01 Comprehensive X  X   X  
50 BIT Bahrain 29-Sep-99 30-May-01 Comprehensive X  X   X  
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